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High performance organizations desire to provide services in an effective and efficient 
manner with positive outcomes; therefore measures of performance and cost can be 
utilized to gauge such success. Through comparative research and analysis of local 
governments that have and do not have collective bargaining for law enforcement, 
findings and results can determine if there is any correlation between employee 
workforce classification (in collective or non-collective bargaining workplaces), high 
performance traits, costs and high performance return on costs (HPRC) for law 
enforcement. A HPRC composite measure was developed and utilized to compare and 
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contrast all of the local governments to determine relationships between performance 
and costs. Based upon the research, the following findings were discovered for the null 
hypothesis which compared two forms of collective bargaining - arbitration and 
mediation - separately to non-collective bargaining localities: 1) Correlation between 
workforce classification and high performance attributes – mediation (negative – 
perform at a lower performance level); 2) Correlation between workforce classification 
and law enforcement costs - arbitration (negative – costs are at a lower level); and 3) 
No correlation between workforce classification and HPRC. In the preceding three 
areas, only the model on high performance attributes had a high r square and low 
variance with adjusted r square; both indicators of a parsimonious model. While 
correlations arose, further research in this area is warranted in developing a more 
enhanced and publicly accepted comparable metric of performance, costs and HPRC 
for law enforcement. In addition, certain control variables illustrated a correlation with 
the dependent variables as follows: 1) Performance - High median household incomes, 
density, age, survey quality of life, and city; 2) Law Enforcement Costs per Capita - 
Non-right-to-work state and county; and 3) HPRC - Median household income and 
county. A rational choice theory was utilized as the lens of framework in assessing an 
employee’s motivational behavior in a collective and non-collective bargaining work 
environment that could contribute to differentials in performance. 
Keywords: collective bargaining, high performance organization, law enforcement, 
police, union, rational choice theory, local government, return on investment, city, 
county, town, crime rate, survey, accreditation, mediation, arbitration, expenditures, 
budget 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Problem Statement 
As local governments continue to seek pathways towards high performance, 
variances amongst them can be analyzed to determine which traits may yield a more 
favorable and higher performing organization. The inherent pursuit of any business or 
public sector organization towards a high performance organization (HPO) should be a 
fundamental and common goal shared by all; employer, employee and customer. 
Therefore, the understanding of the key variables and the degree of differentiation that 
exists between HPOs and those with lower performance outputs and outcomes can 
enable focused strategies on how to maximize the more results-based variables for 
HPO success. 
There are many services provided by local government; each of which may be 
governed by national, state and local regulations and standards. Law enforcement 
services are one of the more common services provided amongst local governments. 
Because of its broad scope and the vested interest of citizens, businesses and 
politicians in ensuring that such service is performed well in providing for a safe and 
secure community, this service has been researched in many facets. The scope of law 
enforcement is the individuals and organizations responsible for enforcing laws and 
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maintaining public order and public safety through the prevention, detection, and 
investigation of crime and the apprehension and detention of individuals suspected of 
law violation (Bureau of Justice, 2012).  
One variance between organizations is the ability of employees to access and 
use collective bargaining in negotiated contracts for salaries, benefits and workplace 
conditions. These employees are generally represented by an empowered union to act 
on behalf of the employees. The International Labour Organization defines collective 
bargaining as a process whereby trade unions, representing workers, and employers, 
through their representatives, reach a collective agreement with provisions reflecting 
terms and conditions of employment of the workers, and conferring to them their rights, 
privileges and responsibilities (International Labour Organization, 2012). Because of the 
inherent emotion of assigning or not assigning rights to workers in defining their 
relationship with management, advocacies for and against collective bargaining may 
arise. These similar advocacies may also be segmented into whether or not such rights 
should be assigned to just private sector workers in their competition with one another 
of private goods and services or also to include public sector workers with their more 
natural monopolistic public services. An example of these emotional debates was noted 
in 2011 newspaper story about Nevada public sector unions that summarized the 
debates conclusion with “in the end, only acrimony prevailed” (Doughman, 2011, p. 1). 
Local governments are governed through their respective state laws to either 
avail or not avail collective bargaining rights to certain classes of workers amongst its 
local government workforce; including law enforcement employees (Salerno, 1981). For 
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those local government law enforcement workers with collective bargaining rights, there 
may be variation in the scope and leverage through which the employees or their union 
representatives can negotiate favorable outcomes from the employee’s perspective. 
Nevertheless the rights afforded to these workers, regardless of their ability to maximize 
such rights, are still greater rights and influences than those employees without such 
rights. 
As there are many variables that can exist between local governments, the focus 
herein is on the correlation, if any, between collective bargaining and the HPO for a 
specific local government service – law enforcement. In formulating the problem 
statement, there appears to be prior, but separate, research on HPOs, law enforcement 
organizations, cost of services and collective bargaining. There appears to be little 
research conducted on linking these four variables together. In focusing on the 
independent variable of collective bargaining amongst law enforcement operations 
across the United States, dependent variable correlations can possibly be derived in 
HPO relationships.  
Because of dependent variable variances that may exist in a local government’s 
investment in law enforcement or the control variable of demographic (including socio-
economic) factors of the locality, the ability to equalize for service costs and 
demographics can possibly better focus the results on more comparative collective 
bargaining and HPO traits. This would better attempt to remove non-comparable HPO 
result outcomes that may be influenced by higher (or lower) investment in a service or 
favorable (or unfavorable) demographic traits rather than on determining the ability of 
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the employee’s performance or aggregate law enforcement organization workforce’s 
performance.  
As the problem statement is the first step in the research process, it is also 
critical that the problem to be investigated is defined appropriately and accurately. In 
attempting to formulate a problem statement for this research, efforts were made to 
initially review and assess the environment for a topic that is suitable, yet unique, for 
research. In addition, the ability to derive a hypothesis from the problem statement, 
utilize a theoretical framework to help give perspective and basis for analysis, and 
develop analytical methods were also considered. Based upon these factors, the 
following problem statement has been formulated:  
 Local government law enforcement collective bargaining practices 
appear to create advocacy groups in support and against such 
practices; however, these emotional debates seem to focus on just 
salary and benefit costs and not on any high performance law 
enforcement organization factors; especially when total law 
enforcement costs and demographic factors are considered in 
determining high performance return on costs. 
 
Importance of this Issue and Purpose of this Study 
 The importance of this issue and purpose of this study will be addressed through: 
research question; general problem to be addressed; major dimensions or variables of 
the problem; specific aspect of the problem being addressed; and answering the 
question “why is this a problem in public policy and administration?." 
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Research Question 
As the problem statement illustrates the basis for which further research should 
be conducted on this topic, the next step to help best frame the research to be 
conducted is formulating a research question. Understanding what, if any, relationship 
exists between collective bargaining and HPO can help address the problem. The 
research can be designed to remove the emotional and advocacy-related elements that 
are often associated with collective bargaining with emphasis on theoretical inspired 
data analysis. In order to not be too broad, the focused local government service 
subject to this question is law enforcement. Accounting for the costs amongst the 
various local government law enforcement organizations is important to the research 
question’s focus on the relationship between collective bargaining and HPO. Based 
upon these research goals, the following research question is formulated:    
 Is there a relationship between a local government law enforcement 
collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining workforce and a high 
performance law enforcement organization when cost and demographic 
factors are considered in determining high performance return on 
costs?  
 
 
General Problem Being Addressed 
There is a long history of employee versus employer in the working environment 
(Salerno, 1981). This history has segments of certain industries focused upon more and 
advocated on behalf of or against more than others. This history is also highlighted by 
advocacy groups with scenes of oppressed workers in unsafe working environments 
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making little wages being reduced to indentured servants with little ability for the worker 
or their succeeding generations from ever emerging to higher prosperity. Opposing 
advocacy groups have shown the ramifications of union strikes that hinder goods and 
services to be provided to customers and workers who leverage employers with threat 
of strikes in return for guarantees of above market compensated and benefited jobs; 
regardless of whether the employer is making a profit or loss. In addition, this history 
and related advocacies can also be segmented between public and private sector 
workers. To further illustrate variances between initially like-minded advocacy groups, 
some of these advocacies groups are in favor of private collective bargaining subject to 
market competitiveness for eventual success, but do not advocate on behalf of public 
sector collective bargaining with far less market driven factors. As an example and 
discussed further in Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature is the private sector union of 
American Federation of Labor’s (AFL) reaction to the 1919 Boston Police social club 
strikes which were not supported by the AFL in the chaos that ensued after the strikes. 
The right of employees for collective bargaining (and through empowered unions) 
is one variance that exists amongst local governments. Collective bargaining’s history is 
rooted in enabling defined and protected rights of salaries and benefits to certain 
workers. In addition, it is through collective bargaining that workplace environment 
conditions can be defined and provide pathways for any employee grievances to be 
resolved. Workforce and workplace advocacy organizations often lobby on behalf of 
collective bargaining whereas opposing viewpoints often arise from employer 
perspectives. 
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The importance of this issue is justified from the perspective that public sector 
collective bargaining is a topic that continues to be raised as to what the return on 
taxpayer investment (performance) accrues for the benefits bestowed on protected 
employees. As local governments are becoming further scrutinized by taxpayers to 
have an appropriate array of high performing services in both effective and efficient 
manners, collective bargaining can be isolated as an independent variable to determine 
if it has any impacts or effect upon high performing results. In addition, while 
effectiveness measures (output, outcome) of performance are one attribute of 
correlation to performance, the comparison and contrast to the relative cost (efficiency 
measures) is another key attribute of performance. Together these effectiveness and 
efficiency measures need to both excel for a HPO. 
If there is a way in which law enforcement employees are best motivated to 
perform quality services at the lowest cost needed to meet quality objectives, then 
continued efforts would need to focus on whether collective bargaining is a trait that 
helps local governments attain and then maintain HPO status. Conversely, if it appears 
that collective bargaining constrains a local government’s ability in becoming a HPO or 
challenges its sustainability as a HPO, then further analysis may warrant actions to 
reduce collective bargaining opportunities. It is this proper manner of organizational 
design which contributes to HPO as this design is a “series of activities aimed at 
aligning all the elements” which can result in a HPO (Stanford, 2007, p. 19).  
However, it is prudent that the scope of this research be further qualified from the 
employer and customer’s perspective as employee perspectives are not fully 
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represented. The research question scope does not address what merits exist or don’t 
exist from an employee’s perspective (e.g., salary, benefits, qualitative factors) via 
employee survey in assessing whether the law enforcement employee is getting their 
rightful or fair wage, benefit and recognition. This also does not address how the 
employee feels about their job or co-workers in what may contribute to them in 
performing at a higher (or lower) level. Nor are the employer’s or customer’s viewpoints 
gauged via survey on their beliefs and perceptions of the merits of collective bargaining 
beyond the statistical data subjected to the analysis. If there exists employee and 
customer consensus for wages and benefits via collective bargaining, then collective 
bargaining may be a higher priority goal; regardless of its impacts on HPO goals. 
 
Major Dimensions or Variables of the Problem 
 The dimensions and variables of this problem have been narrowed with the focus 
limited to local government law enforcement services. If this research was on all of local 
government services, then the variables between the arrays of local government 
services would have made this research topic too broad. The initial independent 
variable of whether a local government law enforcement organization has collective 
bargaining abilities is relatively easily determined. However, there are two primary 
manners in which collective bargaining practices are leveraged within certain states for 
resolution when impasse in negotiations exists: 1) Mediation; or 2) Mandatory 
arbitration. These traits are further detailed in Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature. 
The determination of HPO traits of a local government law enforcement 
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organization is a major dimension that was further refined to determine the best 
representative traits that are most aligned with the ability of the law enforcement 
employee’s performance and related outcome of such performance. Factors that 
influence outcomes of law enforcement services that are not as highly correlated to an 
employee’s performance need to be carefully reviewed and identified via control 
variables, if possible, as part of any data analysis. However, non-employee control 
variables (e.g., locality’s demographic and socio-economic factors) can be helpful in 
capturing similarly positioned law enforcement organizations for comparative purposes.     
 This research is just limited to analysis of data as it pertains to demographics, 
performance and cost. Other factors, some of them grounded with the impetus that 
created collective bargaining, were not subject to this analysis. This included workplace 
environment (workplace safety) and determination of a fair compensation and benefits 
package to better ensure that the employee is not oppressed or otherwise treated 
unfairly. However, further research would need to also measure, most likely through 
employee surveys, the employee satisfaction with employer and related employee’s 
quality of life and workplace attributes. If such surveys resulted in no discernible 
difference between collective bargaining employees and non-collective bargaining 
employees, then the analytical results of this research of performance and costs would 
be further validated.  
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Specific Aspect of the Problem Being Addressed 
The specific aspect of the problem being addressed is the influence of collective 
bargaining on performance. For most organizations, including local government law 
enforcement, the highest cost is labor (Putchinisky, 2007). Therefore, the performance 
attributes of the labor force translate into the foundation from which HPOs can best 
succeed. The present study is not focused upon unions as a whole and their relevance 
or merit in the 21st century, but rather specifically focusing on local government law 
enforcement services. It is through this focus that comparable and contrasting 
information will be accumulated. Upon completion of data analysis, the research 
attempts to determine what differentiations foster a HPO workplace that is better 
positioned to achieve their outcomes – with or without collective bargaining; or no 
absolute differentiation based upon the collective bargaining independent variable. 
 
Why is this a Problem in Public Policy and Administration? 
 The public policy and administration field and research attempt to understand the 
manner in which the public sector can best perform in meeting citizen needs and issues, 
while being a proper steward of leveraging finite resources for the greatest outcome and 
HPO goals. Large components of such resources are workforce costs. Therefore, it is 
through further discussion, research and knowledge that policies and strategies can be 
developed about how the workforce can best be recruited, retained and rewarded with 
such workforce costs leveraged best to perform in a manner that enables the public 
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sector unit to achieve its goals towards HPO.  
The importance of this issue from a citizen’s perspective is that the more safe 
and secure their community is, the higher their quality of life in relation to a variety of 
factors (CNBC, 2012). For example, higher crime areas may adversely affect property 
values as evidenced by a decrease in home property values of 10% for areas with a 
higher crime rate of one standard deviation (Gibbons, 2004). This is where HPOs in the 
public sector distinguish themselves from the private sector. For the private sector, the 
HPO may garner a more secure customer base and yield greater profits; however, for 
the public sector entity, the HPO factors translate into positive quality of life attributes for 
citizens and productive environment for businesses; all with a reasonable tax burden 
that maximizes the potential of return on investment of such tax burden. 
 
Justification of the Importance of the Issue 
Generally-Accepted Knowledge about the Problem  
As with much research, there are some things known about this problem and 
other things that are not known. It would be suffice to say that if everything were known 
about this problem and what is the definitive best HPO manner to provide for a safe and 
secure community, and if collective bargaining was a determining factor in achieving 
this or not achieving this goal, then there would be a definitive migration towards a 
collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining type of organizational environmental 
structure with HPO results evident. 
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This research will attempt to address the bigger issue that has been arising in 
many parts of the country over recent years – determining if there is a benefit to the 
public sector workplace with unionized workers compared to non-unionized workers. It 
has inherently become part of the American culture to form strong opinions on what the 
costs and benefits are in relation to unionized and non-unionized workplaces. There can 
even be escalated opinions on this topic for certain public sector workers as evidenced 
in a recent Nevada meeting where proposed state bills were labeled as “insulting” and 
state representatives wanted apologies for “derogatory comments” (Doughman, 2011, 
p. 1). Everyone can generally agree that the necessity for unions arose from 
substandard work environments (e.g., poor safety practices), suppressed market wages 
and little or no benefits (e.g., retirement, health insurance, grievance process). The 
formation of unions enabled workers’ rights to be negotiated through collective 
bargaining and empowered unions to further protect workers via legislative changes at 
federal, state and local levels for initially private sector workers, then public sector 
workers. Eventually many federal and state laws were passed to protect all workers 
(e.g., workplace safety). 
Private sector employees and their unions in the United States were formally 
recognized and empowered with the passage of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act 
(also known as the Wagner Act ; after New York Senator Robert Wagner) and the 
implementation and oversight provided by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB); 
an independent federal agency (LaborUnionReport.com, 2012). The following NLRB 
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policy excerpt from the Code of Federal Regulations (1935) is an example of the pro-
employee position of the NLRB in 1935:  
“It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of 
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and 
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the 
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms 
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection” 
The impetus for the 1935 Wagner Act was focused on the private sector as 
public sector applicability was not envisioned (Code of Federal Regulations, 1935). 
President Franklin Roosevelt, a private-sector union advocate, cautioned that collective 
bargaining was not meant to be transplanted to the public sector (DiSalvo, 2010). As the 
unions became more empowered and utilized strikes in many facets to shut down 
production, the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) union’s sit-down strike of 
General Motors and Republican Steel in 1937 motivated Congress in 1938 to pass the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). A key provision related to workers was the 
“elimination of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum 
standards of living necessary for health, efficiency and well-being of workers” (US 
History, 2012, p. 1).  
As the Wagner Act and FLSA provided empowerment to the unions and many 
protections to the employees (including general protections for all workers), employers 
successfully lobbied Congress to enhance employer empowerment for a better balance 
between employee and employer. In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act’s employer protections 
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included employees needing to vote on establishing a union which replaced prior 
practices of a “closed shop” – unions established without employee votes, unions 
making political contributions and little employer protections and due process prior to 
the initiation of a union strike (Taft-Hartley Act, 1947). In addition, the Taft-Hartley Act 
enabled states to enact “right-to-work” laws that protected employees who did not join a 
union from being terminated. The Taft-Hartley Act was silent as to the rights of public 
sector workers.  
It was not until 1958, when New York City Mayor Robert Wagner, son of the 
United States Senator Robert Wagner who sponsored the 1935 National Labor 
Relations Act, issued an executive order enabling certain local public workers the ability 
to unionize. Soon thereafter, many other states, starting with Wisconsin in 1959 
(LaborUnionReport.com, 2012), and local governments provided such access for 
defined segments of their workforce. In 1962, President John Kennedy enabled certain 
federal workers the right to unionize for the first time through Executive Order 10988 
(American Presidency Project, 2012). This executive order was reinforced by Title VII of 
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Dilts and Walsh, 1988). 
The correlation of public sector unions and performance were initially referenced 
in President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10988 resolution. HPO attribute references 
included: 1) “Participation of employees in the formulation and implementation of 
personnel policies affecting them contributes to effective conduct of public business”; 
and 2) “Efficient administration of the government and the well-being of employees 
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require that orderly and constructive relationships be maintained between employee 
organizations and management officials” (American Presidency Project, 2012, p.1).  
Although some states preceded the federal government in enabling collective 
bargaining for local government employees, the federal government’s action in 1962 
was an impetus for many states to further enable and define state and local government 
collective bargaining. However, variances exist amongst the states as each state has 
developed its own laws at different times and under different political circumstances 
which results in a variety of “scope, coverage and impasse procedures” (Dilts and 
Walsh, 1988, p. 176). 
In more recent times, local government public sector unions have received much 
attention as certain states debate changes to their collective bargaining laws. This 
attention is fueled by recessionary conditions; declining investment return rate impacts 
upon public sector defined benefit pension plans that create material unfunded pension 
liabilities; and collective bargaining agreements that stipulate defined salary increases 
and employer payments towards health insurance during employees’ tenure and 
retirement. All of these factors constrained local government budgets and resulted in 
some combination of tax rate increases or service reductions; both of which are 
generally opposed by the citizens. 
In 2011, Wisconsin received much attention as Governor Scott Walker proposed 
major revisions to Wisconsin state law in restricting collective bargaining rights of public 
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sector workers located in Wisconsin. As an example of the ensuing rhetoric that 
followed, the following quote is from a local Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania newspaper’s 
perspective: “The fight in Wisconsin has focused the nation's attention on collective 
bargaining and its role in a democratic society. Other states facing fiscal crises are 
watching the battle there. Unfortunately, because of the highly partisan nature of the 
fight in Wisconsin, the debate has shed more heat than light” (Clark, 2011, p. 1). 
Because of similar political structures in Indiana’s General Assembly and 
governor’s office, Indiana is also actively debating this issue. Ironically, Indiana enacted 
a right-to-work law in 1957, but repealed it in 1965. Other states with similar political 
potential to debate this issue further include Michigan, Pennsylvania, Maine, Florida, 
Tennessee, Nebraska, Kansas, Idaho, North Dakota and South Dakota (Barro, 2011). 
 
Problem’s Treatment in Professional Reports and Writings 
The issue of collective bargaining has been researched often amongst many 
employee classes in both public and private sector. As advocacies on either side of this 
issue are passionate, it is important to ensure that professional research is not 
influenced by these advocacies. Any references from advocacy-based groups should be 
prefaced accordingly, with information used in illustrating a point or providing further 
enlightenment on a topic further vetted for accuracy. The following studies highlighted in 
the remainder of this section reflect samples of the professional research conducted in 
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this area. A more representative and complete research compilation is included in 
Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature. 
It appears that the most researched public sector profession with collective 
bargaining inferences is school teachers. From research of Richard Freeman and 
Casey Ichinowski (1988, p. 305), state comparisons with greater and lesser unionization 
were performed with the result that “collective bargaining coverage is associated with 
higher salaries for public school teachers and generally, though not uniformly, higher 
educational performance as measured by student test scores and high graduation 
rates.” In addition, “fixed-effects analysis of the effects of unionism on teacher wages 
and student performance yield greatly reduced estimated effects of unionism on wages, 
but continue to show substantial teacher union impacts on student performance” 
(Freeman and  Ichinowski, 1988, p. 306). Eberts and Stone (1986) used test scores on 
14,000 fourth graders in selected school districts to evaluate the impact of unionization 
on performance and find that when other socio-economic factors are controlled for, 
scores are 7% higher in union districts. 
There is also a great deal of professional reports on collective bargaining and the 
private sector. As an example, in a study that reviewed collective bargaining of private 
sector call centers, workplace-level collective bargaining arrangements were associated 
with significantly higher measures of job quality (Doellgast, Holtgrewe and Deery, 2009). 
There also is research that compares the influence of collective bargaining between 
adjoining geographic areas. As an example, Thomas Holmes (1998) compared counties 
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close to the border between states with and without right-to-work laws (thereby holding 
constant an array of factors related to geography and climate). Results indicated that 
the cumulative growth of employment in manufacturing in the right-to-work states was 
26% greater than that in the non-right-to-work states (Holmes, 1998). 
There have also been many HPO-related research studies in this field. As an 
example of law enforcement research, Hua Xu’s (2008) study of organizational 
performance (as measured through crime clearance rates) and variables (e.g., 
spending), the outcomes of human resource strategy and application of technology did 
not have a strong correlation (Xu, 2008). However, this study also recognized 
challenges in the variability in how information was compiled between comparative 
localities. From Laurence Putchinisky’s (2007) research, “very few studies have 
researched the actual extent of union influence on the budget decision process and 
none of these studies examined to what extent that influence affects local government 
decisions regarding operating expenses” (Putchinisky, 2007, p. 2). 
As these preceding examples and further research studies cited in Chapter 2 – 
Review of the Literature illustrate, there are many different manners in which the 
variables can be defined and target workforces further examined. These collective 
research results will help frame the variables to be subject to the data analysis in 
Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology.  
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Importance of this Research in Relationship to the Problem 
Through this research, a correlation between collective bargaining and local 
government law enforcement’s HPO traits can be determined to exist or not exist. The 
importance in knowing if such a relationship exists can help better address the problem 
statement and reduce the emotional rhetoric that is often associated with this issue. 
Because this problem is focused solely on law enforcement, findings are also focused 
on law enforcement. This focus should contribute to a more accurate portrayal of law 
enforcement, HPO and collective bargaining without being influenced by other facets of 
collective bargaining, other public sector professions, public sector budgets and HPO 
correlations. 
If additional costs can yield higher performance, then it would be appropriate to 
best gauge the high performance return on costs of such additional cost and the 
incremental marginal utility rewards. From an economic perspective, there will be a 
point at which such marginal utility is diminished to the point that such additional cost 
investment does not provide a return on such investment (Hicks, 1935); or in this case a 
higher performance return on costs. From a public sector perspective, this point may be 
debated as there can be subjective determinants as to what is defined as “return” as 
there may exist more qualitative factors in the public sector than private sector. 
However, if agreed-upon objective measures of performance can be assembled 
together with a consistent cost basis by which such services are performed, then 
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correlations of costs to higher performance can possibly be calculated, analyzed and 
further discussed. 
 
Making the Problem More Understandable 
The correlations of cost, performance and collective bargaining can regress into 
hard to understand relations of these variables. As an example, knowing the marginal 
utility point of diminishing returns is complex. An illustrative, yet simplistic example is 
public school education. As further investment in the classroom may result in lower 
student-teacher ratios, there may be improved performance on the part of the student, 
but this improvement, while still an improvement, may diminish in its relevance at some 
point. At its most extreme, a ratio of 1:1 may yield the best performance of the student, 
but is cost prohibitive. Therefore, finding that appropriate threshold is a constant 
challenge as advocacies will always exist in helping a child achieve their full potential 
via low teacher ratios while other advocacies will note that performance can still be 
achieved, at a much lower cost, with higher teacher ratios if high performing teachers 
and school districts existed. A local government can invest in resources to lower the 
student-teacher ratio regardless if it’s a collective bargaining entity or not. However, the 
variable of unions on performance related to schools was studied and the variables 
underlying why there was improved school performance in an union environment 
(Freeman and Ichinowski, 1988).  
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Identification of Theoretical Basis 
Theoretical Framework – Rational Choice Theory (RCT) 
Applying an appropriate theory enables position the research question to better 
be answered. The theoretical basis utilized to best help answer the research question 
for this dissertation was Rational Choice Theory (RCT). Rational Choice Theory is a 
subset of the neo-classical theories (employee marginal utility and employer profit 
maximization) whereby individuals through “explanation and prediction” enable a 
rational choice process to ensue even with the likelihood of “high uncertainty and 
imperfect information” (Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 404). The underlying primary value 
of Rational Choice Theory is its efficiency in rational goal attainment (Harmon and 
Mayer, 1986). As the research question is based upon HPO attributes which are 
dependent upon employee performance, Rational Choice Theory’s approach to 
employee motivation is a critical factor to high performance. 
The degree of organizational reality attempts to gauge the ability of the manager 
to “optimize instead of maximize on the quality of their decision” based upon the 
changing environment around them (Steers, 1984, p71). It is through rational choice 
process of optimization that viable alternatives emerge and that the selected alternative 
is appropriate to meet environmental demands (Steers, 1984). In addition, this theory 
provides a framework to better understand and analyze social and economic behavior 
(Blume and Easley, 2008); which are key attributes in individual and aggregate 
employee performance. Rational Choice Theory uses a specific and narrower definition 
of rationality simply to mean that an individual acts as if balancing costs against benefits 
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to arrive at an action that maximizes personal advantage (Friedman, 1953). Because of 
the relative success of economics at understanding markets, Rational Choice Theory 
has also become increasingly employed in social sciences other than economics (e.g., 
sociology and political science) (Scott, 2011). 
Elements of four other theories helped support the research and the 
operationalization of Rational Choice Theory. It is through the compilation of these other 
theories that better efforts were made in considering the variables subject to the data 
analysis. Chapter 2 - Review of the Literature contains brief summaries of the following 
four theories: 1) Conflict Theory; 2) Self-Determinant Theory; 3) Self-Regulation Theory; 
and 4) Expectancy Theory. 
 
How Theoretical Framework will be Operationalized for Research  
Rational Choice Theory is the primary background context from which variables 
will be selected, compiled and utilized in data analysis. This theoretical framework will 
also be operationalized in this research via descriptions of independent and dependent 
variables; important definitions and assumptions; the type of logic employed; and other 
standards of proof that may be required. The independent variable will be whether or 
not there is collective bargaining for local government law enforcement services further 
segmented into two tiers of collective bargaining. 
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Proposed Methodology 
The proposed methodology, further specified in Chapter 3 - Research Design 
and Methodology, will seek to gather a representative and comparative sample group of 
local governments across the United States. As noted previously, the independent 
variable of collective bargaining will try to segment the sample population into two strata 
initially – those with and without collective bargaining. The sample population is derived 
by using all participants in the National Citizen Survey (NCS). The NCS organization is 
a nationally recognized survey group that performs professionally stratified samples of 
citizens for over 250 local governments. In order to ensure that comparable localities 
can emerge, an assortment of demographic and socio-economic information about each 
of the localities will also be accumulated. Traditional data sources for this information 
will rely on federal databases (e.g., Census) and other data sources illustrating 
commonly-accepted and relevant traits and characteristics of a local government (e.g., 
bond ratings). These data sources, all secondary data sources, upon compilation can 
provide a perspective of the local government and enable similar local governments to 
be grouped together; hopefully with enough representative collective bargaining and 
non-collective bargaining local governments in each strata segment. 
The importance of developing appropriate strata segments is fundamental to 
ensuring empirical research can be conducted. It would not be appropriate to measure 
HPOs that have higher socio-economic or differing demographics that are heavily 
weighted with a “yes” type of independent variable (e.g., collective bargaining) against 
lower socio-economic localities with a “no” type of independent variable (e.g., non-
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collective bargaining). Fiscal information of the locality and its funding investment in law 
enforcement will enable the data analysis to account for the ability of the local 
government’s impact to operations. This will also help illustrate any similarities or 
discrepancies of the influence that collective bargaining has on the operational cost of 
law enforcement.  
In determining HPO traits that may or may not exist for a local government’s law 
enforcement, three primary data sources will be utilized: 1) Citizen surveys; and 2) 
Crime statistics; and 3) National accreditation. Sections of the NCS standardized survey 
have questions about law enforcement services and perceptions about citizen safety 
and quality of life. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a uniform crime report 
process by which all local governments submit information to the FBI. These reports 
capture information on the volume and types of crimes. Finally, there is a national 
accreditation agency for law enforcement called Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). The standards for accreditation emulate many best 
practices for law enforcement and while not an absolute connection to HPO results, the 
intent of a law enforcement office to pursue and receive such accreditation can be 
deemed as a trait of a HPO. 
All of data and strata categories would be entered into statistical software (e.g., 
Statistical Package for Social Services (SPSS)). The traditional statistical results will be 
further compiled and analyzed in Chapter 4 - Findings for any significant variations that 
may emerge. 
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Definition of Terms 
The definition of terms includes the following key words and their acronyms, as 
applicable, that are used throughout this research: 
 Collective Bargaining: Process by which empowered employee unions and 
employer managements negotiate and administer labor agreements. There are 
generally two tiers to resolution of impasse in collective bargaining negotiations 
for law enforcement organizations: 1) Mediation; and 2) Arbitration. 
 High Performance Organization (HPO): Ability of an organization to outperform 
its peers through superior customer service, efficient utilization of resources and 
effective outcomes in meeting defined strategic goals. 
 High Performance Return on Costs (HPRC) Composite Measure: A calculation 
derived from a weighted average of the high performance attributes compared to 
costs for services derived from same concepts that return on investment (ROI) 
ratios are used in private sector analysis. 
 Rational Choice Theory: An individual’s behavior in seeking the most cost 
effective means in attaining a specific goal (“ends”) whereby the “ends” justify the 
“means.” 
 
Significance of the Study 
A significant contribution of this study is that it seeks to not focus on just costs, 
but to put any costs in context with performance for local government law enforcement 
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services. The ability to know whether there is a result or not of collective bargaining as it 
pertains to a law enforcement HPO can help to include that variable in future 
discussions; and if there is no correlation, then it is appropriate to not include that 
variable in future discussions. The introduction of a new composite measure, high 
performance return on costs (HPRC), also adds to the significance of the study as such 
calculation can potentially correlate costs to performance and enable such calculations 
to be uniformly compiled, compared and contrasted. 
As there were two federal legislation proposals in 2007 which would have 
redefined collective bargaining rights and those of law enforcement organizations 
across the United States in further empowering the unions, this research can perhaps 
better determine rationale of performance attribute change that may be associated for 
or against such proposals. These two proposals (Employee Free Choice Act and Public 
Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act) are further addressed in Chapter 2 – 
Review of the Literature. 
 
Limitations 
The limitations of this study are in the ability of collective bargaining being a key 
variable in differentiation amongst local governments and a factor in HPO attributes. As 
there are so many variables that comprise a local government’s law enforcement 
service and its ability to perform, isolating for any one variable is always a challenge. In 
addition, as this research is focused solely on the quantitative aspects of the law 
enforcement organization in performance, there are many qualitative aspects that are 
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also important which are not addressed. As examples, there are many manners in 
which law enforcement can contribute to a community and their citizens’ well-being; and 
the role that being part of a union contributes positively or negatively to an employee’s 
own quality of life and well-being.  
 
Overview of the Remaining Chapters 
The remaining chapters of the dissertation are organized in the following manner: 
Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature: It is through this review of the literature that 
history and background is provided on collective bargaining and its role in the public 
sector; with emphasis on law enforcement. The theoretical frameworks of Rational 
Choice Theory and the other theories utilized are addressed in order to best position the 
analysis of this topic.  
Chapter 3 - Research Design and Methodology: This chapter will formulate the 
hypotheses to be tested and outline in detail the steps and manner in which data will be 
selected and tested. Additional information will address the propriety of the data and the 
analysis that will result to ensure validity and reliability of the data; as well as the 
representativeness of the data to the population of all local law enforcement 
organizations. 
Chapter 4 – Findings: Provides the findings from the data output results from the 
research process as outlined in Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology. The 
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findings will focus on correlations, not causations, between the independent and 
dependent variables.  
Chapter 5 – Summary: Provides the summary amongst the preceding four 
chapters in bringing closure to this research project and positions future research in this 
area to further test and address similar or different variables in furthering the knowledge 
in this key issue. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The literature review is meant to be a “useful but fallible source of ideas about 
what’s going on, and to attempt to see alternative ways of framing the issues” and not 
as an “authority” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 35). In addition, the theoretical framework is further 
illustrated, compared and contrasted to better help inform the research and its 
application to the problem statement. As first identified in Chapter 1 - Introduction, the 
following is the research question:    
 Is there a relationship between a local government law enforcement 
collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining workforce and a high 
performance law enforcement organization when cost and demographic 
factors are considered in determining higher performance return on 
costs?  
 
Theoretical Framework – Research and Problem Statement Applications 
As part of this theoretical framework, Rational Choice Theory attributes will be 
raised in regards to their application to the problem statement and research question 
with focus on collective bargaining and HPO. As HPOs reliance upon the employee is 
critical, it is important to differentiate between an employee’s motivation and 
performance, as motivation is the “employee’s desire to perform” whereas performance 
is the “extent to which an individual can successfully accomplish a task or achieve a 
goal” (Steers, 1984, p. 179). In regards to the research question, if employees have just 
the desire through motivation to perform better, that is not enough, as the HPO attribute 
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would have them actually perform better. This research further explores the role, if any, 
that collective bargaining may have upon not just the individual’s desire to perform 
better, but if in fact, if they actually perform better because of a collective bargaining 
environment. There is much research that indicates HPO relies upon individuals to be 
working together and that “many of the failures of cooperation in collective action are 
traceable to the isolation of individuals from one another” (Frohock, 1987, p. 74). It is 
not determinable without further research if this isolation attribute exists at a higher or 
lower rate based upon the collective bargaining environment. 
 
Rational Choice Theory - Historical Perspective 
Rational Choice Theory can trace its origins to Aristotle in 350BC and his three 
observations: 1) “The same thing is deliberated and chosen”; 2) “Deliberate not about 
ends, but about means”; and 3) “Wish relates rather to the end, choice to the means” 
(Aristotle, 1980, p. 54). With little transformation to modern-day thought “rationality is 
seen as an instrument for achieving ends which are not themselves determined by 
reason” (Allingham, 1999, p. 1). Whether or not collective bargaining has an influence 
on the “means” by which HPOs can be developed and then maintained is the challenge 
being addressed in this research. The collective bargaining process in itself positions 
the worker and the employer for potentially a different “means” path, but perhaps there 
are more than one “means” path to the “ends” of being HPO.  
Thomas Hobbes in 1651 helped further shape some of the early concepts of 
Rational Choice Theory in observing “all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit 
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of themselves; and those actions are most reasonable, that conduce most to their ends” 
(Hobbes, 1994, p. 4). However, even Hobbes recognized early that human behavior is 
constrained by morality. While there is nothing that is immoral with being part of a union 
or not being a part of a union, this flexibility affords the individual the opportunity to 
better achieve their “ends.” However, because many workplace environments do not 
easily permit for the voluntary inclusion or exclusion of being part of a union, an 
individual may feel the constraint of such involuntary action as an impendent in fully 
attaining their “ends.” However, if the environment of collective bargaining has 
positioned similar workers with similar “ends,” then it may be a more efficient “means” 
process by which one entity (the union) positions the workforce to a common “ends” and 
the employer can therefore negotiate with one representative body rather than the 
challenges of individual processes to best motivate the worker. 
Another manner in which to approach Rational Choice Theory is recognizing how 
human behavior is influenced by passion and choice. The differentiation between 
passion and choice is also a topic that has been discussed for many years. In 1740, 
David Hume tried to explain the differentiation by denoting that reason is a “slave of the 
passions” with passions neither reasonable nor unreasonable, but reason is the agent 
when passions are manifested by “choice into action” (Hume, 1740, p. 415). Therefore, 
whether or not collective bargaining may or may not yield greater “passion,” it will not be 
the passion-fueled practices contributing to a HPO, but rather the employee “choice” 
factors in maximizing utility that yields the more productive worker and highly associated 
trait of HPO. 
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An often referenced story illustrating human behavior, Rational Choice Theory 
and the challenges of individual versus group decisions-making is “the prisoner’s 
dilemma.” This story portrays a common situation that has the individual doing what is 
rational for them, but the result is not rational for the group. In this story framed by 
Itzhak Gilboa (2010), two people commit a crime and are arrested by law enforcement, 
but the law enforcement officers cannot prove the criminals are guilty unless at least 
one of them confesses. The prisoners are placed in separate holding cells as the law 
enforcement officers prepare for integration. Each prisoner reflects on whether they 
should confess or not with the outcomes being one of three situations: 1) If one 
confesses, then that one will be set free (and possibly rewarded) in order to convict the 
other, who doesn’t confess, to a harsher sentence; 2) If both confess, then they will get 
a reduced sentence; or 3) If neither confesses, they will be set free for lack of evidence. 
The rationality of what’s best for the individual should lead them into confessing for the 
possible rewards, rather than be found guilty from their accomplices confession or the 
lessor of the consequences that may result if both confess. Therefore, in this case, 
doing a rational individual choice does not provide the best option that a rational group 
choice would have yielded – both not confessing and being set free. “The outcome, of 
both getting a reduced sentence, is Pareto-dominated by the alternative of both being 
set free” (Gilboa, 2010, p. 92).   
The prisoner’s dilemma is based upon the individual being selfish and ignores 
the impact of positive traits that may produce more rational choices for a group. These 
traits can include loyalty, altruism and other traits that a HPO related organization can 
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instill upon its workforce. These traits start with the professional efforts put forth in 
recruiting the law enforcement officer, training them properly prior to deployment and 
rewarding them for not just individual acts of high performance, but also rewarding the 
team, division or unit that may have also contributed to a successful outcome. This 
sense of organizational or at least team, division or unit loyalty and altruism should 
position the individual to make rational choices for positive group outcomes; which may 
also serve as a byproduct result in positive individual outcomes. 
 
Rational Choice Theory – Maximizing Utility 
It is recognized that an individual’s self-interest goal is to maximize utility; which 
is correlated to the concept of “ends” previously addressed and positions the individual 
to make choices to best serve the individual. “Choosing rationality becomes equivalent 
to maximizing utility” which seeks the “greatest fulfillment of pre-existing passions” 
(Allingham, 1999, p. 1). When referring to the individual, it should be noted that an 
individual’s self-interest may be for their family as well; therefore when referencing 
“individual” or “employee” in this research, it is implied that their motivation may also be 
that of their family. This may lead the individual to make choices that may not expressly 
benefit themselves as an individual, but rather benefit the family if the “ends” and 
“maximized utility” of the family unit is deemed the primary individual motivation. If 
maximizing the utility and its associated outcomes occurs, then it is through rational 
choice; anything less may be considered “reasonable” (Allingham, 1999, p. 2).  
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Rational Choice Theory also “maximizes the satisfaction of preferences” by 
“individual actors” (Hindess, 1988, p. 1). “Narrow rationality” is where individual actions 
are motivated by “self-interest”; however, that does not necessarily translate to the 
actions of a group as acting rationally (Hardin, 1982, p. 9). From this perspective, non-
collective bargaining traits appear to be more self-interest targeted for narrow rationality 
to excel. Perhaps a key connection to narrow rationality’s success in law enforcement is 
whether such employees perform better in a self-interest capacity than in larger groups 
most traditionally associated with law enforcement unions. It is a “mistake to suppose 
that rational individuals sharing an interest in a collective outcome can normally be 
expected to act so as to produce that outcome” (Hindess, 1988, p.12) as “rational self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” (Olson, 
1965, p. 2). The effects of groups and the effects of their negatively portrayed 
“groupthink” outcomes would appear to be a performance issue for collective bargaining 
employees to overcome. However, such potential challenges could be overcome by the 
individual collective bargaining employee when given an environment to perform. They 
are motivated by their self-interests and associate the group-interest process of 
collective bargaining as either a separate exercise apart from performance or rationalize 
their self-interest motivation as part of such exercise.  
Peter Abell (1991) describes the framework for rational choice in trying to explain 
a specified outcome: 1) Actors responsible for generating the outcome to be rationally 
self-interested given their objective resources and preferences; 2) Model the structure of 
actors interdependencies in the sense that the outcome depends jointly on what others 
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do (each actor thinks about what others will do, are likely to do or have done in the 
past); 3) Determine courses of action each actor will rationally pursue; 4) Predict the 
outcome(s); and 5) If this simple model approach fails, then adjust variables that may 
have influenced the outcome (e.g., self-interest higher or lower). As law enforcement is 
a defined and technical profession for which certain individuals have similar traits and 
desires in pursuing a career in law enforcement, there is a possibility that because of 
such similarities that rational choice processes may not yield much variance. In addition, 
the interdependency of a law enforcement officer upon another law enforcement officer 
may result in “life or death” situations which may also create an environment for an 
individual’s self-interest in outcome goals to also be that of the collective group’s 
outcome goal. 
It is through this individual’s awareness of their collective group that contributes 
to their behavior in “responding to the reality of the world around them and making 
decisions – the legal, approved and even encouraged decisions – that maximize their 
quality of life” (Murray, 1984, p. 162). It was this “reality of the world” concept that may 
have first motivated the laborer worker (and subsequently law enforcement officers) to 
pursue decision-making and advocacies to maximize their quality of life. The rise of the 
worker to organize and advocate for benefits is an example of the “development of the 
underclass” which could have been “predicted from the changes that social policy made 
in the rewards and penalties, carrots and sticks, that govern human behavior” in 
becoming “rational responses to changes in the rules of the game of surviving and 
getting ahead” (Murray, 1984, p. 154). It is perhaps from these rational responses that 
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an environment was created for private sector unions to initially materialize from an idea 
to a legal standing via the Wagner Act to having the public sector employee also 
interpret such societal benefits and higher quality of life for themselves in their advocacy 
of creating organized public sector unions. Until the ability to form unions existed, 
individuals may not have had any defined pathway towards coordination. An “absence 
of assurance and coordination among individuals can make second-best choices 
rational to all” because a “joint outcome of such choices is a rationally inferior product 
from the point of view of the participating individuals” (Frohock, 1987, p. 131). 
Archer and Tritter (2002) identified three assumptions in their critique of Rational 
Choice Theory: 1) Rationality; 2) Individualism; and 3) Temporality. For rationality, what 
people care most about involves emotionality and normativity; however these traits and 
the related norms are challenged in being constrained into the Rational Choice Theory 
model of the average person seeking to maximize utility; even if the apparent purpose is 
mysterious (Archer and Tritter, 2002). In this case the “people” are the employees and 
how the effects of collective bargaining influence the employee in their perception and 
feelings of how things should be from a normative state and how congruent those 
perceptions and feelings are with the employer. Even if perceptions are congruent, the 
next question would be if the means to achieve are aligned with HPO traits of law 
enforcement. This is a challenge in many workplaces that may have benefited from 
being associated with other HPOs, but their achievement was not from any employer-
driven process, but simply from the collective individual actions of employee’s emotions 
and normative desires. Conversely, the employer may think they have developed the 
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plan and provided the environment for HPO to succeed, but may fall short in also 
ensuring that employees also aspire to the same “means” path to defined HPO success. 
For individualism, the structure and culture of society influence personal goal-
formulation, which may challenge the individual’s current state of self-interest; not by 
simply changing their self-interest to a more altruistic contributing member of society, 
but rather influence the individual’s environment enough for them to modify their 
previously defined self-interests. An “extended sense of individuals may contribute to a 
solution generalizable to several different types of rational breakdowns between 
individual and collective” (Frohock, 1987, p. 75). The societal influences and the 
situations presented to the individual cannot be simply treated as aggregates, but rather 
influential traits that impact decision-making (Archer and Twitter, 2002). The effect of a 
changing environment is a challenge that any HPO operating in a continuum state of 
high performance overcomes. These environmental changes are often subjective in 
nature and how an employee reacts to these changes is also subjective, but generally 
within their self-interest. This challenge faced by employers is something shared by 
collective and non-collective bargaining employers. In addition, the representative 
unions are also faced with their self-interest as a collective group and also may change 
strategies and goals over time acting in their group’s self-interest while challenged with 
the ability to properly reflect their individual members also being influenced by similar or 
different societal changes.  
In addressing Archer and Tritter’s (2002) third assumption - temporality, the 
individual’s rational choice process is not a consistently structured process that evolves 
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to the same decisions through maximizing utility as an individual’s values, creativity and 
environment changes over time so would the values they assign variables in defining 
utility maximization. It is through these individual experiences that reflection of past 
experiences will occur in the future, learning traits are further developed and their 
inherent creativity make it challenging to predict what will be the preferences in the 
future as current experiences continue to influence the individual (Archer and Tritter, 
2000). This variability and subjective nature in which they arise should focus the 
employer on developing proper educational training to mitigate adverse changes from 
employee’s evolving of different utility maximization variables. Longer tenured 
employees for which past experiences have been positive, may also be able to continue 
on a less volatile utility maximization path or at least on a path congruent with that of the 
HPO or aspiring HPO. The effect of past experiences and environmental changes also 
may either challenge a union or further strengthen it in a manner similar to that of a 
HPO. 
 
Rational Choice Theory – An Individual’s Means to an End 
A fundamental assumption of Rational Choice Theory is the individual’s means to 
the end as the influential manner in which their behavior motivates them to make 
decisions amongst alternatives for which their preferences in selecting the actual 
decision are in their self-interest.  An individual is considered a “simple unit of classical 
rationality” when they rank preferences on “sets of knowledgeable values, settling on 
means to get these preferences” (means produced by rational, constrained by moral, 
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rules) and acting consistently in a “means-ends” system (Frohock, 1987, p. 131). 
However, when the outcomes from these means-ends approach fall short of individual’s 
rational criteria, the dilemma that arises may be from conflicts that also arise between 
an individual’s own social structure, the rules used to combine values and the actions of 
others (McClennen, 1983). These actions of others in the workplace may be co-worker 
to co-worker, subordinate to supervisor or upper management to workforce. For those 
conflicts that arise from hierarchal issues, the greater impetus exists for an environment 
of fellow co-workers advocating for a similar “means-ends” system. The formality of this 
advocacy is a differential between unions and their collective bargaining ability and non-
union workplaces. Regardless of the mechanism to address, the individual will continue 
to seek their “means-end” system; the challenge for the employer is trying to align such 
system towards a HPO environment.  
Rational Choice Theory analysis involves an “explicit methodological 
individualism and a distinctive model of the individual actor” (Hindess, 1988, p. 93). 
However, an alternative to “methodological individualism” may occur as individuals are 
“acting out of social norms rather than individual rationality” (Elster, 1986, p. 23). These 
social norms should not be governing forces, but rather, can be viewed as interfering 
when collective thoughts of individuals have no clear choice. In addition, these social 
norms, even if they are laws, can change and therefore should not be the primary basis 
by which rational choice of individuals is formulated. It would appear that when no clear 
choices are evident, that social norms over the long-term can either be positioned to 
make a clear choice more apparent or make it permissible as a society to have multiple, 
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but finite choices from which to choose. This perhaps sets the possibility that there is 
neither an absolute social norm that may exist for collective bargaining or non-collective 
bargaining as these choices, while clear and distinct, may each have a rational basis 
from an individual’s perspective that is reinforced if that individual is surrounded by 
similar collective thoughts of other individuals. This also appears to not constrain a HPO 
(or existing organization seeking HPO status) in developing multiple, but finite courses 
of action to best position the employee, customer and organization for continuum of 
HPO success. The result for law enforcement officers is that they will be “happier in 
their work and more productive when the decisions they are allowed to make for 
themselves are maximized and the decisions others make for them are minimized” 
(Maddox, 1975, p. 25). 
In attempting to illustrate in another manner the individual’s motivation and 
environment for decision-making in the “means to an ends” system, Hanna Nurmi 
(1998) developed the setting of decision theory as depicted in Figure 2.1: Single 
Decision-Maker. This table illustrates a single decision-maker faced with a choice 
problem in an essentially passive or disinterested environment. Depending upon how 
much they know about the environment, the decision-maker is operating under 
“decision modalities of certainty, risk or uncertainty” (Nurmi, 1998, p. 5). If there is 
certainty, then the decision-maker should know everything about the environment and 
the outcomes (and consequences) of any choice. For these situations, the decision-
maker is actually choosing between consequences and would therefore make a clear 
selection in maximizing their utility towards the “ends” of their goal.  
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If there is risk amongst the choices, then the decision-maker is assessing the 
probabilities, outcomes and consequences based upon such risks. If uncertainty, the 
decision-maker does not know the probability of the outcomes and consequences as 
the relative newness of such situation does not afford the decision-maker any 
knowledge to assess probability. For risk or uncertainty choices, the individual still 
pursues the path towards the “ends,” but because the environment for making such 
decision is not absolute, there may be environmental or other factors that could change 
the individual’s choice and it is the HPO that best educates and positions its employees 
to make choices to further position the HPO for success.  
In any of these three situations (certainty, risk or uncertainty), rationality will seek 
utility maximization based upon behavioral assumptions. These behavior assumptions 
follow preferences in having the decision-maker choose between preferred alternatives 
in their goal to make “optimal choices in specified environments” (Nurmi, 1998, p. 15). A 
high performing law enforcement officer relies upon their environment and its actors in 
assessing, often in split-second decisions, what actions they as an officer will take and 
the related outcomes and consequences of such actions. Because of the numerous 
instances in which law enforcement officers may be in such situations, the rationality of 
utility maximization is possibly more correlated to this profession than other professions. 
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Figure 2.1: Single Decision-Maker 
 
 
A model that represents the various paths to social outcomes in rational choice 
explanation was developed by Debra Friedman and Michael Hechter (1988) and is 
illustrated in Figure 2.2: Various Paths to Social Outcomes. The actors and the 
information available to them (whether intuitive information or information sought by the 
actor) enable them to begin a rational choice process. Variations in outcomes are 
attributed to variations in an individual’s preference, opportunity costs of foregoing the 
next most attractive course of action and institutional constraints (e.g., laws, family, 
religion, employer). While the process presented represents the individual as the actor 
through the social outcome of that individual’s rational choice process, many social 
outcomes are actually a compilation of many separate individual actions aggregated to 
produce the actual social outcome.  For the HPO employer, having an employee 
(“actor”) possess the proper information and creating an environment whereby work 
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productivity is very high on the hierarchy of preferences (for which opportunity costs and 
institutional constraints are best managed), should produce the desired social outcome 
to further contribute towards a HPO. In relation to law enforcement organizations, 
structured training helps positions all the officers to attain information and it is the 
employer’s hope that through such training that productive decisions and utilization of 
their time while assigned will be the result. 
 
Figure 2.2: Various Paths to Social Outcomes 
 
 
Rational Choice Theory – From Individual to Group 
While most discussion has focused upon an individual and their Rational Choice 
Theory process, collective groups can also seek utility maximizing behavior strategies. 
Understanding collective groups can help better frame differences that may or may not 
exist between union and non-union environments as well as differences that may or 
may not exist between HPOs and non-HPOs. Because of this “universal maximizing 
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behavior,” other groups could include “firms, families, social movements, political 
parties, governments, racial and ethnic groups, churches or scientists, as they all are 
assumed to optimize their utility functions” (Zafirovski, 1999, p. 48). However, collective 
groups may not always be the conduit by which an individual perceives to achieve their 
goals as rational choice can also lead an individual to act in a predictable manner under 
a defined set of circumstances, even if that decision is to not join the collective action of 
others. Therefore, there are circumstances in which the individual and not the collective 
group may be positioned to perform better given the defined set of circumstances and 
environment in which to perform. 
As unions are a group, they can be treated as social systems and as relational 
systems consisting of group members; “their relevant interrelations and dependencies, 
as well as some artifacts” (Peter and Schmid, 2007, p. 236). “Social groups are formed 
by agents who have similar goals or interests (concerning some topic) and who are 
mutually believed to be members of the group” with their topic of concern considered to 
be the group’s “ethos” (Peter and Schmid, 2007, p. 236).  For workplaces, employees 
have an “ethos” that can be through informal associations, or for collective bargaining 
workplaces, the “ethos” structure is more formal. It is from this “ethos” that the group 
share “constitutive goals, standards and norms” that are collectively accepted by the 
individual group members that enables “coherence and unity” traits to emerge in the 
group and cooperation is “more likely to emerge” in these “ethos-related topics because 
the agents’ preferences are likely to be positively correlated” (Peter and Schmid, 2007, 
p. 236).  The challenge for the law enforcement organization is to leverage such “ethos” 
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towards a HPO environment and, at a minimum, not position such “ethos” to be adverse 
to the law enforcement organization’s outcome goals.  
For the law enforcement employee, they may be continually challenged in having 
to reinforce the group’s “ethos” with the risk that issues, perhaps many, may arise in 
which their own personal belief system is challenged or compromised by that of the 
group. This challenge is reiterated every time an individual acts in group dynamic for 
“when a group member acts as a group member” they must respect the “ethos of the 
group” and reinforce the commitment collectively agreed-upon (Peter and Schmid, 
2007, p. 236). If the individual believes that they do not possess the ability to influence 
or change group “ethos” to their own personal belief system of utility maximization and 
means-end concepts previously addressed, then stress may be incurred by the 
individual with the byproduct being a lower performing worker and a lesser HPO. 
Therefore, in order for the group ethos to succeed, it can be assumed that an individual 
needs to possibly compromise their own individual self-interest for the betterment of the 
collective group. 
However, “some of the greatest mistakes in human history had to do with 
assumptions that people will be kinder, gentler and more altruistic than they ended up 
being” (Gilboa, 2010, p. 98). In presenting a scenario where the assumption of the 
individual’s self-interest is subordinate to that of the group’s, Gilboa (2010) uses 
communism as a case study. Communism may have sounded better than it actually 
turned out to be, because a flawed assumption was that the people would provide for 
the well-being of others. However, because of selfishness and other variables, secret 
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law enforcement officers and other overzealous governing institutions were often 
created and survival of the individual (or family) and not of the group became a more 
paramount motivator; which in effect negated any of the initial perceived benefits of 
communism. This is not to intend any correlation to collective bargaining or other 
workplace collective group roles to communism, but rather to recognize inherent 
challenges exist when an individual with their self-interest is constrained daily to 
sacrifice their self-interest for that of a larger group. This group in some cases may be 
people who do not share the individual’s value or judgment system, are influenced by 
different environmental factors or who otherwise may not simply work as hard for the 
collective action for which the individual may deem these other individuals a “free-rider” 
at the expense of their own hard working efforts.  
The “free-rider” analogy is similar to national defense – once a country has a 
national defense to properly protect its citizens, both the taxpayer and the non-taxpayer 
receive the same benefit from national defense regardless of who may have invested 
more of their time, money (taxes) or sentiment towards the national defense program. A 
remedy for the “free-rider” problem is “social coercion” (Hindess, 1988, p. 13) whereby 
apparent and visible pressure is applied to individuals, perhaps in a mandatory or 
compulsory fashion, in order for all applicable individuals to “appear” vested in the 
situation. This does not differentiate whether voluntarily or involuntarily vested; hence 
the “appear” emphasis. As it pertains to collective bargaining, social coercion 
techniques leveraged many state laws and its employers to have employees pay 
compulsory dues and upon such mandatory payments, the “employees voted in much 
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more overwhelming margins for union-advocated topics” (Olson, 1982, p. 22). The 
compulsory nature of such union operations may be challenged if it is not in the self-
interest of the employee to be compelled towards anything compulsory; however, if 
such compulsory items serve the individual’s means-end and utility maximization 
desires, then such compulsory items may be tolerated by the employee. 
 Perhaps what provides unions their momentum and continuity of existence is that 
the employees that they represent may generally be the same types of employees for 
whom the needs for the unions were first advocated. The actions of the current day 
employee’s predecessors was for a purposeful change in the manner of how an 
employee should be treated by the employer; with a common-shared goal with the 
employer – to have the employer maintain its operation and thereby its workforce for 
employer profit and employee income. This initial grass-roots action of employees who 
may have felt disenfranchised may be a cornerstone to a “functioning society” as well as 
the “engine of social change could be grounded in the purposive actions of individuals, 
taken in particular institutional and structural settings that shaped the incentives and 
thus the action” (Coleman, 1986, p. 1309). It is groups of people, and perhaps unions 
themselves, that utilized their collective means to define their group’s necessary 
compensation, benefits, grievance and workplace conditions and performed the 
necessary action steps to try and attain such goals. 
The more similar a group’s underlying characteristics and traits are, the better the 
group is able to leverage the proper resources (e.g., time and money) needed to act on 
behalf of the larger group. “Group heterogeneity has a positive effect on the prospects 
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for collective action” as a smaller critical mass can provide “collective goods that can 
benefit others” (Oliver and Marwell, 1988, p. 4). In essence, the number of group 
members willing and able to give at any contribution level is always higher for a larger 
group. “Since collective goods with pure joint benefit of supply have a fixed cost that 
does not vary with the size of the group enjoying the good, the greater expected number 
of large contributors in a larger group means that, in general, fewer people will be 
needed to achieve a given total contribution size than in a small group” (Oliver and 
Marwell, 1988, p. 6). This may be a factor in how over time various unions have joined 
forces (e.g., American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO)) in uniting for a common good as the efficiency of one entity may not only be 
more successful in its advocacies, but that the resources needed to advocate may be 
easier to attain with such a large group. Even though the AFL-CIO is comprised of 56 
underlying national and international unions with little direct influence over the collective 
bargaining processes that these individual unions may go through with their employers, 
it nevertheless serves as a common entity with resources to be shared amongst its 
member organizations in best positioning them to be a successful union (AFL-CIO, 
2008). 
While the preceding highlights the advantages and rewards of social groups 
acting on behalf the individual, there are also many disadvantages and challenges 
experienced. Many social groups are subject to collective sanctions, including both 
collective punishment (e.g., the military practice of punishing all recruits in a barracks for 
the violation of a single recruit) and collective rewards (e.g., bonuses for especially 
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productive work groups). These incentives sometimes “encourage group members to 
monitor and regulate one another’s behavior and, in doing so, create norms and enforce 
their compliance” to such norms (Heckathorn, 1988, p. 535). As the individual’s self-
interest may not be aligned with any third party’s regulations and constraints over them, 
it is important for any employee representative group, union or non-union, and the 
employer to monitor its regulatory and constraining nature in reinforcing desired or 
targeted behavior. Simply changing its culture from removing collective disincentives to 
be replaced with collective incentives may not in itself change the constraining attribute 
of the employee and their self-interest. In reference to law enforcement organizations 
and unions, the nature of a law enforcement officer’s solitude in performing their job 
(e.g., patrolling alone), may often leave the officer without a sense of belonging. The law 
enforcement union can provide a “sense of belonging”; an accomplishment that they 
cannot get from a largely impersonal law enforcement organization (Salerno, 1981, p. 
38). 
However, if designed properly, collective incentives can have exactly the 
“opposite effect as a group threatened by collective punishment could react by not 
complying and attack the agent that issues the threat” (Heckathorn, 1988, p. 536). 
Douglas Heckathorn (1988, p. 378) studied collective reward and punishment incentives 
and determined that they can be highly effective at creating “exogenous compliance 
norms” or may have the “opposite effect and provoke passivity or even revolt.” 
According to the model, the effect of control depends upon both the attributes of the 
agent that controls collective incentives (e.g., agent’s monitoring capabilities, 
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vulnerability to revolt and the strength of the agent’s sanctions) and the attributes of the 
group (e.g., the group’s size, degree of intragroup control, proportion of potential 
violators, costliness of normative control and revolt). It would appear that a HPO 
challenge is to have a collective incentive system designed to create a culture of high 
performance norms without having adverse side-effects (e.g., passivity or revolt) arise. 
This challenge is also one shared by employee unions in representing their members. 
This constraining aspect is further reinforced for unions that require a majority of the 
workers in a “specific bargaining unit to vote for union representation” and the growing, 
and better managed “employer resistance” and labor laws benefiting employers (Verma 
and Kochan, 2004, p. 7). 
 
Other Theories Utilized to Support the Research 
Conflict Theory frames the perspective of the impoverished worker through 
which collective bargaining was a means to which improved working conditions and fair 
wages and benefits could be better realized. From a rational perspective, “systematic 
deduction of public policies from moral principles, with the welfare function one derives 
polices from quantitative (economic) analysis that calculates how general preferences 
around ends may most effectively be realized” (Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 268). Two 
concepts as it pertains to unions and Conflict Theory revolve around the ability of a 
union having a “voice” through constituent membership and how such “voice” impacts 
policies and decisions of an organization.  
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Chris Argyris (1960) tries to connect the individual’s psychological contract with a 
“seminal dynamism” or future action of various forces as a manner in which 
organizational policy can be evolved and embraced. Albert Hirschman (1970) describes 
an “inceptive or beginning value” whereby the individual is part of an action or policy 
which affects both the individual and the organization. While Karl Marx focused on the 
way individual behavior is conditioned by social structure, Max Weber emphasized the 
importance of social action, the ability of individuals to affect their social relationships 
(Livesay, 2010). C. Wright Mills highlighted social structures created through conflict 
between people with differing interests and resources whereby individuals and 
resources, in turn, are influenced by these structures and by society’s unequal 
distribution of power and resources (Knapp, 1994). As it pertains to HPO, workplace 
environments may or may not be differentiated between unions and non-unionized; 
therefore Conflict Theory may or may not have the same propensity to motivate worker 
to perform better.  
Self-Determinant Theory focuses on an organizational design and behavior 
perspective of intrinsic motivation (i.e., workers have passion to advocate on behalf of 
clients which in return enables the worker to be more enriched on the job and to 
personally and professionally grow as an individual). This theory was initially developed 
by Edward Deci and Richard Ryan (2002) and noted the importance of the employee to 
feel the need for competence, autonomy and relatedness. Another element that arose 
from this study was the satisfaction union members got in not just advocating in areas 
specifically associated with their area of expertise, but also in having a voice in the 
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community on other areas of community interest in helping give attention to such issues 
(e.g., social injustices). Finally, the correlation of current union members to their family’s 
history of union involvement represents a “loyalty” measure that may motivate the 
worker to perform better. 
The intrinsic motivation of workers to advocate on behalf of co-workers enables 
the worker to be more enriched on the job and to personally and professionally grow as 
an individual. The Self-Determinant Theory is focused upon employee’s motivation 
while mitigating external influences. Deci and Vansteenkiste (2004) claim that there are 
three essential elements of the theory: 1) Humans are inherently proactive with their 
potential and mastering their inner forces (e.g., drives and emotions); 2) Humans have 
inherent tendency toward growth development and integrated functioning; and 3) 
Optimal development and actions are inherent in humans, but they don’t happen 
automatically. While there may be extrinsic factors of motivation, the primary focus is on 
intrinsic factors. However, the influences of a union may represent an extrinsic factor in 
the rewards of compensation and benefits. 
Self-Regulation Theory is also focused on an individual’s desire to control their 
environment; especially during stressful conditions. Illusions of control can arise when 
the environment may not be conducive or receptive in enabling the employee the 
opportunity for such control (Fenton-O’Creevy, Nicholson, Soane and Willman, 2003). 
The effect of collective bargaining may enable such control to be realized by the 
employee if the union and the individual’s control-related goals are the same and stress 
is mitigated. However, if such traits are not aligned between the individual and the 
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union, then an individual’s control desires may be more comprised than if they were not 
in a union. Karoly (1993) defines Self-Regulation Theory as those processes, internal 
and/or transactional, that enable an individual to guide their goal-directed activities over 
time and across changing circumstances. The processes of self-regulation are apparent 
when recurring activity is constrained by irrelevant goals, new challenges and the failure 
that can occur from repetitive actions without regard to thought. Self-Regulation Theory 
appears to be the stable element attempting to guide behavior along a specific path to a 
directed aim or goal (Karoly, 1993). 
Expectancy Theory is the motivation an employee has based upon the desired 
outcomes which emphasizes the employer’s rewards should “relate directly to 
performance and to ensure that the rewards provided are those rewards deserved and 
wanted” by the employees (Montana and Charnov, 2008). As collective bargaining may 
be more associated with uniform rewards provided to the employees, then the 
employee’s motivation may be mitigated without employee rewards for employee 
performance. However, if the tasks are being performed require team traits and such 
rewards were better aligned with the team accomplishments, then perhaps such 
motivation may not be mitigated. The Expectancy Theory focuses on the three 
components: 1) Expectancy; 2) Instrumentality; and 3) Valence; with the “motivational 
force” being a factor of all three (Rao, 2000).  It can be applied in two different formats 
according to Kim and Bae (2005).  
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 Firstly: For the union organizations, it is the union’s motivation in participating 
in organizational change and innovation that will produce a desired outcome 
for which the union will benefit. The union also goes through the cognitive 
process acting as an agent for the employees in making the choice to 
participate. In essence, the employee has deferred such cognitive process to 
the union and is accepting of the union’s judgment, then is motivated to 
succeed and be rewarded in a collective manner by such outcome (individual 
reward not apparent).  
 Secondly: For the non-union organizations, the traditional Expectancy Theory 
process is experienced at the individual employee level; and it is the 
expectation of the individual that individual rewards will be granted to 
reinforce such motivation that enables them to make the choice of positively 
participating in change and innovation.  
 
Workforce Classifications and Collective Bargaining 
Historical Perspective 
The United Nations recognized the ability of workers to organize unions as a 
fundamental human right (United Nations, 1948) and the Internal Labour Organization 
notes the "freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining" as an essential right of workers (Internal Labour Organization, 1998). In 
contrast, collective bargaining has also been associated with increased costs of labor 
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and benefits, especially health insurance and retirement, which may over compensate 
the employee and may provide an inability of the employer to be competitive and adapt 
to market changes. Over the past fifty years, private sector unions have declined in 
membership while public sector unions have grown or at least remained stable (Carrell 
and Heavrin, 2004). According to the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2004), public sector employees represented by unions constituted over 40% 
of the total government employment in 2003; the highest amongst any private sector 
categories of employment is only 13%. Union organizing was primarily motivated by 
dissatisfaction with working conditions and the perspective that unions could improve 
these conditions; however, this motivational aspect of organizing is not as applicable in 
the 21st century (Verma and Kochan, 2004).  
While this motivational aspect may be less in the 21st century, this fragmentation 
between employer and employee as it pertains to law enforcement was evident in the 
early actions of the Boston Police Social Club (called a “club” prior to formal law 
enforcement unions with no collective bargaining powers). When the Boston law 
enforcement chief in 1919 refused to recognize this social club as having union status, a 
majority of the law enforcement officers “walked off the job” for four days which resulted 
in “widespread looting, hundreds of injuries and seven deaths” with order restored only 
upon National Guard arrival (DeLord, Burpo, Shannon, and Spearing, 2008, p. 227). 
With the National Guard’s presence, all striking law enforcement officers were 
“terminated and related labor unions (e.g., American Federation of Labor (AFL)) 
concern about solidarity and strikebreakers did not have them further advocate or strike” 
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on behalf of the law enforcement organization (DeLord, Burpo, Shannon, and Spearing, 
2008, p. 227).  
Even though political intervention did not arise in providing the opportunity for law 
enforcement officers to form unions and collective bargaining, that does not mean that 
such services were absent of any politics. During the first half of the 20th century, there 
was a high level of political interference in law enforcement organizations. “Patronage 
was rampant, and employment or promotion was often dependent on how well 
connected an individual was, rather than how capable he was to fill the position” 
(Salerno, 1981, p. 4). Perhaps because of such organizational structure, which appears 
to be completely devoid of any HPO characteristics, there was no incentive by many of 
the rank and file officers for forming unions as the politically-influenced employment and 
promotion aspects of the law enforcement organization began at the hiring stage of the 
entry level officer. Therefore, the entry level officer, already benefiting from some form 
of political patronage, may have been positioned to benefit over and over from the same 
patronage; even if the benefit was simply retaining their job with low productivity and 
performance. 
It wasn’t until New York City started the law enforcement union movement in 
1958 did law enforcement unions begin to gain momentum and prominence. However, 
public sentiment toward public sector collective bargaining, especially law enforcement 
was hostile (Ichinowski, Freeman and Lauer, 1989). President Kennedy’s 1962 
Executive Order 10988 is largely credited with providing the momentum for public sector 
unions to gain momentum nationwide. While Kennedy’s Executive Order only pertained 
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to certain federal workers (i.e., armed forces have never been unionized), many state 
legislatures began to feel pressure to enact collective bargaining-friendly laws (Kearney, 
2001). Between 1958 and 1968, various court cases and local government policies 
discouraged collective bargaining in the public sector. An example was a 1963 Michigan 
Supreme Court decision that upheld the “Muskegon Police Chief’s policy that essentially 
prohibited law enforcement officers from becoming members of unions” (Morgan and 
Korstad, 1977, p. 3). However, in 1968, the 7th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in 
McLaughlin v. Tilendis ruled that an individuals’ right to form and join unions are 
protected by the First Amendment (398 F 2nd 287, 7th Cir., 1968). 
The two national law enforcement unions that started out as employee 
organizations, not unions, are the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) and the Police 
Benevolent Association (PBA). The FOP, with 310,000 members currently, formed in 
1915 in Fort Pitt, Pennsylvania as law enforcement officers were unhappy with 12 hour 
working days and other poor working conditions (Fraternal Order of Police, 2004). The 
PBA (actually the “P” initially stood for “Patrolmen”) began in New York City in 1892 as 
a social institution and by 1914 became an effective political lobbying force in defeating 
New York legislation associated with mitigating a law enforcement officer’s right to 
appeal dismissal (Colwell, 1994). Even though these and many other examples of poor 
working conditions for the law enforcement officer existed similar to that of other 
laborers, law enforcement unions did not initially experience the same expansion in 
unions or collective bargaining ability as other labor unions (private and public sector). 
One rationale behind such lagging unionization is that law enforcement officers have 
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been “historically opposed to true unionization, because of their generally conservative 
philosophies, the unsavory history of some trade unions and the fear that unionism is 
diametrically opposed to professionalism” (Salerno, 1981, p. 36). 
Even though such law enforcement unions may not exert the same powers (e.g., 
no strikes permitted in 49 states and in the remaining state (Montana) there are many 
barriers to striking), law enforcement officers have large representation in unions. Law 
enforcement officers and firefighters have over 36% of their employees nationwide part 
of a union; which is second only to teachers for all occupational categories, private or 
public (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004). This percentage 
increases substantially when it is just large law enforcement organizations; with over 
70% of organizations with greater than 100 sworn officers engaging in collective 
bargaining (Zhao and Lovrich, 1997). 
Ultimately, it has been a state’s right to determine whether or not to permit 
collective bargaining (and the related unions needed to represent the worker) for local 
government employees and law enforcement officers. The threshold of enabling a union 
first divides each state into “right-to-work” (twenty-three states) and “agency shops” 
(twenty-seven states) whereby two tiers exist for the right-to-work states: 1) The state, 
generally through its constitution (six states) or legislative code (seventeen states), 
defines whether or not a union can be established and if so, does it also enable public 
sector unions and if so, does it enable law enforcement unions; and 2) If it does enable 
unions, then the employees have the right to either join or not join such union. Indiana 
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was the most recent to change its status to right-to-work in 2012 with the previous state 
change to right-to-work being Oklahoma in 2001. What makes Indiana’s change to right-
to-work unique is that it is now the only non-contiguous right-to-work state.  
For the twenty-seven states that are not right-to-work, these states enable unions 
via “agency shops” to be formed through membership votes. Upon the formation of the 
union, the union acts as an agent for all employees in negotiating with the employer, 
whether or not they are formally part of the union membership. For those employees 
who choose to not become a member after a defined period of time after employment, 
these non-union employees still may be required to pay a portion of established union 
dues for the union’s actual efforts involved with collective bargaining on behalf of the 
non-unionized employee.  
The Supreme Court, in Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), 
ruled that “objecting nonmembers cannot be required to pay union dues. The most that 
nonmembers can be required to pay is an agency fee that equals their share of what the 
union can prove is its costs of collective bargaining, contract administration, and 
grievance adjustment with their employer” (National Right-to-work Legal Defense 
Foundation, 2012, p. 1). This situation creates a variance between those employees 
who are members of a union and the higher number of employees that are represented 
by a union.  
It is through more formal employee organizations that arise from collective 
bargaining that a law enforcement officer can “improve not only their personal means” 
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(e.g., compensation and benefits), but also improve their “professional destinies” 
through having more formal opportunities of input (Maddox, 1975, p. 25). As Figure 2.3: 
Public Sector Union Membership and Representation illustrates, this divide has 
narrowed between 1983 and 1995 as it appears that a greater percentage of employees 
actually are members of the unions that represent them. 
Figure 2.3: Public Sector Union Membership and Representation
 
Figure 2.4: Right-to-Work States Map is reproduced from the National Right-to-
work Legal Defense Foundation and highlights the twenty-three states with “right-to-
work” laws as evidenced by darker shaded areas (National Right-to-work Legal Defense 
Foundation, 2012). What can be confusing terminology to many is that even in right-to-
work states there may be the enabling of unions to form, but it is not uniformly granted 
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that these unions have collective bargaining powers bestowed to them. Instead these 
unions, if permitted, may be a membership-based group that employees can join 
voluntarily; which generally impede its ability to attract and retain members as it is 
challenged to overcome the “free-rider” concept discussed previously. For these right-
to-work states, the employee representative groups may act in capacity of presenting 
needs and requests to the employer, but the employer is under no contractual process 
to negotiate or bargain with such group. These unions may also not have rights to “work 
to the contract,” slow down their work or strike as many other collective bargaining 
empowered unions have those tools in non-right-to-work states (National Right-to-work 
Legal Defense Foundation, 2012, p. 1).  
While the preceding sentence may not be as applicable for law enforcement 
unions (e.g., strikes, with many limitations, are only permitted in one of the non-right-to-
work states for law enforcement unions), it does illustrate the variances that can arise 
between states. For example, Florida is considered a right-to-work state, but their state 
law permits unions to be organized; however, such membership in the union is not an 
expectation for the new employee. The Florida constitution outlines such provision as 
follows: “The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of 
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of 
employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be 
denied or abridged” (US History, 2012, p. 1).  
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Figure 2.4: Right-to-Work States Map (Darker Shade)
 
As in Florida and other places in which the collective bargaining exercise must be 
performed, “there is no doubt that collective bargaining has taken or will continue to take 
some of a chief’s unilateral decision-making authority away from him” (Salerno, 1981, p. 
43). The manner in which such time constraints and authoritative manners are 
suppressed and its correlation to performance is not readily apparent. However, from an 
efficiency perspective, any additional time of the employee or employer that is 
consumed on tasks (e.g., collective bargaining negotiating) that are not correlated to an 
increase in efficiencies that arise with agreed-upon labor contracts, may represent an 
inefficient use of time and its related cost incurred on such time-consuming activities. 
From a time management perspective, “collective bargaining as a concept is not 
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incompatible with professionalism because it is no more than a device in which men sit 
across a table from one another for communication purposes” (Maddox, 1975, p. 130). 
In illustrating the difference in organizations across the United States, a study of 
private sector employees determined that 20% of the private sector workforce was a 
member of a union in non-right-to-work states whereas only 8% of private sector 
employees were members of unions in right-to-work states (Davis and Huston, 1995, p. 
223). This difference reflects that not only is there a difference in how the states view 
their private sector workforce’s ability to collective bargaining, but how such persona is 
also reflected in the politician (who makes the laws) in how private sector workers are 
also viewed. In addition, there is a “paradigm shift” occurring in labor unions in “where, 
how and by whom goods are produced” and four trends continue to support this shift: 1) 
Global completion and deregulation; 2) Workforce demographics (e.g., women and part-
time workers), increase in number of illegal immigrants who fear retribution in organized 
structures and transition from manufacturing to service-based industries; 3) Federal 
laws (e.g., safe workplace conditions and family medical leave); and 4) General little 
interest from the new generation of workers (Wagner, 2008, p. 17).  
All of these issues has challenged the HPO in determining where and the 
manner it should produce its goods, and when mobility issues are not over-constraining, 
then the employer may often move such production facilities to an environment that the 
employer believes can position it better to maintain or attain HPO status. A current 
example of this challenge is Boeing. As Boeing created a new product, the 787 
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Dreamliner, it decided that it would be better for the company to build it in South 
Carolina (a right-to-work state) instead of Washington with its unions that caused 
various Boeing plant shutdowns over the years during contractual negotiations. What 
has made this private sector decision more complicated and the subject of national 
attention is that the United States government has intervened and determined that 
Boeing’s move cannot occur if the primary reason is seeking a non-unionized workforce; 
a current legal challenge requiring a lengthy court process to resolve (Steinglass, 2011). 
While mobility issues in the production of goods is not applicable to the public sector 
(e.g., City ABC can’t move to another state), it does illustrate an inherent variance 
between public and private sector unions. The economic factors benefiting one locality 
and hindering another locality because of private sector relocations may impact the 
quality of life factors for general citizens’ at-large in the localities affected by such 
migrations. 
 
Collective Bargaining – Benefits to Today’s Worker  
With regard to collective bargaining, the benefits bestowed from the union to the 
employee will most likely occur whether the employee is active in helping the union or 
the collective bargaining negotiation process to succeed. Because of this inherent 
dilemma, there may not be a connection between the employee and the union. This 
dilemma causes the challenges that arise in voluntary union workplaces whereby the 
non-union members may receive the same benefits as the union members without the 
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contribution of union dues and the time needed for union activities. For these 
workplaces, additional incentives from the union may need to be provided so that union 
members feel the return on investment of such costs and time (Hindess, 1988). This 
would also avert the “free-rider” challenges previously addressed as the non-union 
“free-rider” employee receives the same contractual benefit as the dues-paying 
employee. This challenge is partially overcome in legal authority granted to unions to 
recover the pro-rata costs of collective bargaining negotiations from non-union members 
via a calculated fee. This fee may be far less than any union membership dues and 
does not grant the employee any other union membership privilege. 
Today’s employee expresses a “strong interest in having a job environment that 
supports continued learning and development,” enables the worker flexibility in 
balancing work and family life; all without the stress commonly associated with “risks of 
strikes, employer retaliation and resistance” (Verma and Kochan, 2004, p. 7). These 
self-interest worker desires can be compatible with a HPO. The organizations that can 
meet these current day desires of the worker will be in higher demand for existing 
employees to remain and prospective employees to apply. It is when these workplace 
traits don’t exist that the employee would feel more compelled to leverage the abilities of 
a union to advocate for such traits or migrate to another employer that provides the 
environment of such traits; regardless if the new employer is an union or non-union 
workplace. Many of these organizational trait concepts illustrated for the self-interest of 
the worker may not be traits that traditional unions possess; which is also a challenge to 
continued or growing membership. In addition, there is “twice as many former union 
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members as there are current union members”; which makes recruiting for union 
membership increases even more challenging (Verma and Kochan, 2004, p. 8).  
 The premise that workers would be long-term employees of a single company 
helped position for a strong union with a continuum of members. However, an 
“independent workforce” has emerged that enables them to perform in a variety of 
manners and often “flexible models of work” (e.g., self-employed, independent 
contractors, temporary worker, contracted employees) (Wagner, 2008, p. 204). These 
growing populations of an independent workforce are more directly responsible for 
themselves in earning an income, getting access to affordable health insurance and 
plans for retirement savings. Because of the very nature in how the individual defines in 
their own self-interest the work environment and scope, moving from one employer to 
another or changing their scope for new challenges and rewards, negates their need to 
be part of a union whose foundation is built-upon continuity of same employer with 
increased benefits as a reward for tenure. 
An additional challenge for the law enforcement officer union is the inherent 
conflicts between their law and order mantra with that of certain union strategies of 
creating disruption when impasse in negotiations occur. When the labor movement was 
in its infancy, it was the local law enforcement officers who were needed to restore 
order from protesting workers in the early stages of their union or during a strike; which 
created divides between the law enforcement officer and union worker – “a situation that 
has never been completely rectified” (Salerno, 1981, p. 4). In addition, because many 
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law enforcement unions negotiate locality by locality for their own union, there are 
challenges in having these segmented union contract processes seek the same benefits 
and desires; even with affiliation of national law enforcement union organizations.  
There is a “fragmented local, state and national law enforcement labor 
movement” and the lack of a unified voice from law enforcement unions on issues 
pertaining to the “democratization and improvements of policing” (DeLord, Burpo, 
Shannon, and Spearing, 2008, p. 224). The effects of these fragmentations on the 
ability to attain HPO is not readily known, but it is through this type research that 
additional insight may be gained into determining correlations, if any, between collective 
bargaining and high performance. However, even with these uncertainties, an analysis 
of law enforcement union contracts between 1975 and 1981 determined that collective 
bargaining over time favors the local law enforcement union as it becomes more 
empowered and influential (Feuille, Delaney and Hendricks, 1985). Therefore, the 
longer standing unions and their collective bargaining strategies are a sustaining force; 
whether or not HPO correlations exist. 
Johnson and Jarley (2004) approached this topic from another perspective. 
Through the application of mobilization, social exchange and organizational justice 
theories, union participants were surveyed to determine worker’s perceptions of 
workplace injustice and union justice in explaining an individual’s participation in unions. 
These measures were also benchmarked against more traditional measures of union 
participation (e.g., job satisfaction and union instrumentality perceptions), to determine 
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what factors correlated better for union participation. As workers often assign blame for 
their work-related problems to their employer, this research tried to distinguish such 
directed dissatisfaction. The Equity Theory is evident as it deals with workers’ 
perceptions of fairness and equity regarding how rewards, punishments and workloads 
are provided amongst the workforce (Johnson and Jarley, 2004). Rational Choice 
Theory is also noted in how workers weigh the costs (“means”) and benefits (potential 
“ends”) of union participation and its correlation to the actual member goals (actual 
“ends”) that can be satisfied through union participation (Johnson and Jarley, 2004). 
Public sector unions not only have “voice privileges” at the negotiating table with 
their employer similar to private sector unions, they also “exert voice at the policy 
making table with elected officials” (Freeman, 1986, p. 42). This influence can also be 
associated with public sector workers voting at a higher rate than private sector workers 
and with this higher turnout rate a “greater influence over political conditions within 
government” also occurs (Babcock, Engberg and Glazer (1997). Therefore, the 
combination of higher voting participation of being in a union and also working in the 
public sector can represent a significant voting influence over elected officials. This 
influence can encompass local, state and federal politicians. It is the local politician who 
ultimately enacts the tax structure to balance budgets for agreed-upon union contracts. 
It is the state politician who can define laws regarding right-to-work status, abilities for 
law enforcement unions to exist and the manner in which impasse resolutions are 
resolved. It is the federal politician who can set national labor relation policies in defining 
agency shops, compensation, benefit and workplace environment laws. As recently as 
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2007, federal legislation was proposed to remove the state’s right in determining its 
right-to-work to status; an action that would better empower unions nationwide.   
In 2007, two federal legislative acts were proposed that were designed to remove 
the right-to-work state determination in favor of a national standard (Employee Free 
Choice Act) and favor a national standard for unionization of state and local public 
safety personnel (Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act). There does not 
appear to be any formal research conducted in the formulation of these bills in regards 
to HPO correlations associated with the passage of such bills.  For the Employee Free 
Choice Act (HR800), its purpose was to “amend the National Labor Relations Act to 
establish an efficient system to enable employees to form, join, or assist labor unions, to 
provide for mandatory injunctions for unfair labor practices during organizing efforts, and 
for other purposes” (HR800, 2007, p. 1). For the Public Safety Employer-Employee 
Cooperation Act (HR980), its purpose was to enable public safety employees, including 
all employees of local government law enforcement organizations, “the right to join a 
union and have the union recognized by the employer; the right of public safety officers 
to bargain over wages, hours, and working conditions; a dispute resolution mechanism 
(e.g., fact finding or mediation); and enforcement of contracts through state courts” 
(HR980, 2007, p. 1). 
Both of these bills failed to get passed as Democrats generally supported 
passage and Republicans generally supported rejection of the bills. There are also 
numerous advocacy groups that were for and against such legislation; even some 
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advocacy groups who may be on different sides of certain issues that were united for 
this issue. As with many federal legislative processes, even though these bills were 
defeated or tabled, that does not mean that the motivation to reintroduce them has 
diminished. Even if successfully passed, these new federal legislative mandates may 
seek legal challenges from states as their “state’s rights” will become further diminished 
and may not be resolved until a Supreme Court decision. The interesting facet of federal 
versus states’ rights, employer versus employee rights and local law enforcement 
organization employee versus employer rights provides for continued advocacies, 
alliances and to the layperson, sometimes confusion. Through this research, it is hoped 
that fact-based information can better help illustrate, at least, the roles of collective 
bargaining to high performance. 
 
High Performance Organizations (HPO) 
HPO - Background 
HPOs are defined in many ways, but generally address the ability of the 
organization to leverage its collective resources to achieve the highest production value 
of products and services produced. Continuous improvement in four critical areas is 
also indicative of a HPO: “1) Quality of goods and services; 2) Cost of producing goods 
and services; 3) Speed at which products and services are brought to the market; and 
4) Innovation in the development of new products and services” (Lawler, 2012, p. 3). 
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These preceding critical areas are also subject to continuous improvement as the 
organization “must know what one wants to create, so one must continually reflect on 
their sense of purpose/vision and, second, one must continually develop the capability 
to move in that direction” (Wooldridge, 2007, p, 44).  
The challenge is that there is no universal manner in which continuous 
improvement practices can be developed and deployed to attain the four preceding 
goals. In fact, because of the competitive nature of businesses, the ability for a business 
to creatively distinguish itself from another provides it the necessary competitive edge to 
stay HPO. This inherent and continuing challenge positions management in “a 
continuing search for independence in the pursuit of professional objectives, a quest 
which managers do not always view in sympathetic terms” (Maddox, 1975, p. 25).  
The measures of performance should not just focus on the “production of certain 
tangible units of output, but also on less tangible outputs; like effectively supervising 
others, thinking in a creative way, inventing a new product, resolving conflicts between 
others, or selling a good or service” (Steers, 1984, p. 179). Key factors, in addition to 
motivation, for performance to flourish include: 1) Abilities and traits; 2) Role clarity and 
acceptance; and 3) Opportunity to perform (Porter and Lawler, 1968; Campbell and 
Pritchard, 1976). HPO traits are more evident when higher standards exist for employee 
knowledge, skill and abilities; understanding of what their job function is required to 
perform; and the opportunity to attain performance goals. It is through these manners 
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that maximizing utility (a Rational Choice Theory trait) and HPO are linked as part of a 
process and pathway towards and continuum of HPO. 
A key trait of HPO is quality of work life and the workplace should be designed to 
meet needs for human achievement, continuous learning and stimulation of minds, 
mutually supportive relationships with others, and sense that contributions are being 
made to society (Rosen, 1993). It is from the framework of a quality of work life that 
worker productivity can be positioned to occur through a properly designed rewards 
system as “productivity improvement and human satisfaction are directly related” 
(Rosen, 1993, p. 155). While HPOs and the traits previously noted appear to cater to 
private sector entities, “public organizations must become as competitive as the private 
sector, rapidly handle clients’ requests and respond to them, attentively manage the 
resources that are available to them, while at the same time, obtaining significant value 
added for the clients” (Charih, Bourgault, Maltais, and Rouillard, 2007, p. 31). It is these 
and similar HPO traits that initially may have arisen via a privatization movement which 
has raised the expectation for HPO standards in the public sector (Wooldridge, Amagoh 
and Menefee, 2002). 
As outlined by Wendell L. French and Cecil H. Bell (1973), the HPO development 
program has eight major foundations: 1) On-going, interactive process (always needing 
to learn new skills); 2) Form of applied behavioral science (enables logical and effective 
decisions); 3) Reductive strategy of change (rational changes that develops reasoning 
skills); 4) Systems-based (relationship of one event to others); 5) Day-to-day approach 
to planned change (timely evaluation of data required); 6) Experienced-based 
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(knowledge is gained from learning experiences); 7) Goal setting and planning 
(compare against measurable and attainable goals); and 8) Focus on work teams 
(beliefs and experiences from many levels).  
As illustrated in Figure 2.5: Effective Decisions from Donald Lynch (1986), the 
ability to achieve effective decisions in an HPO environment clearly shows that the 
effectiveness of the decision is best correlated to a consensus-based approach with the 
individual decision being the least effective (in Figure 2.5, a “6” is the highest score of 
decision making whereas a “0” is the lowest score; with the line representing the 
“adequacy curve”). For the consensus decision-making approach, ideally all members 
share equally in the final decision and interaction amongst members is “encouraged, 
accepted and utilized” (Lynch, 1986, p. 218). 
Figure 2.5: Effective Decisions 
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The motivational aspects of the employee from the managers perspective had 
changed little between 1946 to 1995 (Kovach, 1995), yet the variance between what 
these managers believed and what the actual employees wanted continued to differ 
considerably (Jurkiewicz and Massey, 1996). This inability of managers to recognize the 
needs and desires of their subordinates creates this trust division between manager and 
worker and contributes to the challenge in becoming a HPO and the underlying distrust 
that fosters further divisions between unions and management.  
 
HPO and Collective Bargaining 
Previous research has indicated “no significant relationship to organizational 
structure and incentives structure and the level of organizational performance” (Xu, 
2008). This organizational structure relationship can also be further defined to note 
collective bargaining aspects of the structure. For purposes of defining the union 
structure, there are four traits of a powerful union: 1) Organizational power (sole 
purpose is to achieve union goals); 2) Political action (it is the source of strength in 
mastering the “power game”); 3) Media involvement (a “use it or it will use you” 
challenge); and 4) Confrontation (tool to maintain respect between union, management 
and elected officials) (DeLord, Burpo, Shannon, and Spearing, 2008, p. 9). In absence 
of a powerful union structure, the preceding four traits are not necessarily the manner in 
which the individual seeks out to maximize utility as each individual may approach such 
roles and advocacies with their employer differently. 
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Other attributes that may impact HPO traits with correlations to collective 
bargaining, include, but are not limited to: 1) Additional dynamics that may arise from 
political power that unions can foster through lobbying and consensus-based leverage 
(e.g., non-workplace advocacies on behalf of the employee); and 2) Quality of life 
attributes from the employee’s perspective. For each of these attributes, further scope, 
including employee and employer surveys, would be required to effectively gauge the 
impact of such attributes. If such attributes lead to better employee performance, not 
just a desire for the employee to perform better, then the correlation of these and other 
attributes would be considered to positively influence an organization towards a HPO. 
Likewise, if employee performance is not enhanced or even decreased, then these 
attributes would not be considered in an HPO-seeking environment. 
Donna Baines (2010) focus on “social unionism” as an intrinsic factor identified 
three “power resources” that serve as union strength: 1) Proactivity (capacity to form an 
independent agenda); 2) Internal solidarity (internal mechanisms for democratic and 
cohesive actions); and 3) External solidarity (community activity with horizontal-vertical 
ties within their union and other unions). However, while such power resources were 
identified, non-unionized comparative “power resources” were not identified nor 
addressed to determine what similarities or contrasts may exist between union and non-
unionized workplaces. There does appear to be a correlation in the ability for the worker 
to feel empowered and providing a service to a client that can correlate to their vested 
interest in their job. This correlation of vested interest can also enable HPO traits to 
emerge more readily and sustainably.  
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Union contracts can have macro statements regarding performance or 
productivity which represent attempts to address HPO desires. A union contract 
example would be the following statement regarding delivery of services - in the “most 
efficient, effective and courteous manner is of paramount importance” and that this is 
“recognized to be a mutual obligation of both parties within their respective roles” 
(Zagoria, 1973, p. 16). In a separate study of collective bargaining of private sector call 
centers, unionized call centers and in-house call centers (compared to outsourced) 
were associated with significantly higher measures of job quality (Doellgast, Holtgrewe 
and Deery, 2009). High job quality is a factor in an environment of HPO success, but as 
noted previously, just having a high job quality environment alone does not guarantee 
employee higher performance. 
A motivational aspect that may enable workers to perform at a higher ability may 
be the worker’s ability to advocate on behalf of their vested interests (e.g., client, 
themself). Baines (2010) compared and contrasted the experiences of Canadian and 
Australian social services workers; both unionized workplaces. While both sets of 
workers benefited from leveraging their vested interest in their service area to advocate 
for the service, budget constraints in Canada mitigated the time available for advocacy. 
As the budget constraints mounted, social workers became isolated and worked in 
solitude; often performing redundant and bureaucratic tasks. This lack of time for 
community involvement and empowering clients outside of the workplace “pushing 
paper” led employees to feel less able to help advocate for their clients. A law 
enforcement employee's solitude shift or constant negative interactions with potential 
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lawbreakers can also lead to constraints in positive interactions. HPO law enforcement 
organizations may be able to overcome such constraints through positive interactions 
whereby the law enforcement officer can meet with good citizens and businesses as 
part of their shift (e.g., “park, walk and talk” programs with neighborhoods and 
businesses). 
In another study about union workers and high performance traits, Kim and Bae 
(2005) examined two different Korean companies to determine if there was a correlation 
between being unionized and innovation. Innovation is another HPO trait that is always 
encouraged and further developed in a HPO. It was evident that for union workplaces 
that embraced the innovative change proposed, that such performance outcomes were 
better, but when the union did not embrace such change, then outcomes were less. 
Two separate approaches for unions and non-union workplaces arose: “Lean 
production’s” more centralized approach preferred by non-union workplaces and “team 
production’s” more decentralized approach preferred by union workplaces. As both 
entities yielded success from two different approaches in implementing change, it 
appears that good organizational design practices would adapt to the better approach 
relative to the type of workers in order to succeed. This is an example that a HPO 
pathway may not be through one absolute path as different workers positively respond, 
via higher performance, to different approaches in how to achieve innovation goals. 
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HPO and the Public Sector 
The measures and metrics of HPOs in the public sector rightfully are different 
than those in the private sector for many, but not all facets, of HPOs. The primary 
differentials may pertain to measures of profitability and defining the customer. 
However, from an employee workplace perspective, an HPO should strive to provide 
the most conducive environment to enable its workers to perform at their best and 
motivated to perform on behalf of the locality or company; while also primarily motivated 
by their self-interest. An example of a simple HPO-type measure for both private and 
public sectors is the employee turnover rate. As the time and investment put forth in 
recruiting, selecting and training an employee is significant, the retention of these 
trained employees enables the organization to be more effective and efficient. However, 
that does not mean that all employees once hired need to be retained for their entire 
careers. While low turnover is a HPO trait, a HPO should also have some manner in 
which lower performing employees are dismissed.  
For law enforcement organizations, large organizations retain employees longer 
than smaller organizations (Koper, Maguire and Moore, 2001) and larger organizations 
also tend to be more associated with collective bargaining (Valletta, 1989). Collective 
bargaining’s “strong voice” to an employee is considered a primary factor for lower 
turnover rates than non-collective bargaining law enforcement organizations (Rees, 
1991, p. 31). However, even such statistics on their surface may not represent 
underlying issues associated with employee turnover that should be vetted further. For 
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example, this would include analysis to determine if mobility issues make it harder to 
leave one unionized employer for another or whether promotional rewards are greater 
and apparent for a unionized employer based primarily upon tenure (and not 
performance) compared to a non-unionized employer. 
Continued focus on organizational development is an integral component of 
HPO. One goal of organizational development is to create an “open, problem-solving 
climate” throughout the law enforcement organization (Lynch, 1986, p. 209). This 
process “decides specifically what objectives are to be reached in the upcoming few 
years, how these objectives are to be reached and how the resultant changes will be 
evaluated, in terms of overall departmental effectiveness” (Lynch, 1986, p. 209). 
Constraints to starting organizational design include abilities of key staff, the values of 
the organization and community; and any legal restrictions. Law enforcement chiefs 
also may not have to just overcome creating an environment of trust within its 
organization to proceed, but also need to get approval from those in the hierarchy of its 
local government (e.g., other non-law enforcement organizations, chief administrative 
officer, local governing body).   
Employee and employer management relations focused herein have primarily 
centered on employee compensation, benefits and work environment. As a few 
measures are focused on highly, other measures (e.g., equity and accountability) are 
less focused upon (ICMA, 1991). As an example, a HPO does not just convene 
employee committees for employee negotiations, but rather formally establishes such 
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committees, and empowers them to be a partner in addressing other organizational 
matters. This performance improvement strategy of using labor-management 
committees that are usually standing committees when not consumed with their 
collective bargaining issues, can leverage their time and talent into performance 
enhancements (e.g., review of policies, creation of new policies). This type of 
engagement can be “very successful and provide a wealth of new ideas and a great 
spirit of cooperation” (Salerno, 1981, p. 44). However a challenge exists as many law 
enforcement organizations utilize “minority control” where a few leaders traditionally 
make the decision or the “majority vote” as both of these may be easier (less time) than 
the efforts needed to reach consensus (Lynch, 1986, p. 218). A HPO needs to carefully 
assess when such easier practices are prudent for the organization and when more 
deliberative and employee-engaged practices are more prudent. 
 
HPO and Law Enforcement - Background 
Having an appreciation for the historical environment that has given rise to the 
motivations of the law enforcement union worker may help frame the motivations for 
performance and employer-employee perceptions of workplace environment, 
compensation and benefits. The word “police” was correlated with corruption or the 
imposition of the ruling regime in Europe through 1748, when Henry Fielding was 
appointed to magistrate role in London. Fielding began to publish pamphlets on the 
effectiveness of “parochial” law enforcement forces in better providing justice through 
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reliable information to judges, constables and the general public (More, 1979, p. 3). The 
next evolution of effectiveness was also in England in 1829 through Robert Peel’s “an 
Act for Improving Police in and Near the Metropolis” which was in response to the 
apprehension many citizens had on the ability of local law enforcement to protect their 
life and property (Lyman, 1955, p. 53). Robert Peel’s officers were affectionately known 
as “bobbies” (nickname for Robert); a term still used today (ICMA, 1991). 
In the United States, Lawrence Fuld is credited in 1909 with outlining traits of an 
effective law enforcement organization and its officers who “need to live up to a higher 
code of conduct and morality than that demanded from other citizens” and the most 
important duty was “knowledge” (Fuld, 1909, p. 112). In 1915, Raymond Fosdick 
performed a study of law enforcement organizations in seventy-two cities and 
determined that the higher performing law enforcement organizations had fulfilled three 
conditions: “1) Relationship between supervision and work was well-balanced; 2) 
Different parts of the mechanism must be adjusted to each other; and 3) Whole 
machine must be adapted to its task” (Fosdick, 1969, p. 382). In 1921, Elmer Graper 
recognized that law enforcement organizations perform better when their officers were 
organized into divisions accounting to the special kinds of law enforcement services 
they perform (e.g., detective, patrol) and were properly distributed throughout the city 
(Graper, 1921). O.W. Wilson’s Police Administration book in 1950 is considered a 
“monumental work” by Harry More (1979, p. 27) and frames high performing objectives 
of the law enforcement organization, including: 1) “Each assignment of responsibility 
carries with it commensurate authority to fulfill the responsibility”; and 2) “No more units 
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or persons are placed under the direct control” of one person than they are able to 
manage (Wilson, 1950, p. 9). 
There were not only individuals committed to helping make law enforcement 
organizations higher performing, but also organizations; such as International City 
(County) Management Association (ICMA). Their first book on law enforcement 
management was in 1938 and subsequent editions have periodically been done ever 
since. The law enforcement organization was defined as “the grouping of related tasks 
to assure more effective accomplishment, and the establishment of clear-cut channels 
of communication, authority and responsibility” (ICMA, 1943, p. 69).  
 
HPO and Law Enforcement 
HPO traits of law enforcement include performance measurement techniques. 
Performance criteria generally are segmented into the following measures: 
“Effectiveness, efficiency, equity and accountability” (ICMA, 1991, p. 380). As an 
example, performance measurement enables the law enforcement organization to 
establish law enforcement capacity to accomplish a given objective and monitor 
objectives previously defined (ICMA, 1991). “Performance measures can measure the 
output produced by the organization or the outcomes created in the community which 
results from organizational output” (Wooldridge, 2007, p. 47). A HPO-type performance 
measurement strategy can position the law enforcement organization to be proactive in 
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dealing with issues as they arise, rather than reactive strategies hurriedly put together to 
appease politicians or the public.  
A law enforcement organization evolves from being a “reactive component into a 
proactive component by sensing and accommodating change” (More, 1979, p. 222). A 
key trait of HPOs is in their ability to have an environment that accepts change; 
especially as it pertains to the ability to continuous improvement. In order to create or 
further maintain such an environment, management “must accentuate to a maximum 
degree” the following attributes: 1) In-depth delegation; 2) Maximize participation in 
objective setting and planning processes; 3) Managers are permitted to make some 
mistakes; 4) Change is encouraged and planned; 5) Minimal policies and procedures, 
and updated when necessary; 6) Minimum, but strong controls imposed; 7) Meaningful 
reward experiences; and 8) High degree of “self-management, self-discipline and self-
control from managers” (More, 1979, p. 228). 
There are many manners in how objectives for HPO-related traits can exist 
amongst law enforcement organizations. The following are some examples and their 
source: 
 Law enforcement patrol objectives: 1) Crime deterrence; 2) Apprehension of 
criminal offenders (clearance rate); 3) Citizen satisfaction; 4) Recovery of stolen 
property; and 5) Provide community with sense of security (National Commission 
on Productivity, 1973) 
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 Highly effective law enforcement organization goals: “1) Requests from the 
public are to receive the most immediate possible response; 2) All law 
enforcement officers are to do their utmost always to be courteous; and 3) Law is 
to be justly enforced” (Lynch, 1986, p. 230).  
 Law enforcement goal attainment strategies (with officers committed to their 
work): 1) “Bias of law enforcement chief towards some form of action” (willing to 
take risks); 2) Simple organizational structure (focused on front-line staff who 
can make decisions); 3) Oriented towards productivity and such productivity 
depends on employee improvement; and 4) “Emphasis is on a few key goals and 
not burdensome with too many rules and regulations that causes big picture to 
be lost” (Lynch, 1986, p. 230).  
As noted previously, clearance rate is regarded as a performance standard and 
there can be an assumption that investment in the resources via budgets can be a 
contributing factor in having a higher clearance rate. However, Xu’s study of 
organizational performance (as measured through clearance rate) and variables such 
as spending, human resource strategy and application of technology did not have a 
strong correlation (Xu, 2008). However, this study also recognized challenges in the 
variability in how information was compiled between comparative localities. This study 
may also recognize that there are contributing factors in any law enforcement 
organization that may result in a high cost commitment for which clearance results may 
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not be correlated (e.g., other law enforcement programs (deterrence), higher levels of 
patrol).   
The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment in 1975 was designed to see what 
correlations existed between preventive patrol (the general patrolling of a law 
enforcement officer not on a call for service) increases and citizen perception of law 
enforcement presence or personal safety, or reported crimes (Kelling, 1975). Although 
against the traditional mindset and even intuitive perception that there should be a 
positive correlation, the Kansas City study found that there was little or no effect. This 
study is still highly discussed and debated as it was bold in ascertaining that a law 
enforcement organization’s resources could be better deployed to non-patrol programs 
and efforts. Perhaps the challenge is that many law enforcement organizations have a 
“social broad goal that focuses on crime deterrence”; but the challenge is this social 
broad goal is not readily observable simply by watching law enforcement officers as 
they go about their duties (ICMA, 1991, p. 378). 
Another study with deterrence as a theme is commonly referred to as “broken 
windows” which illustrated the correlation of mitigation practices of abandoned or state 
of disrepair homes and businesses and the perception of citizens of how safe they feel 
(Wilson and Kelling, 1982). As was determined in the study regarding “broken 
windows”-type neighborhoods: 1) Primary source of citizen fear; 2) Sense that nobody 
cares, which can lead to more series disorders of crime; and 3) Reducing this disorder 
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needs to have the law enforcement organization, and their local government, leverage 
the resources of the citizens for both legitimacy and assistance. 
  It appears that a HPO law enforcement organization cannot be achieved if 
criminal activity is higher than any tolerated threshold with consideration to socio-
economic factors of the locality. “For all of its problems, crime is still one of the few 
measures” that law enforcement managers have to “provide some check – however 
general and unreliable – on their activities” (More, 1979, p. 337). The crime rate and the 
trend fluctuations of the crime rate often involves much media attention, anecdotes and 
analysis as to the cause in the change - good or bad – in measuring law enforcement 
effectiveness. However, it has recently become popular to measure law enforcement 
effectiveness by focusing on “victimization data and citizens’ satisfaction with law 
enforcement service” (ICMA, 1991, p. 381). The accounts from the victim’s perspective 
and the community at-large on how well law enforcement is performing in a variety of 
manners may help better frame the strengths and weaknesses of the law enforcement 
organization for which the community may want further action plans initiated in reducing 
any weaknesses.  
  How law enforcement organization leaders react to these perceptions can also 
be a factor towards HPO attainment. On one end of the scale is ignorance, which is not 
a HPO trait and on the other end of the scale would be strategic action plans developed, 
monitored and adjusted to focus attention towards a defined problem with metrics 
established to determine success. Determining what these specific areas needing 
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attention or the metrics gathered in determining how well the law enforcement 
organization is performing is a skill that the law enforcement organization and the 
locality’s leaders need to work on together; with applicable input from employees, 
citizens and businesses. “In the absence of scientific validation of the vast majority of 
departmental performance measures, the fact remains that law enforcement 
administrators are paid to exercise their best judgment on enormously complex topics, 
and they will necessarily have to decide whether and how to use imperfect measures 
currently available” (ICMA, 1991, p. 383). 
Having an organizational culture that is recognized by the community, leaders 
and media as being effective is another HPO trait. This culture can be the “informal 
rules and regulations or the policies that may not be outlined” which in many cases 
provides for the flexibility and adaption of the law enforcement officer and their 
organization to evolve, grow and be responsive to their community (Lynch, 1986, p. 
211). The positively viewed status of the law enforcement organization enables the 
HPO to continue and the potential HPO to gravitate towards becoming a HPO. This 
status of the internal operations can be varied and can include such topics: 1) Are 
younger or older law enforcement offices viewed differently?; or 2) Are college 
educational achievements viewed differently?   
Utilizing the resources of a national accreditation agency can assist these 
leaders in performing an environmental scan throughout their organization. CALEA 
accreditation standards are not an “assessment in how well a local law enforcement 
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organization has controlled crime or disorder, but rather how the organization has 
complied with guidelines that CALEA believes are associated with “good administrative 
practices” and “if these practices produce better performance, the law enforcement 
leader may claim that their organization is a higher performer as a result of such 
practices” (ICMA, 1991, p. 391). Because CALEA is a respected accreditation 
organization and utilizes a stringent process in developing standards and having 
independent assessors from outside the state of the locality asking for the review, the 
earning of such accreditation is deemed to be a component of HPO. For those who 
seek accreditation, but fail to earn it, then implementing the CALEA recommendations in 
a timely manner can be associated with HPO pursuit. In leveraging CALEA-type 
standards into an operational mode, the productivity of law enforcement can be 
increased through: “1) Improving current policies and practices to the highest level; 2) 
Allocating resources most efficiently to the varied law enforcement services; 3) 
Increasing the probability of goal accomplishment; and 4) Leveraging the workforce 
talents to their full potential” (More, 1979, p. 326). All of the previous measures and 
attributes for the HPO need to also be done in a continuous improvement environment, 
and in the most efficient manner, in order for HPO attainment and continuum of HPO 
status. 
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Costs of Services and Operations 
The cost of services and operations for law enforcement are often highly debated 
during a locality’s budget process with expectations on high correlations of service 
performance to costs. Compensation and benefits is also the highest portion of an 
organization’s budget; therefore inclusion of this cost measure is warranted as a 
dependent variable. Compensation is the set of rewards that organizations provide to 
individuals in return for their willingness to perform various jobs and tasks within the 
organization (DeNisi and Griffin, 2001). Prior studies have indicated that local 
government union employees are paid 32% more than non-union local government 
employees (Department of Labor, 2004). However, even costs can have conflicting 
results as illustrated by the following statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(DiSalvo, 2010): 
 Average annual salary for the roughly 330,000 office clerks who work in the 
public sector was almost $27,000 in 2005, while the 2.7 million in the private 
sector received an average pay of just under $23,000. Nationwide, among the 
108,000 janitors who work in the public sector, the average salary was $23,700; 
the average salary of the 2.0 million janitors working in the private sector, 
meanwhile, was $19,800. 
 Private-sector economists earn an average of $99,000 a year, compared to the 
$69,000 earned by their government colleagues. Accountants in the private 
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sector world earn average annual salaries of $52,000, compared to $48,000 for 
their public sector counterparts. 
 
Public Sector 
As HPOs rely upon measures, constrained public sector budgets must rely on 
decreasing workload resources and productivity measures to meet budgets (Hatry, 
1972); with these measures primarily focused upon efficiency and effectiveness 
measures. If there is a correlation to having a higher wage and also having the ability to 
join a union, then through the “selectivity argument” of both employer and union in the 
hiring process, then the “more able” workers should be selected (Garonna, Mori and 
Tedeschi, 1992, p. 106). Labor costs are generally the highest component of local 
government departmental budgets; therefore, the ability to get a high performance 
return on costs of such costs needs to be achieved at any level of investment. The 
higher the investment, the greater expectation should then exist in having a higher 
return. Conversely, if the labor costs are lower, then those same correlated reasonable 
expectations should be modified for a proportionately lower return.  
There are many resources which address the inherent overhead costs of public 
sector unions, for which law enforcement unions emulate such overhead practices. 
Examples primarily include the additional time of resources spent on collective 
bargaining agreements between not just union and management representatives, but 
also to the union members in educating them and soliciting votes on union agreement 
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proposals. There are also studies that illustrate that unionized workplaces have higher 
hourly wage rates and benefit advantages (e.g., healthcare and retirement) over non-
unionized comparable positions. For example, the Economic Policy Institute notes that 
unionized wages are 20% higher and increase to 28% higher when benefits are 
factored into total compensation (Mishel and Walters, 2003). 
From a public sector standpoint, these differentials may even be higher as 
private sector workplace costs have an inherent ceiling in order for the employer to 
remain competitive in the marketplace. With the monopolistic perspectives of the public 
sector, the inherent ceiling is not as evident; which can give rise to even a higher 
differential. However, the public sector through its citizens does have a certain tolerance 
for what may be a maximum tax burden ceiling for which good elected officials are 
keenly aware. Mobility may enable some, not all, to move their household or businesses 
to less taxed areas and if not, then advocacy roles for lower taxes may be greater.  
From analysis of ballot measures in California and Oregon, economist Richard 
Freeman notes public sector unions use their political power to increase public sector 
service demand and their bargaining power to lobby for increased compensation 
(DiSalvo, 2010). These market forces on demand, and its correlated supply, are not 
attributes as evident in the private sector; therefore, if additive costs exist for public 
sector unions, other tangible benefits and measures of performance would need to be 
correlated to such added costs. If additional costs can yield higher performance, then it 
would be appropriate to best gauge the high performance return on costs and the 
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incremental marginal utility rewards. From an economic perspective, there will be a 
point at which such marginal utility is diminished to the point that such additional cost 
investment does not provide a higher performance return on such investment. From a 
public sector perspective, this point may be debated as there can be more subjective 
determinants as to public sector “return” as compared to more industry standard 
definitions for private sector “return.” As Figure 2.6: Marginal Utility Graph illustrates, the 
increasing utility return of “x” decreases as the quantity of “x” increases and there will 
actually be a point that any further addition of “x” does not result in any further additional 
utility. 
Figure 2.6: Marginal Utility Graph 
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Law Enforcement 
Compensation and benefits of the union worker are better in many traditional 
measures: 1) 20% higher wages; 2) Greater opportunity for paid leave; 3) Over 18% 
more likely to have employer-provided health insurance; and 4) “Over 23% more likely 
to have employer-provided pension plans with employer providing over 28% more 
funding”  (Wagner, 2008, p. 49). Laurence Putchinisky’s (2007) study of 257 Florida 
cities provided evidence that unions do influence law enforcement expenditures and 
“influence these expenditures to a substantial degree” (Putchinisky, 2007, p. 223). 
However, since Florida is a right-to-work state (more employer-favored) and through its 
state statutes enables law enforcement unions to exist with any impasse in negotiations 
via mediation (employer-favored approach in agreements), additional influential 
attributes of law enforcement may be present.  
As noted previously, there is a clear distinction between a union that has 
collective bargaining abilities and “unions” in many right-to work states that may have an 
association or volunteer-based group that may call itself a union. Putchinisky 
recognized the “union voice” ability of the worker in having influence over the employer 
and extrapolated that if such voice was effective in a right-to-work state, then it could be 
easily assumed that such “union voice” would be even more effective in a state where 
collective bargaining was a granted state right to all employees within a state 
(Putchinisky, 2007, p. 225). Even with such empowerment capabilities availed to certain 
law enforcement officers and correlations to higher compensation and benefits as a 
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result of union representation, survey results of law enforcement officer employees did 
not have economic factors high on their list of job concerns. The highest rated job 
concern factor of these employees was “job security, job protection, citizen apathy and 
prestige” (Maddox, 1975, p. 24).  
In another study of compensation and law enforcement unions, Richard Victor 
(1977) determined the differential to be that union law enforcement officers and 
firefighters were paid 8 – 12% over their non-union counterparts. However, a 
determining factor in this study was not just the effect of the firefighter’s union in being 
able to leverage additional compensation and benefit packages because of the law 
enforcement unions contract (5% impact), but rather the effect of any other “key 
bargains” leveraged by the law enforcement unions and its “spillover effect” towards the 
firefighters (12% impact). This illustrates a recurring challenge for local government - as 
any increased or perceived increase in benefits of one class of employees in a newly 
agreed-upon collective bargaining agreement become the benchmark for another class 
of employees that is beginning its collective bargaining process. This issue is further 
extrapolated when the first group of employees in their new contract has pent-up 
increased demands when the second group of employees finishes their contract with 
results equal to or exceeding the first group’s contract.  Victor also notes “union power 
is a function of the wage elasticity of demand for labor of the unionized group – more 
inelastic demand is associated with more powerful unions” (Victor, 1977, p. 39). This 
recognizes the many other inherent characters or traits that a powerful union has in its 
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ability to recruit and retain fellow union members in addition to traditionally viewed 
positive traits of increased wages.  
This inelasticity can be better illustrated in Figure 2.7: Elasticity Comparisons for 
Law Enforcement Employees. In the figure 1 diagram a perfectly elastic demand is 
illustrated whereby the price (Pe) can represent wages paid to law enforcement officers 
and it has an inherent ceiling regardless of the quantity of law enforcement officers 
supplied. Above Pe there is no demand and while there may be demand for wages 
below Pe, because market wages are being sought by all law enforcement officers, 
there would be nobody willing to be employed for a lower wage. In contrast, in the figure 
2 diagram a perfectly inelastic demand is illustrated whereby the demand (Qi) is not 
subject to any price threshold. From a law enforcement officer perspective, a perfectly  
inelastic demand would have their wages continually increase and only subject to the 
constraint of the demand for law enforcement officers. As both of these illustrations are 
absolute representations of perfect elastic and perfect inelastic demand, they are not 
generally representative of a law enforcement’s demand for wages. However, as noted 
in the preceding paragraph regarding Victor’s study, those in unions are more 
associated with inelastic demand.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
Figure 2.7: Elasticity Comparisons for Law Enforcement Employees 
 
In a cross-sectional study of costs (Feuille and Delaney, 1985), law enforcement 
organizations were classified into one of the following four categories: 1) Non-
bargaining cities; 2) Collective bargaining cities without a mandate to bargain; 3) 
Collective bargaining cities with a legislative mandate to bargain but no arbitration 
availability; and 4) Collective bargaining with legislative mandate to bargain and access 
to arbitration. The results of this study indicated those organizations with legislative 
mandated collective bargaining practices resulted in significant influences on human 
and financial resource allocations and a 7.5% differential than non-bargaining cities. It 
appears that the further collective bargaining is recognized by the state for public sector 
workers and especially for law enforcement workers, an identified benefit accrues to the 
worker in higher compensation and benefits. 
Additional salary benefits were also noted by Zhao and Lovrich (1997) for large 
law enforcement organizations that have collective bargaining and by cities with 
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collective bargaining in a study by Zax (1988). While Putchinisky's study analyzed 
personnel, operating and capital costs separately and together with personnel and 
operating costs higher for collective bargaining organizations, capital costs did not have 
any higher or lower correlated effect (Putchinisky, 2007). However, because capital 
costs may fluctuate from year-to-year with varying degrees of vehicle purchases, the 
effects of this variability was not part of the scope of such research. There are many 
other studies regarding correlations of collective bargaining and its influence on 
compensation and benefits; with some of these studies also focused upon law 
enforcement organizations. In an illustration on how these studies were designed, 
sample selection process, methodologies and results, Table 2.1: Studies, Scope and 
Results for Law Enforcement Unions highlights two studies as they pertain to law 
enforcement collective bargaining and costs (Putchinisky, 2008).  
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Table 2.1: Studies, Scope and Results for Law Enforcement Unions 
Author/Year Study Sample Sample 
Date 
Methodology Results 
Zhao and 
Lovrich 
(1997) 
Collective 
bargaining 
effect on 
supplemental 
compensation 
Law 
Enforcement 
Management 
and 
Administrative 
Statistics 
Report 
(LEMAS): 
2945 law 
enforcement 
organizations 
1990 Logistic 
regression 
analysis 
Existence of 
a collective 
bargaining 
mechanism 
in large law 
enforcement 
organizations 
is 
significantly 
correlated 
with the 
presence of 
supplemental 
pay benefits 
favorable to 
officers 
Gely and 
Chandler 
(1993) 
Impact of law 
enforcement 
and firefighter 
unions on 
departmental 
expenditures 
Law 
enforcement 
and fire 
departments 
in 614 cities > 
25,000 
population 
1981 and 
1986 
Ordinary 
least 
squares 
regression 
Presence of 
a collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
increases the 
overall level 
of 
departmental 
expenditures 
by 19% 
 
Hypotheses 
 Based upon the environmental scan and theory development in this chapter, 
developing appropriate data to help measure is imperative in determining costs and 
high performance traits. Based upon the problem statement and research question, and 
related literature review, the following hypotheses were derived:  
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 Law Enforcement Performance Hypotheses (1) 
o Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
o Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Cost Hypotheses (2) 
o Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
o Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Hypotheses (3) 
o Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
o  Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
For each of the hypothesis, the independent variable is defined as collective 
bargaining. The “collective bargaining” attribute refers to the manner in which the 
workforce can leverage the employer and ranges from non-collective bargaining to 
collective bargaining’s mediation and mandatory arbitration processes. The collective 
bargaining distinction is through impasse resolution practices whereby mandatory 
arbitration generally favors the employee more than mediation. In Chapter 3 – Research 
Design and Methodology additional information will be presented to segment collective 
bargaining localities into these two classifications regarding how impasse resolution is 
approached. 
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For purposes of testing the hypothesis, collective bargaining for law enforcement 
services and its related workforce classification factor for employees (mediation or 
mandatory arbitration) would be defining whether a locality has collective bargaining for 
its law enforcement workforce. The high performance return on costs (HPRC) 
composite measure attribute attempts to compare high performance traits to the 
correlating costs that contributed to such high performance traits. HPRC is a 
performance measure used to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of taxpayers’ 
costs for law enforcement. It is similar to the private sector’s return on investment (ROI) 
which measures the efficiency of an investment or to compare the efficiency of one 
investment amongst other choices (Money-zine, 2012). The ROI formula can be 
generically expressed as ROI = (change from investment – cost of investment)/cost of 
investment, but can also be modified for this research as HPRC = high performance law 
enforcement attributes/law enforcement costs. Because performance attributes can be 
of varying measures, a rationale and systematic process is needed to convert such 
measures into comparative quantitative factors in order for such HPRC calculation to 
occur. Refer to Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology for further information 
on how the HPRC is calculated. 
In order to gauge correlations between costs and performance which may have 
elements of time lapse effects of a change in variable, collective bargaining traits would 
need to be present for a defined time period prior to the measurement of performance 
and costs. For this research, that time period is defined as five years (i.e., only those 
local governments with law enforcement organization collective bargaining (with 
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impasse resolution through mediation or mandatory arbitration) for greater than five 
years are subject to the sample for collective bargaining and those non-collective 
bargaining localities would not have had any collective bargaining agreements also 
during that same period of time). 
The following helps illustrate how each of the hypotheses will respond to each of 
the variables: 
 Workforce Classification: 
o Hypotheses 1: As workforce classification is the independent variable, the 
proper definition of type of employee workforce will be defined and also 
assigned to each of the sample localities. Through statistical research, the 
dependent variable of a composite performance index will be analyzed as 
it pertains to employee workforce classification. 
o Hypotheses 2: As workforce classification is the independent variable, the 
proper definition of type of employee workforce will be defined and 
assigned to each of the sample localities. Through statistical research, the 
dependent variable of cost will be analyzed as it pertains to employee 
workforce classification. 
o Hypotheses 3: This hypothesis gauges the relationship between 
dependent variables of performance and cost to determine what high 
performance return on cost composite measure exists amongst the 
workforce classifications assigned. 
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 Performance: 
o Hypotheses 1: Performance attributes will be defined and through 
statistical research, the composite performance index will be noted for 
each sample locality. 
o Hypotheses 2: Not applicable as performance attributes are not a 
dependent variable or subject to other analytical tests as part of these 
hypotheses. 
o Hypotheses 3: These hypotheses gauge the high performance return on 
costs composite measure between dependent variables of performance 
attributes and cost to determine what differentiation exists amongst the 
classifications of employee workforce. 
 Costs: 
o Hypotheses 1: Not applicable as cost attributes are not a dependent 
variable or subject to other analytical tests as part of these hypotheses. 
o Hypotheses 2: Cost attributes will be defined and through statistical 
research, cost attributes will be noted for each sample locality. 
o Hypotheses 3: These hypotheses gauge the high performance return on 
costs composite measure between dependent variables of performance 
and cost to determine what differentiation exists amongst the 
classifications of employee workforce. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
  
Research Goal 
Through the restatement of the research question and how each hypothesis will 
be tested, the following research goal is anticipated to be accomplished: To be able to 
determine if the hypotheses statements, upon testing, can help better answer or refine 
the research question and attempt to provide credible research in furthering the 
knowledge in regards to the problem. The relationship of the research question to 
Chapter 2 - Review of the Literature represents the relationship of workforce 
classification and its service cost to high performance with the scope limited to local 
government law enforcement services. The ability to best control for these variables is 
accomplished by focusing on certain tools from authoritative sources that can mitigate 
any externality.  
Problem Statement and Research Question 
 As noted in Chapter 1 - Introduction, the problem statement and research 
question were initially formulated and subjected to further review and analysis in 
Chapter 2 - Review of the Literature. Based upon this further review and analysis, no 
alternations to either the problem statement or research question are proposed. The 
problem statement and research question are therefore repeated as follows: 
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 Problem Statement: Local government law enforcement collective 
bargaining practices appear to create advocacy groups in support and 
against such practices; however, these emotional debates seem to 
focus on just salary and benefit costs and not on any high performance 
law enforcement organization factors; especially when total law 
enforcement costs and demographic factors are considered in 
determining high performance return on costs. 
 
 Research Question: Is there a relationship between a local government 
law enforcement collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining 
workforce and a high performance law enforcement organization when 
cost and demographic factors are considered in determining high 
performance return on costs?  
 
Linking of Hypothesis to Rational Choice Theory 
From the general observations of Rational Choice Theory, the hypotheses 
developed from Rational Choice Theory tenets helps frame the analysis approach. With 
the hypothesis, the likely relationship between two or more phenomena or key variables 
together with empirical indicators, may enable tests to be conducted, and where 
necessary, refuted. In addition, through propositions or sets of propositions that seek to 
explain or predict something, modifications to the conceptual framework may emerge. 
The hypotheses link to Rational Choice Theory is apparent in higher performance 
attributes from the law enforcement workforce in the motivation and roles workers have 
in helping achieve and maintain a HPO environment. The manner in which the law 
enforcement officer attempts to maximize their utility and their “means” should be 
complimented by the manner that the employer recognizes these employee Rational 
Choice Theory traits. Each law enforcement worker, regardless of collective bargaining 
or not, may be motivated by these Rational Choice Theory attributes. In addition, as the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
costs will be analyzed as part of this research and costs are most represented by the 
law enforcement officers in performing their service, the correlations, if any, of Rational 
Choice Theory traits of the worker and their costs will be determined. 
Independent Variable – Workforce Classification 
For purposes of potentially identifying workforce classification, each locality was 
placed in one of three classifications: 1) Non-collective bargaining localities (which 
include localities with union representation that formally “meet and confer,” but 
employer’s position is deciding factor); 2) Collective bargaining localities with any 
impasse resolved through mediation; and 3) Collective bargaining localities with any 
impasse resolved through arbitration. While there are similar traits of collective 
bargaining in two of the classifications, the research can help better gauge if there are 
any implications for the dependent variable based upon the type of impasse resolution. 
Mediation is a “voluntary process where an impartial, neutral, third party with the 
professional training and experience acts as a catalyst to enable clear and concise 
communication and negotiation between two conflicting parties” (Conflict Resolution, 
2012, p. 1).  With a goal of a mutually satisfactory resolution, the process may provide 
solutions that otherwise were not apparent at the start of the negation process. This 
flexibility component is a contrast to arbitration, whereby a more structured legally 
binding arbitration process may focus on whether the employer or the union is right. For 
arbitration, an attorney or retired judge may utilize sworn testimony and employer and 
union can each present their “evidence” in having the arbitrator reach a final decision. 
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Certain challenges with mediation may arise if compromise mindsets are not apparent 
and the impasse needs to be resolved. However, mediation may provide leverage to the 
employer’s position whereas arbitration may provide leverage to the employee’s union; 
therefore, arbitration impasse resolution is more often associated with more powerful 
unions.   
Table 3.1: Collective Bargaining State Laws for Law Enforcement Employees 
was derived from Charles Salerno’s Police at the Bargaining Table (1981), amended for 
environment that existed in 2010, and illustrates the variance of collective bargaining 
laws for law enforcement employees amongst the states. As Table 3.1 illustrates, there 
are thirty-two states that permit collective bargaining for its law enforcement 
organizations and for the other eighteen states not listed in the table (36.0% of total 
states), those states do not permit collective bargaining. For these collective bargaining 
states, they are segmented in two manners based upon how an impasse (inability) in 
negotiations to proceed further towards agreement is resolved: 1) Fifteen states (30.0% 
of total states) - Any impasse is resolved through mediation and not any binding 
arbitration; and 2) Seventeen states (34.0% of total states) - Any impasse is resolved 
through binding arbitration. While the table was compiled in 1981, additional reviews 
were done through state-by-state research to determine if any state changes have been 
done with regards to local law enforcement organizations, with adjustments made as 
applicable, and based upon such reviews, the data in the table appears accurate for the 
performance, cost and control variable period under review (2008-2011).   
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Table 3.1: Collective Bargaining State Laws  
for Law Enforcement Employees 
   
 
Mediation  Mandatory Arbitration 
State when Impasse (15 states) when Impasse (17 states) 
   AK 
 
Yes 
CA Yes  
CT 
 
Yes 
DE  Yes 
 FL Yes-1 
 HI Yes 
 IA 
 
Yes-1 
IL  Yes 
IN Yes-1  
ME Yes  
MA 
 
Yes 
MD Yes 
 MI  Yes 
MN 
 
Yes 
MT Yes 
 NE 
 
Yes-1 
NV Yes-1 
 NH Yes 
 NV Yes-1 
 NJ  Yes 
NM 
 
Yes 
NY  Yes 
OH 
 
Yes 
OK Yes-1  
OR 
 
Yes 
PA 
 
Yes 
RI 
 
Yes 
SD Yes-1 
 TX Yes-1 
 VT Yes 
 WA 
 
Yes 
WI 
 
Yes 
-1 Also a right-to-work state (9 states) 
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There appears to be geographic spread amongst both categories as there is no 
concentration of mediation or arbitration in any one geographic region. In addition, 
Table 3.1 also illustrates what states (nine in total) that have collective bargaining also 
classified as right-to-work states. This classification of right-to-work vs. non-right-to-work 
was initially addressed in Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature (Figure 2.4: Right-to-
Work States Map) and is included later in this chapter as this classification will be a 
control variable to determine if any variability exists between localities with such legal 
classifications because of their respective state law. However, because of each state’s 
definition of local law enforcement organizations, their abilities to unionize and their 
abilities to resolve impasse appear to be the hierarchal manner in measuring a law 
enforcement organization’s collective bargaining ability. Therefore, it is this classification 
that will be focused upon as the independent variable rather than the more broad right-
to-work classification which is better represented as a control variable. 
Not included in the thirty-two collective bargaining states are two states: 1) 
Kentucky which permits collective bargaining, but only for Louisville (which will be 
appropriately coded as collective bargaining if Louisville is in the sample); and 2) 
Kansas - which enable law enforcement organization and the employer to “meet and 
confer” for the purpose of negotiating a contract. However, “meet and confer” generally 
favor the employer’s desired terms and conditions as the employee union simply 
presents its desires and not demands. Therefore, because the employer is positioned to 
not negotiate further, these “meet and confer” states have been classified as non-
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collective bargaining for the purposes of data coding. Therefore, there are eighteen 
states in total that do not permit law enforcement collective bargaining.  
For the thirty-two collective bargaining states, the ability for the employee (law 
enforcement officer) to grievance exists in all but three states (Alaska, Delaware and 
Nevada); and because of these few states and the inability to find research which 
focuses on the classification differentials in unions that arise because of a grievance 
process, such trait was not subject to further data analysis or special coding. Only one 
state enables law enforcement to strike (Montana), but there are many restrictions on 
this ability (e.g., request state’s permission, ensure adjoining locality coverage); 
therefore this trait is also not considered a differentiating factor worthy of further 
consideration for data analysis. 
 
Dependent Variable – Composite Performance Measure 
 In determining the population of dependent variables, as they pertain to law 
enforcement HPO measures, focus was placed upon four primary high performance 
statistics or traits: 1) Survey Results - the perception a citizen has about the law 
enforcement services provided in their locality and how safe and secure they feel in 
factors that are key to high quality of life; 2) Crime Index – data from actual crimes 
committed; and 3) National Accreditation – recognition of a professionally managed law 
enforcement organization. The preceding indicators appear to be representative and an 
appropriate gauge for performance from both an internal (staff, elected official) and 
external (citizen, business, media) perspective. dependent and control variables to use, 
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the ICMA’s Performance Measurement Survey was a good source and Appendix C 
includes the complete population of those variables related to law enforcement services 
(ICMA, 2011). From this population of variables, the most relevant to the hypotheses 
were utilized in this research. Each of these four primary HPO statistics or traits is 
further addressed in the following sections. 
Performance and cost of services can also be influenced by factors that are not 
correlated to workplace practices or controlled by the locality which can result in 
variability between two otherwise similar law enforcement organizations. These would 
include: 1) Adverse weather; 2) Federal and state influences (e.g., mandates, funding, 
local taxing authority constraints, classification of correctional officers as law 
enforcement officers); 3) Socio-economic factors (e.g. household incomes, 
unemployment rate); 4) Overlapping law enforcement jurisdictions in service area (e.g., 
town-county, state law enforcement officer roles in localities); and 5) Demographic traits 
(e.g., density of service area, variations between citizen population and others served 
(business workers, visitors, tourists, college students, pass-through traffic), traffic 
congestion, road networks) (ICMA, 2011).  
In addition, the priority of law enforcement services amongst funding priorities of 
other services can change the investment in law enforcement and any correlated result 
outcomes associated with such investment. The locality may also have certain 
demographic and socio-economic traits similar to a comparable locality, but may have a 
large variance in its priority, citizen preferences or political philosophy to tax its citizens 
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and businesses in a comparable manner. Finally, local law enforcement policies may be 
different in administering and interpreting the law which could cause arrests to be higher 
or lower for certain crimes committed (ICMA, 2011). 
Even an otherwise simplistic measurement term for law enforcement from a 
citizen’s perspective - “response time” (how quickly a law enforcement officer responds 
on a service call) - is not universally defined as to the parameters to consistently 
calculate. In some local governments, the 911 call is received by a 911 center and 
dispatched directly to a responding law enforcement unit whereas in other local 
governments, the 911 center may transfer the call to the law enforcement organization 
for them to dispatch officers. Any calls that result in transferring to another entity would 
add to any response time from the citizen’s perspective of when the 911 call was first 
made, but the performance information tracked by the law enforcement division may 
only begin tracking the “response time” after getting the transferred call or when the call 
was actually dispatched to a responding law enforcement unit. Another factor that 
challenges comparability includes density bias as a higher density population has an 
inherent advantage in having a faster response time than a lower density population. 
Therefore, the performance measurement of “response time” has been excluded due to 
inconsistent manners between local governments of how such measurement is reported 
and natural variances that arise because of density attributes.   
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Survey Results - National Citizens Survey 
Measures of high performance include customer satisfaction with service 
(effectiveness measures) that is obtained via survey with citizens. The International 
City-County Managers Association (ICMA) has a partnership with the National 
Research Center, Inc. (NRC) to promote a product called National Citizens Survey 
(NCS). ICMA is a recognized professional membership-based organization serving local 
government managers. NRC is a professionally recognized survey business that is 
contracted by local governments to perform standardized surveys that provides a report 
with comparable results of other local governments. There are many survey questions 
to citizens that inquire about quality of services and quality of life attributes.  
NRC has a current inventory from 2002-2011 of over 250 localities in 41 states, 
but it also compiles information from another 300 local governments that had other 
survey institutions conducting similar surveys of local government services (NRC, 
2012). The surveys of local governments reflect results 2002–2011, with the most 
recent local government’s survey represented in the sample size. Because many local 
governments benefit from cyclical surveys every 2-3 years, much of the sample size 
reflects surveys conducted 2008-2011. This concentration 2008-2011 also correlates to 
the time frames utilized for crime rates, Census data, financial results and other 
variables utilized in data analysis. As public access to the NCS database of all localities 
and their survey results is not publicly available, a phone conversation with the NRC 
Director Tom Miller enabled access to this information. The only caveat to gaining 
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access to this database is that specific local government survey results cannot be 
reproduced publicly. 
 Because local governments elect to participate in such surveys and pay NRC to 
conduct the survey, a self-selection bias may arise in the results of data. This bias 
arises as population of data may not be a random sample amongst the entire population 
of local governments and their law enforcement organizations. However, this bias is 
mitigated based upon the following: 1) The NCS is not designed solely to gauge law 
enforcement services performance, but rather all local government services; therefore 
law enforcement service performance attributes are part of a much larger review with 
the local government governing body or chief administrative officers contracting for the 
survey (and not the law enforcement chief); 2) The NCS process does utilize random 
sampling methods for its survey, so the underlying results by locality meet standardized 
random sampling principles; and 3) Additional demographic information about the local 
governments were accumulated to determine their composite demographic 
representation amongst all local governments. The results of the composite 
demographic analysis are included in Chapter 4 – Findings. Table 3.2: The National 
Citizen Survey Methods and Goals summarize the NCS (NRC, 2012): 
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Table 3.2: The National Citizen Survey Methods and Goals  
Survey Objectives  Assessment Methods  
 *Identify community strengths and weaknesses  
 *Identify service strengths and weaknesses  
 *Multi-contact mailed survey  
 *Representative sample of 1,200 residents 
and households  
 *5% margin of error  
 *Data statistically weighted to reflect 
population  
Assessment Goals  
 Immediate: 
 *Provide useful information for:  
 *Planning resource allocation  
 *Performance measurement  
 *Program and policy  
 Long-term:  
 *Improve services  
 *More civic engagement  
 *Better community quality  
 *Stronger public trust  
  
Survey validity can be segmented into two parts: 1) How can a locality be 
confident that the results from those who completed the survey are representative of the 
results that would been obtained had the survey been administered to the entire 
population? and 2) How closely do the perspectives recorded on the survey reflect what 
residents really believe or do? (NRC, 2011). In addressing the first question, NRC 
attempts to have high response rates via mail surveys to residents within a local 
government in a manner consistent with the original Dillman Approach: 1) Respondent-
friendly questionnaire; 2) Multiple contacts by first-class mail (e.g., respondents 
contacted three times by NCS); 3) Return postage free envelopes; and 4) Personalized 
correspondence (e.g., letter from mayor encouraging citizen to respond) (Thorpe, 2009). 
Revised Dillman approaches, also known as Tailored-Designed Method (TDM), which 
include token financial incentives, are not deployed by NRC. 
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Because of a vested and affiliated nature that exists amongst citizens of their 
locality, response rates traditionally range between 20 – 45%; which together with the 
randomness of the sample selection enable sample error rates of less than 5% (NRC, 
2011). For example, in Hanover County, Virginia’s NCS in 2011, 1200 households were 
randomly selected with 458 surveys returned for a 39% response rate (NRC, 2011). In 
addition, for Hanover County, NRC states that the confidence interval is 95% which 
indicates that for every “100 random samples of 1200 households, 95 of the confidence 
intervals created will include the “true” population response” (NRC, 2011, p. 83). 
“Survey data weighting” is another attribute deployed by NRC to better align the 
sample with the demographic characteristics of the population and is accomplished via: 
1) “Reviewing sampling demographics and comparing them to the population norms 
from the most recent census or other sources; and 2) Comparing the responses to 
different questions for demographic subgroups” (NRC, 2011, p. 85). NRC utilizes a 
special software program using mathematical algorithms to calculate the appropriate 
weights to best fit the data to the demographic profile.  
Additional NCS attributes in determining the confidence of the results include 
(NRC, 2012): 1) Over-sampling of multi-family housing units to improve response from 
hard-to-reach, lower income or younger apartment dwellers; 2) Selecting the 
respondent within the household using an unbiased sampling procedure whereby the 
member of the household asked to respond to the survey is over 18 who most recently 
had a birthday; 3) Offering survey in non-English; and 4) Use most current demographic 
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database of locality to best produce representative sample whereby every nth 
household is systematically selected.  
In addressing the second question of how closely does the survey’s results 
reflect what the people really believe, the citizen’s expectations of service quality play a 
role as well as the objective quality of the service itself provided. NCS research has 
concluded that there is a strong correlation between low survey results in a specific 
topical question being asked (e.g., how safe do you feel?) and low performance 
attributes of the local government organization administering the service (e.g., law 
enforcement) (NRC, 2011).   Even if there is a disparity between the results (e.g., low 
survey result, but HPO confirmed via other means), local government officials cannot 
ignore citizen opinion. Using a non-law enforcement example cited by NRC - even if you 
collect trash three times a day, but residents think that your trash haul is poor, the local 
government still has an issue to overcome with the citizens (NRC, 2011). However, 
strategies in overcoming perception may be more easily developed and deployed (e.g., 
marketing, citizen focus groups) compared to strategies in overcoming poor 
performance (e.g., additional resources, costs, law changes, training). 
 All of the following questions as they pertain to law enforcement services from 
NCS surveys were included in this research analysis:  
 Please rate how safe or unsafe you feel from the following (potential answers are 
very safe, somewhat safe, neither safe nor unsafe, somewhat unsafe, very 
unsafe, don’t know) 
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o Violent crimes (e.g., rape, assault, robbery) 
o Property crimes (e.g., burglary, theft) 
o In your neighborhood during the day 
o In your neighborhood after dark 
o In shopping areas during the day 
o In shopping areas after dark 
 Please rate the quality of law enforcement services (potential answers are 
excellent, good, fair, poor” or don’t know) 
An additional question from the survey will help capture any correlation or 
variance between collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining localities and their 
citizens’ viewpoint of quality of life compared to law enforcement services. This will be 
further addressed under control variables. The entire survey was examined to 
determine if additional questions would be helpful as part of this research analysis and it 
appears that the overall quality of life question best represents the non-law 
enforcement-related questions. Many of the other questions were for other services of 
the local government as well as perceptions about other attributes of the local 
government and their community. 
For purposes of data input, the average overall score will be indexed to reflect 
one variable and its intensity of rating. For example, excellent-good % of total and very 
safe-somewhat safe % of total. For purposes of calculating the total, those respondents 
who didn’t answer the question or noted “don’t know” were excluded from the total. 
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Another resource provided from the surveys is demographic information that will help 
populate some of the control variables that are addressed later in this chapter. There 
may be some local governments that do not formally, or at least statistically, survey their 
customers and this also would be an undesirable trait for any aspiring HPO. 
Through factor analysis, the survey questions can be grouped together to 
determine correlations within the questions. This enables ordinal data to better 
represent normal distributions. The “measured variables depend on a smaller number of 
unobserved (latent) factors” and because each factor may affect “several variables in 
common,” they are known as "common factors" (Mathworks, 2012, p.1). “Each variable 
is assumed to depend on a linear combination of the common factors, and the 
coefficients are known as loadings” and with each measured variable, it also includes a 
“component due to independent random variability, known as "specific variance" 
because it is specific to one variable” (Mathworks, 2012, p.1). 
There are qualitative aspects to any survey as surveys represent a respondent’s 
perceptions of what they think about the question being posed to them. Survey 
respondents are not necessarily given the time, data and other quantitative information 
needed to form an educated response to the question. Rather, they are asked to 
respond in a fairly quick manner within a finite range of options to what they think about 
the question being posed to them.  
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Crime Index – Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) had developed two measures to 
uniformly capture the type, intensity, volume and citizen reporting of crime. These two 
measures are: 1) National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) which reports via sample 
surveys reported and unreported crime from the victim's perspective; and 2) Uniform 
Crime Reports (UCR) based upon standardized local reporting by local law enforcement 
organizations to the FBI. DOJ recommends use of both of these complimentary and 
comprehensive indicators to assess crime and its trends in the United States (USDOJ, 
2012). Some of the differences between UCR and NCVS are illustrated in the Table 3.3: 
Comparison Between Uniform Crime Rate (UCR) and National Crime Victimization 
Survey (NCVS) (USDOJ, 2012). However, because the NCVS data is not segmented by 
locality, it is not able to be used as part of this research.  
Table 3.3: Comparison Between Uniform Crime Rate (UCR) and  
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) 
  UCR NCVS 
Geographic 
coverage 
National and State estimates, local law 
enforcement organization reports 
National estimates 
Collection 
method 
Reports by law enforcement organization 
to the FBI on a monthly basis 
Survey of over 77,000 households and 
134,000 individuals age 12 or older. 
Measures 
Index of serious types of crimes reported 
by law enforcement 
Reported and unreported crime; details 
about the crimes, victims, and offenders 
 The UCR Part I crimes is the common reference point for serious crimes. The 
UCR Part I crimes data is reduced by “unfounded cases” whereby an initial crime 
reported is later removed from the report due to defined circumstances (e.g., victim 
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recants that a crime ever took place). Not included in UCR Part I crimes are unreported 
crimes as some crime victims are unwilling to report offenses against themselves for 
fear of retribution from the offender whereas others report actions as criminal even 
though they may not be criminal (ICMA, 2011). While these constraints are noted, it is 
not possible to segment out the variations between localities that may exist in reporting 
and citizen’s willingness to report. For purposes of this research, it is assumed that such 
variations are immaterial in their influence of the analytical results. 
 The UCR Part I crimes are classified between violent and property crimes. 
Violent crimes include aggravated assault, forcible rape, murder and robbery. Property 
crimes include arson, burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft. The UCR Part II 
crimes are considered less severe and include, but are not limited to, simple assault, 
loitering, embezzlement, forgery, disorderly conduct, driving under the influence, drug 
offenses, gambling, prostitution, sex offenses, stolen property, vandalism and weapons 
offenses (USDOJ, 2012). When multiple crimes are committed by the same offender in 
one event, only the most serious of all the crimes committed is reported. For purposes 
of this research, only UCR Part I crimes are captured in determining crime indexes; as 
there may be more variability in which localities record UCR Part II crimes. The 
comparison between actual crime rates and the survey response results noted in the 
previous section of a citizen’s perception of crime will help illustrate any correlation or 
contrast between actual crime and its perception. Figure 3.1: Violent Crime, Arrests, 
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Reports and Unknown helps capture the manners in which crimes are reported or not 
reported (Robey, 2012). 
Figure 3.1: Violent Crime, Arrests, Reports and Unknown 
 
A source for the crime rates is the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports database in 
which all localities have information self-reported to one source. This information is also 
available for the public to review and was utilized as a source for this research (FBI, 
2010). The most recent complete data source year available is 2010. As violent crimes 
are more serious in nature than property crimes, but property crimes are more 
voluminous, each of these crime rates will be captured and analyzed separately in order 
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to not distort the violent crime rate. The denominator will be the total demand; which in 
this case is planned to be population In order to present the modified crime rate index 
as an appropriate ratio and not a small fractional ratio, the crimes over the demand 
indicator will be multiplied by a factor of 10,000.  
Accreditation – Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) 
The pursuit and attainment of national accreditation for local government law 
enforcement is recognized as a HPO trait in ensuring compliance to generally accepted 
standards of the profession. The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) was formed in 1987 by the four major national law enforcement 
associations: International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Organization for 
Black Law Enforcement Executives, National Sheriff’s Association and Police Executive 
Research Forum. CALEA has published a standards manual containing professional 
standards that address nine major law enforcement areas: 1) Role, responsibilities, and 
relationships; 2) Organization, management, and administration; 3) Personnel structure; 
4) Personnel process; 5) Operations; 6) Operation support; 7) Traffic operations; 8) 
Detainee and court-related activities; and 9) Auxiliary and technical services (CALEA, 
2012).  
As Table 3.4: CALEA Certifications by Type of Organization illustrates, there are 
605 organizations in the United States that have earned CALEA accreditation and once 
accredited, the local organization is required to get reaccredited every three years 
(CALEA, 2012). Of these 605 organizations, only the first three classifications would be 
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subject to a local government survey utilizing NCS; therefore it can be assumed that 
there are potentially 487 local government law enforcement organizations that have 
received CALEA national accreditation. 
 
Table 3.4: CALEA Certifications by Type of Organization 
Organization Type CALEA Certification 
Municipal (City, Town) 390 
Sheriff’s Office 78 
County Law Enforcement 19 
State Organizations 29 
Campus Law Enforcement 57 
Other (e.g. Railroad Authorities) 32 
Total 605 
 
From the U.S. Department of Justice’s (2008) Census of State and Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies, there are 12,501 (80.3% of total) local police departments and 
3,063 sheriff offices (19.7% of total) in the United States for a total 15,564. As noted in 
the types of local government control variable, many law enforcement agencies may be 
overlapping in nature and for many small towns, the law enforcement coverage may be 
performed though inter-local agreements or oversight (e.g., County sheriff for town). 
The standards denote what a law enforcement organization should be doing 
while illustrating compliance with established standards. However, this does not 
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necessarily refer to how the standard is performed or implemented as there is permitted 
variability and discretion deferred to individual local law enforcement organizations. 
There are over 600 standards that comprise over 80 categories. For example, one 
category is titled “Criminal Investigation” and one standard in this category states “if the 
criminal investigative function does not provide 24-hour coverage, an “on-call” schedule 
of investigators is maintained” (CALEA, 2012, p. 1). However, flexibility and discretion is 
given to the local law enforcement organization on how such schedule is developed, 
deployed and reviewed for effectiveness. 
The standards help law enforcement organizations in the following manners: 1) 
Strengthen crime prevention and control capabilities; 2) Formalize essential 
management procedures; 3) Establish fair and nondiscriminatory personnel practices; 
4) Improve service-delivery; 5) Solidify inter-organization cooperation and coordination; 
and 6) Boost citizen and staff confidence in the organization (CALEA, 2012). 
Organizations that seek accreditation are required to comply only with those standards 
that are specifically applicable to them. Applicability is based on two factors: 1) 
Organization’s size; and 2) Functions it performs. Applicable standards are categorized 
as mandatory or other-than-mandatory. Organizations must comply with all applicable 
mandatory standards and at least 80% of applicable other-than-mandatory standards. If 
an organization cannot comply with a standard because of legislation, labor 
agreements, court orders, or case law, waivers can be sought from CALEA. However, 
there are very few local law enforcement organizations amongst the 605 that have 
sought a waiver because of their labor agreement. Therefore, while such waiver factor 
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may be worthy of a separate analysis, it was not considered a determining factor for this 
research analysis.  
As an overview to their accreditation standards, CALEA provides the following 
benchmarks (CALEA, 2012): 
 Requires an organization to develop a comprehensive and uniform set of written 
directives to reach goals, while also providing direction to personnel 
 Provide the necessary reports and analyses a law enforcement chief needs to 
make fact-based, informed management decisions  
 Requires a preparedness program be put in place so an organization is ready to 
address natural or man-made unusual occurrences.  
 Means for developing or improving upon an organization’s relationship with the 
community 
 Strengthens an organization’s accountability, both within the organization and the 
community, through a continuum of standards that clearly define authority, 
performance, and responsibilities  
 Limit an organization’s liability and risk exposure because it demonstrates that 
internationally recognized standards for law enforcement have been met, as 
verified by a team of independent outside CALEA-trained assessors 
 Facilitates an organization’s pursuit of professional excellence 
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For some local law enforcement organizations, national CALEA accreditation is 
not pursued because of the equivalent value, lower cost and general acceptance for 
those states that have their own state accreditation process. As an example, the 
Virginia Law Enforcement Professional Standards Commission (VLEPSC) is managed 
by the State’s Department of Criminal Justice Services and was created in 1993 by the 
governing bodies of the Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police and the Virginia Sheriff’s 
Association. The VLEPSC’s 187 professional standards are in four areas 
(administration, operations, personnel and training). In 2011, there were 82 law 
enforcement organizations in Virginia with VLEPSC accreditation (Va DCJS, 2012). 
Once accredited, the organization is required to be reaccredited every four years. Of 
these 82 organizations with Virginia accreditation, only three also have national CALEA 
accreditation. However, there are 19 Virginia law enforcement organizations that just 
have CALEA accreditation and no VLEPSC accreditation. From a national perspective, 
of the 605 organizations with CALEA accreditation, there appears to be similar 
dynamics to Virginia in which many more have state accreditation, some of which have 
both state and national accreditation and some just have national accreditation. 
Because of the variability of state accreditation practices (e.g., some states may have 
standards similar to CALEA whereas other states may have far less demanding 
standards resulting in easier accreditation), only the national accreditation measure will 
be used in representing a HPO trait of law enforcement organization. 
CALEA actually recognizes law enforcement organizations that are in the self-
assessment phase as part of their CALEA accreditation-seeking process. This step is 
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required prior to a site visit and formal accreditation review. From discussions with 
CALEA Accreditation Assessor Doug Goodman, it appears that any organization that is 
at that step in the accreditation process will seek the formal accreditation review and 
very often, such organization has demonstrated traits of HPO as part of self-
assessment (Goodman, 2012). In essence, the self-assessment helps position the law 
enforcement organization to know the accreditation standards and enables them to 
implement such standards prior to the formal accreditation review. Therefore, as part of 
the data analysis, those law enforcement organizations that are part of the sample that 
have been identified to be part of the self-assessment process will be recognized to 
have 50% of the accreditation HPO trait as opposed to 0% for those organizations that 
have chosen to not participate at all in such process. 
Composite Performance Measure 
The preceding measures comprise a representative array of performance 
attributes for law enforcement agencies. In order to convert these individual measures 
into one composite performance measure, each of the dependent variables are 
converted to a quantitative ordinal measure and assigned a weight so that all of the 
dependent variables are best represented in the one ordinal measure. Therefore, 
additional coding was needed for the composite performance measure in order to 
position the data for consistent and comparable statistical analysis via a 100-point 
scale. The composite performance survey questions were on a 100-point % scale that 
was converted to 100-point scale via multiplying factor of 100. The accreditation 
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variable, as noted previously, was converted to a 100 point scale (0 – none, 50 – self-
assessment, 100 – accreditation). The violent and property crime rate indices were 
each ranked. Those with the lowest index were assigned a 100-point scale value of 100 
and the highest index were assigned a 100-point scale of 1 with incremental 
assignments between 1 to 100 applied to the remainder of the sample. Table 3.5: 
Composite Performance Measure illustrates how each of these variables can be 
transformed into a performance (“return”) composite measure.  
Table 3.5: Composite Performance Measure 
Dependent 
Variable Measure 
Initial Score 
Range 
Process to 
Convert to 
100 Scale 
Additional 
Process to 
Classify 1 -
100 
Weighted 
Average 
Survey questions 
on feeling safe 
Average Score of 
six questions 1-100 No change No change 25% 
Survey question 
on law 
enforcement office 
quality 
Score of one 
question 1-100 No change No change 25% 
Crime rate 
Crime rate for UCR 
Part I Violent (50% 
weighted) and 
Property (50% 
weighted)  
Calculated 
index for 
Violent and 
Property 
Lowest rate 
given "100", 
scaled down 
to highest 
rate at "1" 
No 
additional 
change 
40% 
(20% 
violent, 
20% 
property)  
Accreditation 
Accreditation, Self-
Assessment 
Process or No 
Accreditation 
Yes, Self-
Assessment 
or None 
Yes =100, 
Self-
Assessment 
= 50, None = 
0 
No 
additional 
change 10% 
Total Composite 
Performance 
Measure 
    
100% 
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The weighted average percent ranges from 10% - 25% amongst the five 
dependent variable categories. While these weighted average scales are subjective in 
nature, it was important to define these weighted averages prior to the calculations of 
the HPRC formula on the sample in order to negate unintended bias. For each of the 
weighted criteria, a rationale behind its weighted average is described as follows: 
 Survey Questions on Feeling Safe (25%): A very important attribute from 
the perspective of a citizen and the safety of their environment (home, 
work, shopping, etc.). Although this ranking may be a perception of the 
citizen, such perceptions are based upon a rationale from the citizen’s 
perspective. In order for a citizen and their community to have the 
opportunities for a higher quality of life, the ability of the local government 
to provide a sense of safety for the citizen, their family, their employer and 
other activities the citizen participates in warrant such a high weighted 
average criteria in this attribute. As an inherent goal for any locality should 
be to perform services in a manner to achieve an outcome of having their 
citizens feel safe, the high weighted average criteria for this attribute is 
warranted. 
 Survey Question on Law Enforcement Office Quality (25%): Another 
important attribute from a citizen’s perspective in how their law 
enforcement office performs. While there may be high correlations 
between a citizen’s perspective of how safe they feel and the quality of the 
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law enforcement office, the importance of distinguishing this attribute 
separate and apart from feeling safe is recognizing the HPO potential from 
the law enforcement services perspective, not the safety outcomes that 
the feeling safe and crime rate attributes capture.  
 Crime Rate (20% violent, 20% property): Whereas the previous two 
criteria are based upon the perspective of the citizen and account for 50% 
of the weighted average, the crime rate is based upon actual measures of 
crime. The two primary manners in which crime rates are determined are 
violent and property, each of which is important from measuring the 
relative impact and volume of crime to its community. The factors at 20% 
each are less than the 25% factors applied to the survey questions as the 
survey questions recognize an essential key of a quality of life from a 
citizen’s perspective whereas there may be other variables that affect 
crime rates in comparing them between localities as noted previously 
(e.g., different demand indicators of business and tourism that are not 
reflected in the denominator of citizens).   
 Accreditation (10%): While accreditation at 10% is ranked the lowest, it is 
still an important variable. The low ranking was primarily a result of the 
voluntary nature in which law enforcement organizations participate in the 
national accreditation process; and also recognizes that the time, cost and 
other options available (e.g., State accreditation) may negate an otherwise 
high performing law enforcement organization from participating in the 
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national accreditation process. However, because accreditation is a good 
indicator of an organization’s desire to perform at higher levels and attain 
HPO attributes, it is worthy of being included in the weighted average 
calculation; even if it is just 10%. 
 
Performance Measure Not Utilized - Clearance Rate  
Crime rates alone are not an absolute guide as to the performance of local law 
enforcement organizations. While the crime rates are most commonly used for 
measuring overall law enforcement performance, “the incidence of crime is a function of 
many factors unrelated to law enforcement activity”; therefore “crime rates alone are 
insufficient” measures of law enforcement performance (More, 1979, p. 318). Because 
of that limitation, other measurements were sought for law enforcement performance 
(e.g., surveys, accreditation).  
However, another recognized measure of performance, clearance rate, was 
researched, but ultimately not included as an appropriate measure for this research. A 
clearance rate measures the ability to bring closure to a reported crime. While the 
efforts of the investigative division of the law enforcement organization are highly 
correlated with the clearance results, there are still external factors that can cause 
differentiations between law enforcement organizations. These differences include: 1) 
Complexity of the crime and quality of evidence (e.g., how well was crime scene 
preserved); 2) Willingness and ability of witnesses to assist; 3) Death of the possible 
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suspect; and 4) Extradition challenges for suspected offenders being charged and 
detained elsewhere for another crime (ICMA, 2011). 
Although a valid measure of performance (via ability and effort of law 
enforcement personnel to “clear” a crime, this measure was not reliable enough to be 
captured for this research for the following reasons: 1) Inability of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) to easily and publicly disclose such data at the local government 
level; 2) Inconsistency of reporting between local governments of what constitutes a 
crime being cleared; 3) Challenges in reporting of cleared crimes in one year for a crime 
that occurred in a prior year in developing a ratio of “clearance rate” that is comparable 
amongst local governments; and 4) Less emphasis of FBI and localities to disclose and 
report, respectively, clearance rates for public consumption and comparability amongst 
localities. Although not utilized, research in the clearance rate was performed to 
determine any contributions such research would have in furthering this or future 
research projects.  
Ideally, data recordation systems would record information into varying 
demographic attributes to enable better analysis to be conducted to determine if there 
may be other factors influencing performance and costs from a demographic or socio-
economic perspective. This is an especially important validation procedure for law 
enforcement services as the demand for such services may vary by factors others than 
population (e.g., higher density areas may have more efficient delivery methods for law 
enforcement response, higher unemployment areas may have higher per capita law 
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enforcement responses). Again, a challenge for any HPO, public or private sector, is 
being able to know their customers and their preferences; with this knowledge benefited 
from also knowing the demographics of their customers through appropriate data 
collection techniques that can be done in a professional and non-intrusive or bias-free 
manner. 
A study of local governments was performed by Wellford and Cronin (2000) that 
determined that there were two dominant traits correlated to higher clearance rates for 
homicides: 1) Performance factors of local law enforcement organization; and 2) Types 
of weapons used to commit crime. As it pertains to performance, policies and practices 
can have a “substantial impact on the clearance of homicide cases and can be 
increased by improving certain investigation policies and procedures involving the 
actions taken by the first officer to the scene, how quickly detectives arrive on the scene 
and the subsequent actions they take, and how many resources the organization 
dedicates to the investigation” (Wellford and Cronin, 2000, p.1). Additional performance 
factors identified as significant in Wellford and Cronin’s study include the ability to 
secure the crime scene, identify and reach out to potential witnesses, assigning multiple 
detectives to the case, detective response times to crime scene, and use of technology 
(e.g., crime lab work on weapons, gun checks in national systems).  
While the positive effects of clearance rate can be attributable to the law 
enforcement organization’s performance, the inability to accurately capture and 
compare such data in its current state warrants exclusion of such measure from this 
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research. The performance attributes utilized for this research are of such quality to 
properly distinguish low from high performing law enforcement organizations and 
formulate a composite performance measure to be analyzed in hypotheses 1 and 3. 
 
Dependent Variable - Law Enforcement Cost per Capita 
Law enforcement organizations “traditionally have been more concerned with 
measures of resources than with measures of results” (More, 1979, p. 323). The 
expenditures (or costs as these terms can be used interchangeably) to provide law 
enforcement services are comprised of personal services (salaries and fringe benefits), 
operating (e.g., supplies, fuel, training, contractual services) and capital (e.g., vehicles). 
The first source for actual expenditures of personnel, operating and capital will be 
ICMA’s FY10 Police Services from ICMA’s annual compilation of local government 
services for their Performance Measurement Report (ICMA, 2011). For those localities 
not part of the voluntary submittal of costs, state databases that compile actual costs for 
local government comparative reporting will be reviewed. For states that do not provide 
such comparative budget reports of local governments, then secondary data sources 
will be sought (e.g., individual local government budgets).  
The law enforcement workforce is generally comprised of sworn officers or its 
equivalent and the civilian workforce that provides administrative and support services. 
Efforts were not made to try and segment the sworn officers and their costs separate 
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and apart from non-sworn personnel as such data was not readily available. For 
purposes of this research, it is assumed that such non-sworn officer support services 
are proportionally the same amongst localities. In addition, the support services are an 
integral component to such HPOs and CALEA accreditation has many standards that 
could not be compliant without such support service efforts. 
Actual costs as compared to budgeted costs will be utilized in order to better 
gauge the actual resources of the local government committed to law enforcement 
Efforts will be made to ascertain accounting classifications to ensure that similar 
expenditures amongst law enforcement organizations are recognized in a similar 
fashion. In order for expenditure data to be comparable, the expenditures will be divided 
by population for per capita measures. It is not anticipated that any variability in these 
expenditure data gathering methods would otherwise reflect a materially different result 
in positioning a certain locality or aggregate localities, with similar other performance 
and demographic information, in yielding a different result in Chapter 4 – Findings. 
However, as more complete data is gathered for certain localities, additional efforts will 
be made to determine what volatility exists, if any, amongst these categories and its 
impact, if any, upon results. 
Dependent Variable - High Performance Return on Costs 
As noted in Chapter 2, the high performance return on costs (HPRC) composite 
measure attempts to compare high performance traits to the correlating costs that may 
have contributed to such high performance traits. The HPRC formula modified for law 
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enforcement services can be expressed as HPRC = Total composite performance 
measure (for law enforcement)/Law enforcement costs per capita. The higher the ratio, 
the higher the performance is relative to the costs.  
 
Control Variables – Demographic, Socio-Economic and Other Measures 
There are many control variables which can illustrate the environment that exists 
in a locality for which law enforcement services would need to be configured, funded 
and managed to achieve reasonable and representative results considering such 
environmental factors. In determining the population of control variables to use, the 
ICMA Comparative Performance Measurement Program (more information in Appendix 
C) includes a detail of those variables related to law enforcement services or control 
variables (ICMA, 2011). These control variables are not manipulated as part of the 
research similar to the independent variables or measured after a manipulation has 
occurred similar to dependent variables. Certain control variables selected for the 
sample population will also be utilized in an additional random sample of medians of the 
United States to determine the variance between the sample population utilized in this 
research and the overall medians of the United States. The control variables are 
addressed in two categories: 1) Municipal bond ratings (uninsured) and 2) Other 
demographic and socio-economic measures.  
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Municipal Bond Ratings (Uninsured) 
Municipal bond ratings are used as a measure to give existing and prospective 
bond holders an assessment of risk for the debt obligation of the locality. The higher the 
bond rating, the lower the risk of default. There are three primary bond rating agencies 
recognized: Moody’s Investors Service, 2) Standard and Poor’s; and 3) Fitch Ratings. 
The ratings scale vary slightly amongst the three rating agencies and are illustrated in 
Table 3.6: Bond Rating Scales of Three Primary Rating Agencies, but generally range 
from the highest and best rating of AAA to generally nine incremental lower ratings (WM 
Financial, 2012). The rating variations for most localities municipal debt is within the first 
ten incremental ratings and are classified as “investment grade” (Moody’s, 2009, p.1).  
Some localities may not have issued debt or have acquired debt financing in 
different manners (e.g., bank loans, state loans, insured bonds that default to AAA 
through bond insurance) for which an uninsured bond rating does not exist. The rating 
agencies generally base a bond rating on a composite of the following factors specific to 
the local government: 1) Economic factors (e.g., unemployment rate, business 
environment); 2) Debt factors which include outstanding debt burden ratios (e.g., debt 
per capita, debt to assessed value, debt service to actual expenditures) and pay down 
ratios of existing debt, which is how fast (measured in years) the principal portion of the 
overall debt portfolio will be retired within five and ten years; 3) Administrative factors 
(e.g., skilled and stable leaders); and 4) Financial factors (e.g., fund balance levels). 
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Table 3.6: Bond Rating Scales of Three Primary Rating Agencies 
   
Moody's 
Standard  & 
Poor's 
 
Fitch 
Best Quality Aaa  AAA AAA 
High Quality Aa1 
Aa2 
Aa3 
 
AA+ 
AA  
AA- 
 
AA+ 
AA  
AA- 
 
Upper Medium Grade A1 
A2 
A3 
 
A+ 
A  
A- 
 
A+ 
A  
A- 
 
Medium Grade Baa1 
Baa2 
Baa3 
 
BBB+ 
BBB  
BBB- 
 
BBB+ 
BBB  
BBB- 
 
 
Bond ratings for a locality’s debt issuance may receive a AAA bond rating for 
factors not associated with the four previously mentioned factors. These higher bond 
ratings are the result of bond insurance; an insurance program whereby a premium is 
paid to bond insurance agencies to provide additional protections to bondholders in the 
event of default. The insurance premium cost is generally proportional to how far the 
locality’s actual underlying bond rating would have been from AAA. For example, a 
locality that would have naturally received an A bond rating (underlying rating) would 
pay a higher insurance premium for the AAA insured bond rating than an underlying AA 
bond rated locality. Underlying ratings information is not made formally available to the 
locality as they are not formally issued as part of the debt issuance process. Because 
these insured AAA bond ratings are not representative of the fiscal health of a locality, 
the proper measure for bond ratings are uninsured bond ratings. 
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In best positioning the sample using the variable of bond ratings, the data 
analysis will utilize one of the rating agencies – Moody’s Investors Services. The 
rationale of focusing more specifically on those local governments with bond ratings at 
A or above, would then be based upon the following factors: 1) 3,104 of the 3,197 local 
governments (> 97%) that have bond uninsured ratings, have such ratings at or greater 
than A bond rating (Moody’s, 2012); 2) Sufficient size and scope enabling a more 
complete array of data to be compiled (e.g., citizen surveys, crime statistics, budgetary 
information); and 3) Opportunity for HPO-based policies and practices to be developed, 
implemented and monitored.  
As ordinal scales are developed for the statistical analysis, a no rating 
connotation therefore does not mean that it is below an A rating. However, because 
there appears to be correlations through observation between governments of a lower 
size and scope and no or uninsured bond ratings, the no rating connotation may be 
suitable for such statistical purposes.  
As Figure 3.2: Adjusted Bond Rating Scale illustrates, the incremental changes in 
the bond rating scale are not linear, but rather have higher incremental interest rate 
savings between lower bond rating scale improvements (e.g., A to AA), then changes 
between higher bond rating scale improvements (e.g., AA to AAA). Therefore, in 
assigning a scaled value to the bond rating, each of the incremental ordinal values (1 
through 7) will be subject to an inverse transformation as such a linear scale better 
reflects the change in incremental bond rating changes. For example the value of 1 
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converts to 0, 2 converts to .69, 3 coverts to 1.1, 4 converts to 1.39, 5 converts to 1.61, 
6 converts to 1.79 and 7 converts to 1.95.  
 
Figure 3.2: Adjusted Bond Rating Scale 
 
 
Additional Control Variables (Demographic, Socio-Economic and Other Measures) 
The following additional control variables are available from the United States 
Census and will be used in helping frame comparative analysis amongst similar 
localities that may have a different independent variable of collective bargaining. For 
many of these variables, the U.S. Census five-year estimate 2006 - 2010 is utilized as 
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the source. This range actually matches well to the sample’s reporting period of 2002 – 
2011.  
 Population (000): This is the demand statistic for a local government’s law 
enforcement services. The size of the population in prior research has been 
correlated to higher crime statistics from a per capita and related demand 
statistic perspective (Ellis, Beaver and Wright, 2009). In order to ensure 
consistency, population variable was derived from the U.S. Census and its 2011 
estimate. Efforts were made to determine if there are other factors that warrant 
including additional demand traits in addition to the population. Examples would 
include hotel rooms which may better reflect tourist or business destinations and 
the impact that they may bring upon law enforcement. Another example is the 
number employees in the locality as law enforcement services need to provide 
coverage to citizens and businesses; and the public safety risk activities that can 
be associated with certain businesses. However, because of inability to get 
consistent and reliable data for either hotel rooms or number of employees, such 
demand measures were not included. In order to not have the impact of small 
population localities distort data results, a minimum population threshold of 5,000 
was considered, but further scrutiny of the data in < 5,000 localities will be done 
in Chapter 4 – Findings to determine if removing such data influences results. 
This is because “communities with small populations, and subsequently small 
law enforcement forces, usually do not have law enforcement unions and yet 
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experience a higher proportionate level of law enforcement service expenditures” 
(Valetta, 1989, p. 433). As part of the data analysis, all surveyed localities will 
initially be included, but reviewed to determine if outliners that may affect the 
analysis are present with the smaller populated localities. Varying demographics 
of a locality can be a significant variable that influences the size and scope of a 
law enforcement organization. A related correlating demographic trait is rural vs. 
urban (which is also addressed in density measure) and size of population; 
whereby expenditures are higher in an urban environment (Feuille and Delaney, 
1986) and increases at higher rates as the population increases (Gely and 
Chandler, 1993). The population variable was converted to a 1000 unit measure 
(population/1000)  so as to have the unstandardized coefficient value be in a 
more understandable number. 
 Education Level (High School Graduates): An education level of the citizens 
may influence the need for law enforcement services. An increase in the 
educational level significantly reduces subsequent violent and property crimes 
with numerous other positive impacts upon the community (Lochner, 2008). The 
threshold for education level for this research will be the percentage of population 
over the age of 25 with a high school diploma or greater per the U.S. Census 
five-year estimate 2006-2010 (national average is 85.4%). Research indicates 
that about 75% of America’s state prison inmates, 59% of federal inmates and 
69% of jail inmates did not complete high school with these statistics increasing 
over prior years (Harlow, 2003). A commonly-used demographic that has mixed 
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correlations is education and law enforcement expenditures. While 
generalizations can be made that a lower educated citizenry may yield higher 
crime potential, as it pertains to expenditures, a Chandler and Gely (1995) study 
did not correlate education and expenditures. The mixed results may be 
attributable to a higher educated citizenry may be more understanding of law 
enforcement constraints and willing to commit higher law enforcement 
expenditures in providing for an even safer and more secure community.  
Chandler and Gely (1995) positively correlated the link of increasing percentage 
of residents with a high school education to the increased wages of law 
enforcement personnel. The education level may also be highly correlated to the 
employment potential of the citizen. In addition, as a person becomes further 
educated, they should have greater capacities to understand consequences of 
criminal activity and would therefore not engage in such activity. As noted under 
employment rate, the additional time that is spent occupied with a positive activity 
(e.g., school), reduces the idle time that could contribute to association with 
those with criminal intentions. 
 Wealth (Median Household Income (000)): Median household incomes, per the 
U.S. Census 2006-2010 five-year estimate, can provide a perspective of the 
relative wealth of a locality (national average $52,762). “Income inequality has 
been found to contribute significantly to increases in crime” (Hsieh and Pugh, 
1993). The wealth of a locality may also enable it to contribute to other factors 
that not only stem the increase of crime, but also provide an environment for 
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crime deterrence. An example may be higher taxes from a wealthier tax base 
that may contribute additional resources to law enforcement; not just additional 
law enforcement officers, but also in the various equipment and technologies that 
better enable deterrence and clearance of crimes committed. Another example of 
a wealthier tax base is additional security measures that can be afforded by 
citizens and businesses (e.g., home alarm systems, surveillance cameras, 
contracted security officers). These additional security measures can not only 
deter crimes from occurring, but also enable higher clearance rates through more 
timely notifications to law enforcement of a crime in progress or incriminating 
evidence via video or pictures of perpetrator. Median household income variable 
was converted to a 1000 unit measure (median household income/1000) so as to 
have the unstandardized coefficient value be a more understandable number. 
 Density: This represents population per square miles per the U.S. Census for 
2010 and can affect services that are more associated with density (national 
average 87.4 persons per square mile). Examples include: 1) Response times 
(although excluded as a performance measure because of comparability issued 
previously noted, it may factor into survey results); 2) Higher probability for calls 
for service (e.g., neighbor’s noise complaints); and 3) Type of community (e.g., 
urban, suburban, rural). However, the correlation to density and crime are not 
apparent from research conducted. Keith Harries (2006) concluded that in 
analysing a variety of density measures across communities, that there was no 
evidence of a differential between property and violent crimes based on 
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population density (Harries, 2006). As it is correlated to how often people come 
into contact with one another, Witt (1990, p. 171) concluded that population 
density was one of the most “influential variables” that influences law 
enforcement expenditures. 
 Unemployment Rate: Local governments need for law enforcement services 
may change based upon the unemployment rate. Policies designed to increase 
employment in cities and related studies have illustrated a positive correlation to 
higher employment and reduction in crime (Winter-Ebmer and Raphael, 2012). 
Examples often cited for this correlation include the responsibilities that are 
associated with a job and the wages earned by the employee cause the 
employee to be a more law abiding citizen. If the employee’s wages can provide 
for the needs of the employee and their family (e.g., food, shelter, clothing) as 
well as some luxuries (e.g., vacation, entertainment), then the employed citizen 
should not want to risk such provisions in committing a crime. Another 
contributing factor is simply time as the employed citizen’s additional forty hours 
plus per week is hours that are not otherwise spent idle and subject to criminal 
influences of others who may not be employed. In order to ensure consistency 
amongst the sample population, the U.S. Census 2006-2010 five-year estimate 
for unemployment rate will be utilized (national average is 8.7% unemployment 
rate). 
 Age (% Between 15 to 24): Local governments need for law enforcement 
services may change based upon the age of its population. For this research, the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 
 
age factor utilized is the population % between 15 to 24 years per the 2010 U.S. 
Census as the older (and younger) the population, the volume and severity of the 
crimes committed decreases (national average 13.5%). After age 24, a steep 
drop in criminal activity occurs as people take-on new roles (e.g., wage-earner, 
parent, spouse) and the possibility of jail time becomes a relatively more-serious 
matter because of the impact it will have on the perpetrators life and 
responsibilities (Sociology.org, 2012). As the US Census data for population is 
segmented into different strata every five years, there is the ability to segment 
the population for those above and below the age of 24.  
 Survey Question - Quality of Life: Being able to segment the sample 
population’s overall perception of quality of life may provide analytical results 
showing variances amongst local governments, independent variables and 
dependent variables. In addition, correlations between quality of life and survey 
results of law enforcement noted previously can also be analyzed. The NCS 
survey questions regarding law enforcement were previously addressed under 
dependent variables, but the following NCS survey question about quality of life 
is included as a control variable (NRC, 2011): “Please rate the overall quality of 
life” (potential answers are “excellent, “good,” “fair, “poor” or “don’t know). For the 
purposes of compiling results in this category “excellent” and “good” were 
combined as a result for positive quality of life measure. The “don’t know” 
attribute amongst the sample ranged from 0% - 4.8% (only three localities were > 
2.5%), but because such response rates were not included in the positive 
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measure and because such rates were so low, there appears to be no effect of 
such response category on the positive quality of life citizen rating. 
 Right-to-Work States: While the independent variable properly distinguishes 
between unionized and non-unionized law enforcement unions, some of these 
unions are permitted in right-to-work states and in some non-right-to-work states, 
there may not be a law enforcement union. As noted in Chapter 2 – Review of 
the Literature, it has been a state’s right to determine whether or not to permit 
collective bargaining (and the related unions needed to represent the worker) for 
local government employees and law enforcement officers. The threshold of 
enabling a union first divides each state into “right-to-work” (twenty-three states) 
and “agency shops” (twenty-seven states), whereby two tiers exist for the right-
to-work states: 1) The state, generally through its constitution (six states) or 
legislative code (seventeen states), defines whether or not a union can be 
established and if so, does it also enable public sector unions and if so, does it 
enable law enforcement unions which results in seven right-to-work states having 
law enforcement unions; and 2) If it does enable unions, then it can also define 
the employee’s right to join such union and the benefits that even a non-union 
employee receives from the union. The utilization of this attribute may illustrate if 
there are any variances in performance as a result of a state being classified as 
right-to-work state. As previously illustrated for Figure 2.4: Right-to-Work States 
Map and Table 3.1: Collective Bargaining State Laws for Public Employees, 
there appears to be a concentration of right-to-work states in the southeast 
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corridor and then the Midwest states from Texas north to Minnesota. While the 
right-to-work states are contiguous, as they stretch from Virginia to Nevada with 
some contiguous states only one-state wide across the country. As a 
comparison, the non-right-to-work states are virtually contiguous as well from 
Maine to California except for two states along the way (Montana and Idaho). 
The reason for this contiguous alignment of this many states may be the result of 
similar political philosophies or similar competition for business and workers.  
 Form of Government (County, City, Other): There are three primary types of 
local government structures: City, County and Town (includes all others as well 
(e.g., borough, parish)). They are reflected in Table 3.7: Governments in the 
United States (Census, 2002). Within each type of government, there may be a 
different manner in how the government is structured and managed which could 
contribute to variability in how performance is achieved. In order to account for 
the known variability of certain states whereby there are no overlapping 
jurisdictions of city and county (e.g., Virginia), county information will be further 
segmented between counties whose area is comprised of cities and/or towns or if 
there are no such 100% overlapping jurisdictions. The U.S. Census reflects the 
definition of City, County or Town as part of its data resource by locality. For 
purposes of defining the population, those identified as “county”, “municipal” or 
“town” would total 38,967; however as noted previously, because of overlapping 
services amongst two and possibly three local governments, the actual number 
of law enforcement organizations would accordingly be much lower. Further 
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classification on the number of local government law enforcement organizations 
(total 15,564) was previously addressed under Accreditation - CALEA; therefore, 
on average, there are about 2.5 local governments for every 1 law enforcement 
agency.   
Table 3.7: Governments in the United States 
 
Type Number 
Federal 1 
State 50 
County 3,034 
Municipal (city, town, village...) * 19,429 
Township (in some states called Town) ** 16,504 
School district 13,506 
Special purpose 
(utility, fire, law enforcement, library, etc.) 
35,052 
Total 87,576 
* Municipalities are any incorporated places (e.g., cities, towns, villages, boroughs) 
**New England, New York and Wisconsin  towns are classified as civil townships for census 
purposes 
 
There are two primary structures of local government: 1) Mayor-council; and 2) 
Council-manager. For mayor-council, voters elect both a mayor (who may also serve as 
the chief executive) and a city council and for council-manager, voters elect a city 
council (and possibly an independent mayor) to make public policy for the city, but the 
city council, in turn, appoints a professional city manager to serve as chief executive of 
the city and to administer public policy (Lineberry, 2012). The type and structure of local 
government may influence the type of law enforcement services needed. For the 
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purposes of this research, only the type of government will be captured for the sample 
size. 
 
Sampling Process and Data Collection 
A quantitative approach is taken in this research because of its nominal-level 
measurement. Quantitative approach represents numeric description on some subset of 
the population through data collection process which “enables a researcher to 
generalize the findings” (Creswell, 2009, p. 117). Through an exploratory cross-
sectional study utilizing SPSS, the data collection is a compilation of information 
generally available for local governments that can be further analyzed. In this type of 
research study, the entire population of the National Citizens Survey (NCS) local 
government participants was selected; which is a subset of the local government total 
population. It is from this population selected that data is collected to help answer the 
research question. It is called cross-sectional because the information about X and Y 
that is gathered represents what is going on at only one point in time; and in this case it 
would be the year of the most recent survey and related dependent and control 
variables in relatively close proximity to such survey date (Olsen and St. George, 2004). 
The subjects will be a sample of local governments.  
As the demographics and related control variables are accumulated for the 
survey group, efforts will be made to compare characteristics of the survey group to 
other local governments. This will help evaluate the representativeness of the survey 
group to local governments as a whole or better define what subset of local 
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governments the survey group may better represent. While there are over 30,000 local 
governments (including counties, cities and towns) according to the United States 
Census in 2002, the survey population of 238 was selected. In Chapter 4 - Findings, 
additional information is provided regarding many of the variables to help illustrate how 
the sample size compares to the population of local governments in this cross-sectional 
study. 
Additional techniques are needed to ensure the data is accurate and suitable for 
comparability as part of the analysis stage. The techniques to be deployed include the 
following: 
 Coding System: Because of the various data sources, a coding system will need 
to be constructed to proportionally align the variances amongst data within its set 
criteria and to also not proportionally distort it with data from another criteria data 
source.  
 Expenditure Reporting: Uniformity of expenditure reporting would need to be 
conducted to ensure that disparities, if any, between the manners in which local 
governments classify expenditures can be accounted for and adjusted 
accordingly.  
Design  
Construct validity is a means of assessing how well the measures being used 
assert themselves to be the proper measures. Through use of independent authoritative 
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sources of performance indicators and traditional sources of citizen surveys, the 
measures appear to be the proper measures.  
Through the use of statistical analysis, construct validity can further be analyzed. 
The primary manners in which data was analyzed are as follows: 
 Linear Regression: Linear Regression estimates the coefficients of the linear 
equation, involving one or more independent variables that best predict the value 
of the dependent variable (SPSS, 2009). Linear regression will be utilized for 
each of the hypothesis with focus on the beta standardized coefficient, t-scores 
and significance of the t test. As part of the output from the linear regression, the 
following focused areas helped determine the relationship of the independent 
variable and control variables to the each of the dependent variables (unless 
otherwise noted, definition sources are SPSS, 2009): 
o R Score: A Pearson’s correlation (also referenced as r) will illustrate a 
number between negative 1 (absolute negative correlation) and 1 
(absolute positive correlation) with a 0 serving as an absolute no 
correlation. As a general guideline of r and correlation is (positive or 
negative, as applicable): 1) None from .0 to .09; 2) Small from .1 to .3; 3) 
Medium from .3 to .5; and 4) Strong from .5 to 1; however, it should be 
cautioned that there is no universally accepted measure for correlation 
with regards to this statistic (Buda and Jarynowski, 2010). Another manner 
in which to evaluate the r strength of correlation is from Berman (2002) 
with strong = > .40 and very strong > .65 (Berman, 2002). 
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o Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) – F Value: The ANOVA F–test (of the null-
hypothesis that all treatments have exactly the same effect) is 
“recommended as a practical test, because of its robustness against many 
alternative distributions” (Moore and McCabe, 2003, p 763). The F Value 
is the value used to determine if the variances of the two distributions 
differ significantly from each other.  
o Collinearity Statistic – Variance Inflation Factor (VIF): Multicollinearity 
refers to the “presence of highly inter-correlated predictor variables in 
regression models, and its effect is to invalidate some of the basic 
assumptions underlying their mathematical estimation” and colllinearity 
diagnostics measure how much “regressors are related to other 
regressors and how this affects the stability and variance of the regression 
estimates” (StatPac, 2013). VIF quantifies the severity of multicollinearity 
through an index that measures how much the variance (the square of the 
estimate's standard deviation) of an estimated regression coefficient is 
increased because of colllinearity. Having a low VIF score (< 3.0) is a 
good indication that the variables subject to the test are good fit amongst 
the variables being compared against as part of the statistical test. 
Therefore, for VIFs below 3.0, further statistical analysis will be performed 
on the variable. 
o Significance: Probability that a particular correlation could occur by chance 
with a significance <.05 reflecting that there is less than a 5% probability 
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that the relationship occurred by chance. Therefore, for purposes of 
statistical analysis, further focus of the variable will be on the output 
calculations that have a .05 value or less. For output calculations that 
have a > .05 value, such additional focus is not warranted as there is a 
higher probability that the relationship occurred by chance.  
o t test (independent sample): A comparison of two sample populations 
measured against one common variable (e.g., dependent variable) to 
determine if the means of the two sample populations differ significantly 
from each other as there is no overlap of membership between the two 
sample groups. The actual calculation of the t test is the difference 
between the means (shown as unstandardized coefficient B) divided by 
the standard error. 
o Standardized Coefficient – Beta:  The number of standard deviations a 
dependent variable will change, per standard deviation increase in the 
independent or control variable being examined and because this 
coefficient is standardized, the comparisons between variables can be 
performed easier. This accounts for variables that are measured in 
different units of measurement (e.g., dollars, percent change, numbers, or 
values that may be stated in high values (population) or low values 
(unemployment rate). For purposes of statistical analysis, the higher 
standardized coefficient – beta scores reflect, the higher the impact of that 
variable upon the dependent variable.   
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o Standard Error: The standard deviation divided by the square root of 
sample (N) and is a measure of stability or sampling error of the sample 
means.  
o Unstandardized Coefficient – B: Represents the unit’s change of 1 in the 
independent or control variable and its effect on the mean of the 
dependent variable. Because each of the independent or control variables 
have different basis for their units (e.g., %, $ or #), the size of the B does 
not necessarily reflect the significance of the change.  
 Descriptive Statistics: In order to ensure that the sample is representative of the 
population, descriptive statistics (frequency tabulations for variables comprising 
ordinal or nominal traits) and descriptive tabulations for variables comprising 
scale traits (mean) are utilized.  
 
Threats to Reliability and Validity (Internal and External) 
Internal validity is properly demonstrating the causal relationship between two 
variables based upon three criteria as illustrated by Shadish, Cook and Campbell 
(2002): 1): The "cause" precedes the "effect" in time (temporal precedence); 2) The 
"cause" and the "effect" are related (co-variation); and 3) There are no plausible 
alternative explanations for the observed co-variation. For each of the hypotheses, the 
independent variable is law enforcement collective bargaining and its effect on 
performance, cost and HPRC. In best testing the “cause” (collective bargaining) on 
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effects, it would be important to define appropriate time horizons through which the 
introduction of the independent variable would rationally begin to illustrate changes in 
the dependent variable (defined as five years or greater for purposes of this research). 
While not a part of this research, time studies can illustrate those without any collective 
bargaining and the subsequent impact to performance and costs at various time 
intervals subsequent to the introduction of collective bargaining or removal of collective 
bargaining. 
However, an inherent challenge that can arise are other unknown variables that 
may arise in the community to cause changes in performance or costs that are not 
correlated to collective bargaining (or non-collective bargaining) localities; yet impacts of 
such changes may disproportionately impact collective bargaining trait localities versus 
non-collective bargaining localities. Examples would include: 1) National economic 
conditions that impact communities and challenge sustainability of local programs, 
which may lead to lower citizen satisfaction results or related lower performance 
indicators; or 2) National or state issue arising (e.g., state judicial sentencing guideline 
changes) that could change the demand indicators in sections of the country differently. 
In order to better control for this effect, a cursory review was performed of state law 
changes as they pertain to law enforcement or related factors that could be associated 
with materially changing performance or cost results. As the recession’s effect are 
virtually nationwide and because all the information and data obtained is relatively within 
the same time period, there does not appear to internal validity concerns. There also 
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does not appear to be any major state law enacted in past few years that would 
influence the performance results. However, review of locality by locality law changes or 
related factors, while a further diligent task to fully overcome this inherent internal 
validity challenge, is impractical as part of this research of 255 localities. 
Chava and David Nachmias (2007) identified additional attributes of internal 
validity that could be assessed to ensure proper research design. These attributes have 
either been incorporated as part of this research, have been excluded or are not 
applicable. For attributes excluded (e.g., history impacts), such efforts to properly 
account for each locality in the sample are beyond the scope of this research as it would 
require a detailed knowledge about each of the surveyed localities that is not readily 
available. The following Nachmias attributes do illustrate the strategies to respond to the 
concerns that may arise in these variables (Nachmias, 2007):  
 Addressed as Part of this Research: 
o Maturation impacts would need to be considered, especially if there is an 
elongated time horizon between the introduction or removal of collective 
bargaining and any performance or cost results. Because each locality in 
the sample is in its current state of collective bargaining for five years or 
greater, maturation impacts have been considered and addressed. 
o Instrumental changes also have to be mitigated; therefore the tools of 
measurement used as part of the initial research study are intended to be 
replicated throughout the study. If certain improvements to these 
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instruments are detected during the research, then an assessment would 
be done to determine whether to apply an improved tool to all subjects 
and variables, or simply to note such recommendations for improvement 
for subsequent additional research on this topic. 
o Selection bias will be mitigated by attempting to best ensure that the 
demographics of local governments reviewed are classified similar. This 
mitigates effects of one locality that may have a disproportional age, 
education, income or other factors when compared to another local 
government.  
o Experimental mortality factors are mitigated by the relative non-transition 
nature of local governments and collective bargaining agreements during 
the period of this research which is accessing data over the prior one – 
three years generally. The adversity of this factor is further mitigated as all 
data captured for independent and dependent variables will be within the 
same time horizon.    
 Not Addressed as Part of this Research: 
o History impacts can be controlled through a checklist of major events, 
internal or external to a local government or community, which would 
impact the validity of research. This could include not just natural 
disasters, but also severe economic conditions, that would affect the 
relationship of the variables, or perhaps delay or accelerate any 
correlating effect. While efforts were made to determine if any of the 
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localities sampled suffered from national newsworthy events, the ability to 
know detailed local news over the past few years for each of the sampled 
localities is beyond the scope of this research. 
 Not Applicable as Part of this Research: 
o Regression artifacts should not be applicable with this study as it is not 
the intention to determine extreme outliners whose impacts towards 
regressing to the mean may arise from any introduction of an independent 
variable or even an external variable. However, it is assumed that those 
who respond to customer satisfaction surveys are deemed to be not 100% 
apathetic or passive, but rather have some traits of engagement and 
desire to respond to satisfaction surveys. 
o Selection-maturation interaction is not expected to impact the research 
as the duration is of such a short time period that any physical attribute 
changes that would occur would be minor and is further mitigated by the 
non-relevance of such factors upon the variables being examined (e.g., 
hair color is not a relevant variable being studied nor an external threat to 
captured informational results). 
External validity, which is not disjointed from internal validity, is concerned with 
the causal inferences made from experiment groups to the population as a whole. As 
the effort was made in selecting the localities appropriately for this research and 
capturing the demographic profiles behind such subject matters for appropriate 
groupings, the transferability of results should occur. Cross sectional studies, as 
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opposed to longitudinal data, can have the effect of “generalizability of the results” being 
constrained, and definitively “causality cannot be conclusively stated” (Putchinisky, 
2007, p. 238). However, for purposes of further illustrating external validity, traditional 
quantitative defenses are addressed.  
 Selection of the local governments studied would be a representative sample 
of local governments and not subject to which local governments “volunteer” 
to be studied; which is often a concern with external validity. Although the 
sample is derived from those local governments that elect to participate in a 
survey, such participants are assumed to participate in the survey to meet or 
satisfy their own local government desire for information far beyond that of 
just law enforcement services. In addition, the ability to segment similar 
demographic and socio-economic local governments helps mitigate relative 
external validity concerns. 
 Measurement effects are mitigated in a similar manner as previously noted 
under instrument effects of internal validity. 
 Confounded treatment effects are mitigated by focusing on the incremental 
changes between the dependent variable based upon the independent 
variable with efforts to include those in the sample that have varying levels of 
dependent variable attributes of performance and costs. Therefore, the risk of 
generalization of one group (e.g., those with low performance) to an entire 
population of local governments is mitigated. 
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 Situational effects are mitigated as the subjects are local governments and 
their citizens, all subject to the same scope and duration of study. 
 Effects due to differential mortality are mitigated in a similar manner as noted 
under internal validity. 
Reliability is the consistency in a set of measurements of the actual measuring 
instrument. Reliability is not to be confused with validity, as reliability seeks to ensure 
that what is being measured is being measured consistently without regard to whether it 
is the right variable to measure. Therefore, with regards to this research design, the 
consistency is the application of the same set of parameters of questions to answer 
through research for each and every local government studied. 
 
Conceptual Framework and Concept Map 
The conceptual framework best illustrates the research problem and the 
beginning of the pathway by which such problem can be researched properly. In order 
to help frame the background and mindset of the researcher, Appendix A includes a 
Research Identity Memo. As noted previously, research in the past focused primarily on 
collective bargaining costs. In addition, this prior type of research inordinately focused 
on the bureaucracy of unions and the time, stress, resources and compliance efforts 
devoted to collective bargaining agreements. However, in this research, the ontological 
(nature of existence) perspective is about general assumptions of what similar 
groupings may occur. This will hopefully yield towards an epistemological knowledge-
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 
 
based approach whereby an understanding of the actual differentiations that exist 
between the two types of workplaces.   
From this conceptual framework, goals were further refined and a realistic and 
relevant mindset was sought in developing the research question. The following Figure 
3.3: Concept Map illustrates the theory and the various relationships amongst the 
concepts being captured as part of this research. The attributes of performance and 
costs will be examined from both a collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining 
perspective; then appropriately compared and contrasted. 
Figure 3.3: Concept Map 
  
Threats to Reliability and Validity (Internal and External) 
Subject to 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Law Enforcement Services 
(Lens: Rational Choice Theory) 
No -  
HPRC, Performance and Costs 
Yes (Mediation or Arbitration) -  
HPRC, Performance and Costs 
Compare and Analyze Results with Control Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
163 
 
In determining the array of research literature used, it was important to ensure 
the validity and credibility of such documents. There are many sources for information 
regarding public sector unions, their costs and performance, but underlying bias can be 
expected to occur. This bias is directly associated with an author’s belief in the 
necessity of public sector unions. In addition, HPO traits for the public sector can also 
be skewed in documents to support the position of the author of such documents. 
Therefore, it was important to ascertain that the documents are presented from a non-
biased perspective of the author, that any quantitative research is properly supported 
and that the lens of qualitative research is not too narrowly focused upon a segment 
that may not be representative of the environment. 
The documents utilized were primarily research-based articles and books. Efforts 
were made to find resources that compare and contrast collective bargaining and non-
collective bargaining workforces and workplaces; with a focus on public sector unions 
and, more specifically, law enforcement services. In addition, information was reviewed 
as it pertains to generally accepted HPO traits and measures with emphasis on law 
enforcement services. These traits and measures should be the same regardless of 
whether it is from a collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining locality.   
Validating the accuracy of findings can traditionally be performed via two of the 
three permissible means (Creswell, 2005): 1) Triangulation (utilizing different sources); 
2) Member checking (using participants to check the accuracy); and 3) External audit 
(outside expert perspective). As this stage of the research project is simply data 
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collection, triangulation and external audit are the only alternatives. However, even 
triangulation has its limitations as data collection techniques were focused on limited 
sources (e.g., survey, uniform crime reports, and census-based information). Therefore, 
the external audit resources of the dissertation committee reviewing this project will 
serve as an additional means to the validation of accuracy. 
 
Data Variable Coding 
For each of the variables noted the SPSS statistical variable classification, the 
following traits were inputted for each of the 238 sample items.  
 Name: Variable name 
 Type: Other than “Locality Name” which is classified as a “string”, all variables 
are classified as “numeric” 
 Width: The width is appropriate to capture the largest variable name for each 
variable 
 Decimals: All “numeric” classified variables have been assigned a “0” decimal 
point if represented in dollars or other non-percentage classification and a “1” 
decimal point if a percentage 
 Label: Generally, the label has followed the “Name” classification noted 
previously 
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 Value: All of the values are noted as “None” except for five of the variables 
that have had a 0,1,2, etc. numeric assignment and appropriate description 
noted as follows: 
o Collective Bargaining Classification: Initially coded as 0 – none; 1 – 
collective bargaining via mediation; and 2 – collective bargaining via 
mandatory arbitration. However, for purposes of positioning the ordinal 
data to be properly analyzed with linear regression via two variables (0 
and 1), the workforce classification was recoded as follows: Mediation 
(coded as 1) singularly identified and compared to non-collective 
bargaining and arbitration (coded as 0); and arbitration (coded as 1) 
singularly identified and compared to non-collective bargaining and 
mediation (coded as 0).  
o Accreditation: Initially coded as 0 – none; 1 – self-assessment; and 2 – 
accredited, this coding was converted to a 100 point scale for purposes 
of the composite performance measure calculation with an assignment 
of 0 points for none, 50 points for self-assessment and 100 for 
accreditation. This point assignment is meant to illustrate the complete 
100 point variance between accreditation and non-accreditation, while 
recognizing a high performance aspect and desire for self-assessment. 
The even nature of the spread of 50 points to self-assessment and 
another 50 points to accreditation is based upon an understanding of 
the efforts taken to accomplish such a recognized task. There does not 
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appear to be any quantitative research of assigning a linear 100-point 
scale to levels of accreditation. However, a rationale can be applied to 
stating that full accreditation is worthy of the highest point scale (100 
and that not having any indication of any potential accreditation in the 
short-term is worthy of the lowest point scale (0). Therefore, the only 
subject measure may be self-assessment’s 50 point scale measure 
and with only eight localities with such trait and the realization that 
being self-assessed is neither accredited nor no accreditation, a 50 
point scale appears reasonable. 
o Bond Rating Adjustment Scale: Initially coded as 1 – no rating; 2 - < A; 
3 – A; 4 – AA3; 5 – AA2; 6 - AA1; and 7 – AAA. As Figure 3.2: 
Adjusted Bond Rating Scale illustrates, the incremental changes in the 
bond rating scale are not linear, but rather have higher incremental 
interest rate savings between lower bond rating scale improvements 
(e.g., A to AA), then changes between higher bond rating scale 
improvements (e.g., AA to AAA). Therefore, in assigning a scaled 
value to the bond rating, each of the incremental ordinal values (1 
through 7) will be subject to an inverse transformation as such a linear 
scale better reflects the change in incremental bond rating changes. 
For example the value of 1 converts to 0, 2 converts to .69, 3 coverts 
to 1.1, 4 converts to 1.39, 5 converts to 1.61, 6 converts to 1.79 and 7 
converts to 1.95. 
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o Local Government: 1 – city; 2 – county; and 3 – other. However, for 
purposes of positioning the nominal data to be properly analyzed via 
two variables (0 and 1 for linear regression and related t-tests), the 
local governments were coded in two different manners: County 
(coded as 1) singularly identified and compared to city and other local 
governments (coded as 0); and City (coded as 1) singularly identified 
and compared to county and other local governments (coded as 0). 
o Right-to-work: 0 – right-to-work state; and 1 – non-right-to-work state  
 Missing: All data variables have no missing data 
 Column: Appropriate width assigned to capture data results 
 Align: All variables are aligned right with the exception of locality name which 
aligned left 
 Measure: All variables are aligned to scale as they represent an interval 
manner in how data is recorded with each interval higher a proportional 
difference between the prior interval with the following exceptions to the scale 
classification (those with ordinal are labeled as such because as each interval 
becomes higher it may not necessarily represent a proportional difference 
between the higher variable and the lower variable: 
o Locality Name: Nominal as it represent a word classification 
o Collective Bargaining Classification: Ordinal  
o Accreditation: Ordinal 
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o Bond Rating: Initially recorded as ordinal, but as illustrated previously 
with adjustments applied based upon actual interest rates amongst 
different tiers of bond rating scale, an inverse transformation line better 
illustrates a scale linear relationship  
o Local Government: Nominal as it merely classifies each locality name 
into city, county or other 
o Right-to-work: Nominal as it merely classified each state into one of 
two categories 
 Role: All variables are classified as “input” 
Comparison of Sample Size to the Population 
The comparison of the sample size to the population in this cross-sectional study 
can be better confirmed via the comparison of many of the variables and their traits to 
overall local government and related population statistics. Through such comparison, it 
can better illustrate that the 238 sample size utilized for this research is representative 
of the population; or at a minimum can be qualified accordingly and classified to better 
represent a trait of the population. The sample size was compiled from the National 
Citizens Survey (NCS) entire population of those localities that initiated with NCS to 
perform a survey. The surveys of local governments reflect results 2002–2011, with the 
most recent local government’s survey represented in the sample size. Because many 
local governments benefit from cyclical surveys every 2-3 years, much of the sample 
size reflects surveys conducted 2008-2011. This concentration 2008-2011 also 
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correlates to the time frames utilized for crime rates, Census data, financial results and 
other variables utilized in data analysis. 
There may be an inherent bias in recognizing that higher performing or those 
formally and publicly desiring to become higher performing would initiate such a survey 
whereas lower performing or those not publicly wanting to capture such information may 
not want to initiate such survey. The sample size comparability analysis was comprised 
of frequency tabulations and descriptive tabulations; depending upon the variable and 
its coding methodology. 
Frequency Tabulations 
Through SPSS, frequency tables were compiled on those variables assigned a 
value classification (either nominal or ordinal). For Table 3.8: Workforce Classification 
(independent variable), there is 68 with no collective bargaining (28.6% of total), 83 with 
collective bargaining via mediation (34.9% of total) and 87 with collective bargaining via 
mandatory arbitration (36.6% of total). As noted in Table 3.1: Collective Bargaining 
State Laws for Law Enforcement Employees, the classification amongst states 
illustrated the following composition: 1) No collective bargaining 36.0%; 2) Collective 
bargaining via mediation 30.0%; and 3) Collective bargaining via mandatory arbitration 
34.0%. Based upon the distribution of the sample size compared to the population, it 
appears that the sample is representative of the population.   
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Table 3.8: Workforce Classification 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Non-Collective Barg. 68 28.6 28.6 28.6 
Mediation 83 34.9 34.9 63.4 
Arbitration 87 36.6 36.6 100.0 
Total 238 100.0 100.0  
 
 Regarding national accreditation for law enforcement services, Table 3.9: 
Accreditation (dependent variable) illustrates that those accredited were 19.3% of the 
total sample while self-assessment process (defined by CALEA to be major step 
towards national accreditation) was at 3.4% of the total sample – together both of these 
represent 22.7% of the sample population. There are a total of 487 local government 
law enforcement organizations with national accreditation (CALEA, 2012); of which 46 
of those local governments were included in this sample. In addition, there are a total of 
15,564 local government law enforcement agencies in total (US Census, 2009). 
Comparing total national accreditation (487) to total law enforcement agencies (15,564) 
indicates that 3.1% of all law enforcement agencies have national accreditation.  
While the sample illustrates a much higher rate at 19.3%, it is recognized that 
many of the 15,564 law enforcement agencies are small organizations that may not 
have the resources (staff and funding) to comply with or initiate an accreditation 
process. Also, as noted previously, there can be assumption that local governments 
which initiate a citizen’s survey also have that same characteristic trait in pursuit of 
many accreditations; including law enforcement.  
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The sample’s 19.3% factor applied to the 487 accredited local government 
organizations could calculate that of the 2,523 local governments (487/19.3%) that have 
the ability to pursue and achieve national accreditation, 487 have achieved such 
accomplishment. That statement has a rationale nexus that provides support that the 
sample size does proportionately capture the same population traits of local law 
enforcement organizations. As the top 1,000 cities of the United States ranks the 1000th 
ranked city (Cottonwood Heights UT) with a population of 35,394 in 2009 
(biggestcities.com, 2009), it would appear that recognizing approximately 2,500 local 
governments that have the size and scope of a local law enforcement organization to be 
subject to this population trait for performance-related attributes is a reasonable 
assumption.  
As a further measure of the scope of local governments suitable for the 
population, the bond rating control variable analyzed in the next section notes that there 
are 4,240 local governments with an uninsured bond rating. The nationally accredited 
law enforcement organizations (487) would represent 11.5% of total law enforcement 
organizations (4,240) which is closer to the 19.3% of the sample population. The 
differential between 19.3% and 11.5% can then be more narrowly rationalized to other 
attributes already addressed (e.g., time and funding to comply; lower performing 
electing to not participate; or preference of just having state accreditation).    
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Table 3.9: Accreditation 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
None 184 77.3 77.3 77.3 
Self-Assessment 8 3.4 3.4 80.7 
Accredited 46 19.3 19.3 100.0 
Total 238 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 3.10: Bond Rating (control variable) illustrates the distribution of bond 
ratings amongst the sample size with 55 of the local governments (23.1% of the total) 
having no bond rating. For those 76.9% of local governments with a bond rating, Aa2 
was the most prevalent bond rating with 60 rated at Aa2 (25.2% of the total and 32.8% 
of total with bond ratings). For the highest bond rating of Aaa, there were 22 rated Aaa 
(9.2% of the total).  
From the Moody’s Investors Services (2009) listing of all municipal bond ratings 
there are 4,240 local governments with a bond rating. Comparing these totals with total 
local governments previously noted, 10.9% of all local governments (4,240 total local 
governments with bond ratings/38,967 total local governments) have a bond rating. 
Based upon the distribution of those with and without bond ratings, the sample with 
23.1% not having a bond rating compares to the national average of 89.1%. However, 
using the 15,564 total local governments with law enforcement organizations, this 
lowers the total without bond ratings from 89.1% down to 72.8%. In addition, for those 
with a bond rating, selecting the most prevalent bond rating of Aa2, for which there are 
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1,282 local governments representing 30.2% of the total of all bond ratings (1,282 
Aa2/4,240 total bond ratings). This compares favorably with the previously noted 32.8% 
of the sample with bond ratings of Aa2. The distribution amongst the other bond rating 
categories appears to also compare favorably between the sample and population of 
bond ratings.  
The incremental changes in the bond rating scale are not linear, but rather have 
higher incremental interest rate savings between lower bond rating scale improvements 
(e.g., A to AA), then changes between higher bond rating scale improvements (e.g., AA 
to AAA). Therefore, in assigning a scaled value to the bond rating, each of the 
incremental ordinal values (1 through 7) was subject to an inverse transformation as 
such a linear scale better reflects the change in incremental bond rating changes. Refer 
to Table 3.6: Bond Rating Scales of Three Primary Rating Agencies and Figure 3.2: 
Adjusted Bond Rating Scale for further information regarding scale and data coding.  
 
Table 3.10: Bond Rating 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
No Rating 55 23.1 23.1 23.1 
<A 4 1.7 1.7 24.8 
A 24 10.1 10.1 34.9 
Aa3 44 18.5 18.5 53.4 
Aa2 60 25.2 25.2 78.6 
Aa1 29 12.2 12.2 90.8 
Aaa 22 9.2 9.2 100.0 
Total 238 100.0 100.0  
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Table 3.11: Type of Local Governments (control variable) illustrates the 
distribution between cities, counties and other (includes towns, villages, boroughs, 
districts). As the sample had 14 counties (5.9% of the total sampled), it compares 
favorably with the total population whereby counties represent 7.8% of the total local 
governments. As states classify cities, towns, villages, boroughs in different manners for 
statistical tracking in census data, the sample’s classification of city was only noted 
when the term “city” was part of the local government name; otherwise it was classified 
as “other.” The differentiation between county and city-other is a more important 
distinction as there are counties that may perform a variety of law enforcement services 
within their overlapping cities, towns, villages and boroughs rather than overlapping 
jurisdictions amongst the non-counties. 
 
Table 3.11: Type of Local Governments 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
City 191 80.3 80.3 80.3 
County 14 5.9 5.9 86.1 
Other 33 13.9 13.9 100.0 
Total 238 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 3.12: Non-Right-to-work States (control variable) indicates a distribution by 
state between right-to work states (46.2% of sample) and those states without right-to-
work provisions (53.8% of sample). Generally, the differentiation is that in non-right-to-
work states, the state laws are more favorable towards the collective bargaining process 
and/or related workforce classification practices for public and private sector workers. 
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Previously, Figure 2.4: Right-to-Work States Map illustrated 23 states (46.0% of total) 
with right-to-work classification and 27 without such classification (54.0% of total). 
Based upon the close proximity between the sample’s distribution between these two 
classifications and the population of all states, it appears the sample is representative in 
this control variable. 
 
Table 3.12: Non-Right-to-work States 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Right-to-Work 110 46.2 46.2 46.2 
Non-Right-to-Work 128 53.8 53.8 100.0 
Total 238 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Descriptive Tabulations 
Descriptive tabulation is a SPSS statistical term used to capture traits about a 
sample variable. Generally, it measures the minimum, maximum, median and standard 
deviation of a data set. While frequencies in the previous section help determine 
correlations of nominal or ordinal data of sample to population, descriptive tabulations 
help determine correlations of sample variables that are classified as “scale.” For the 
purposes of this section, Table 3.13: Other Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
captures seven other control variables that are classified as “scale.” For each of these 
control variables, a brief analysis of comparison of the sample that yielded these 
statistics to the total population follows the table. 
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Table 3.13: Other Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
 Population 
(000) 
Bond Rating 
Adj Scale 
High School 
Graduates 
Median HH 
Inc (000) 
Density Unemployment 
Rate 
Age15to24% Survey-
Quality of 
Life 
Mean 86.81 1.1827 .8915 59.03 2378.68 .0784 .1566 .7556 
N 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 
Std. 
Deviation 
156.589 .69472 .06234 21.716 1615.734 .02700 .09233 .15846 
 
 Population (000): Nationally, the mean population amongst all local governments 
is 7,900 or amongst all local law enforcement organizations are 19,789. The 
larger sample mean of 86,814 population is mainly attributable to the many small 
cities and towns that would not meet thresholds to initiate a citizen’s survey as 
previously noted. However, in converting this variable to a more comprehensible 
variable in the statistical analysis, population is divided by 1000 which yields a 
mean of 86.8. 
 Bond Rating Adjusted Scale: As previously noted in converting the bond rating 
scale to a more representative interval between bond ratings (Table 3.6: Bond 
Rating Scales of Three Primary Rating Agencies), an inverse transformation was 
performed. The mean of this adjusted scale is 1.18 (which is slightly higher than 
a bond rating of A (at 1.10) and further below that of the next higher rating of AA3 
(at 1.39). 
 High School Graduates: Nationally, the mean high school graduate portion of the 
population is 85.4% (US Census, 2012) which compares to the sample mean of 
89.1% (shown in SPSS analysis as .891).   
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 Median Household Income: Nationally, the median household income of $52,762 
(US Census, 2012) compares to the sample mean of $59,026. However, in 
converting this variable to a more comprehensible variable in the statistical 
analysis, median household income is divided by 1000 which yields a mean of 
59.0. 
 Density: Nationally, the mean density of the United States is 87 persons per 
square mile (US Census, 2012) which compares to the sample mean of 2,378. 
The disparate nature of this comparison is most likely the result of such large 
land acreage and rural areas outside of traditional cities and towns; however, 
additional statistical analysis relating to this variance in regards to this measure is 
not readily available. 
 Unemployment Rate: Nationally, the mean unemployment rate is 9.9% (US 
Census, 2012) which compares to the sample mean of 7.8% (shown in SPSS 
analysis as .078). The differential between these two statistics may be 
attributable to the sample not including the local governments where 
unemployment characteristics were higher and volatile during the recessionary 
times during the 2010 census. Another example may include larger cities, which 
were adversely impacted during the recession and significantly influence the 
national unemployment rate, but were not generally part of the sample. For 
example, the top three cities in the sample population only ranked 9th, 11th and 
27th amongst the top populated cities (US Census, 2012).  
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 Age 15-24%: Nationally, the % of the population between 15-24 years of age is 
14.7% (Nationsencyclopedia.com, 2013) which compares to the sample mean of 
15.7% (shown in SPSS analysis as .157). 
 Survey – Quality of Life: The mean result of the sample’s survey question in 
regards to quality of life illustrated a mean 75.7% favorable rating (shown in 
SPSS analysis as .757). As there is no overall quality of life survey question 
measure amongst local governments, comparison to this statistic to national 
indicators is not possible. 
Based upon the preceding comparisons, it appears that the control variables in 
the sample reflect well compared to the population’s similar variables; unless otherwise 
noted. For those that had larger differentials between the sample median and the total 
population’s median or comparable statistic (e.g., population, density and 
unemployment rate), additional information was provided to rationalize such differential. 
Therefore, based upon the statistical information yielded in the preceding section’s 
frequency tabulations and this section’s descriptives tabulation, it appears that the 
sample size is a representative subgroup of the variable traits of the population. This 
representativeness will further validate that the sample’s research in testing the null 
hypothesis can be translated to the population regarding correlations, but as noted 
previously, not causations. This also further illustrates the reliability and validity of the 
sample data in performing such research. 
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In addition, based upon the preceding analysis of all of the control variables (via 
VIF analysis), it appears that there is no bias in the sample in regards to socio-
economic and related factors between the varying levels of workforce classification and 
the underlying samples in each of these classifications.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS 
Background 
The examination of correlation, if any, between law enforcement workforce 
classification and performance, costs and associated HPRC was performed in Chapter 
4 – Findings. Though SPSS linear regression, statistical analysis was performed for 
each of the dependent variables compared to the independent and control variables.  
The control variables were accumulated and analyzed in helping determine the 
comparability of data amongst the three independent variable classifications (associated 
with workforce classification): 1) Non-collective bargaining (what the following variables 
of mediation and arbitration are being compared to); 2) Collective bargaining through 
mediation (included in the model); and 3) Collective bargaining through mandatory 
arbitration (included in the model).  
The control variables were reviewed to determine the representativeness of the 
sample to the entire population of local law enforcement organizations. This was 
accomplished via two manners: Research design control and statistical control. For 
research design control, a representative cross-section of many types of localities was 
selected (as the entire data set of National Citizen Survey participants was utilized) so 
that the results are more generalizable to the whole population of localities. For 
statistical control, the various control variables were specifically selected (e.g., 
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population, bond ratings, density) and statistically analyzed to ensure that such 
variables are not linked to the differences between results of the hypothesis being 
tested (performance, cost, and high performance return on costs).  
As the hypotheses are the basis from which this research is conducted and 
findings are emulated, they are illustrated again below: 
 Law Enforcement Performance Hypotheses (1) 
o Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
o Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Cost Hypotheses (2) 
o Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
o Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Hypotheses (3) 
o Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
o  Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
  
As part of the findings, the results may be based upon the result of random 
chance rather than an actual relationship between the variables; therefore the 
hypothesis is neither proven nor rejected as part of this research. Because the research 
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is focused on correlation (positive or negative relationship) and not causation, the 
hypothesis cannot be confirmed as definitively true or false (SPSS, 2009). Rather, a null 
hypothesis (no relationship) is formulated that will either be rejected or fail to be rejected 
as that is the only manner of supporting a hypothesis – by refuting (nullifying) a null 
hypothesis (McDonald, 2009). A deductive valid rejection of a null hypothesis may 
occur, yet not achieve a deductively valid affirmation of it. The examination of how all of 
these variables are possibly correlated or not is the goal of this research and possible 
considerations of future research if certain correlations emerge. Therefore, the following 
null hypotheses have been formulated: 
 Law Enforcement Performance Null Hypotheses (1) 
o Null Hypothesis 1A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
o Null Hypothesis 1B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Cost Null Hypotheses (2) 
o Null Hypothesis 2A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
o Null Hypothesis 2B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Null Hypotheses (3) 
o Null Hypothesis 3A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
o Null Hypothesis 3B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
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Dependent Variables Mean and Standard Deviation 
 In order to gauge the impact of a unit change from the various independent and 
control variables upon the effect of the three dependent variables, Table 4.1: Dependent 
Variables Mean and Standard Deviation illustrates the mean for each of the dependent 
variables. The performance composite measure mean is 46.7, law enforcement 
expenses per capita mean is $236.32 and the high performance return on costs (HPRC) 
mean is 27.3. For purposes of evaluating, performance composite measures higher 
than the mean are higher measures (higher performance), law enforcement expenses 
per capita below the mean are better measures (lower cost) and HPRC ratios higher 
than mean are better measures (higher ratio). The standard deviations amongst all 
three of the variables also illustrate a good variance amongst the data to be tested. 
 
Table 4.1: Dependent Variables Mean and Standard Deviation 
Report 
 PerformCompos
ite 
LE Exp per 
Capita 
HPRC 
Mean 46.4790 236.32 27.2854 
N 238 238 238 
Std. Deviation 13.24954 97.827 35.93457 
 
 
The subsequent coefficient tables computed will illustrate the effect of a one unit 
change (noted as B) in the variable leads to a “factor” variable change in the dependent 
variable under review. This can also be illustrated in the sample equation y (dependent 
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variable under review) = a (constant) + b1X1 (mediation independent variable) + b2X2 
(arbitration independent variable). The t score = b/standard error and is correlated to the 
significance with any scores <.05 viewed as a significant as it correlates to a 95% 
confidence level. For significance factors > .05, no further analysis was performed as 
any other calculated results are more probable to have occurred by chance and not by 
correlation. 
Each of the three hypotheses subject areas, each having two hypothesis 
statements per subject area, will be addressed separately. As the first subject area set 
of hypotheses focuses on performance and the second set focuses on cost, the third set 
focus on the correlation between performance and cost via high performance return on 
costs (HPRC). As each of the statistical tables are able to capture the A and B subject 
areas of the hypothesis for each of the hypotheses subject areas, there is only one 
statistical analysis needed per subject area as all of the non-independent variables can 
be analyzed as part of one analysis. This is because the all of the data output statistics 
for the non-independent variables result us the same numbers being generated. 
However, the A and B independent variables of each hypothesis, arbitration (A) and 
mediation (B), will each be analyzed via narrative analysis separately in testing of the 
null hypothesis.  
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Hypotheses 1A and 1B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
 Null Hypothesis 1A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to 
non-collective bargaining 
Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
 Null Hypothesis 1B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to 
non-collective bargaining 
 
As noted in Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology, the composite 
performance measure (includes survey, crime rates (violent and property) and 
accreditation factors) was calculated for each of the local governments in the sample. 
This composite performance measure was then analyzed via SPSS linear regression. 
Table 4.2: Composite Performance Measure illustrates the following: 
 Model Summary – r square: .603 which indicates on average the model’s 
predictions are 60% better than guessing the mean. The small variance between 
the r square (.603) and adjusted r square (.580) are also indicative of good model 
of data producing results (adjusted r square is 3.8% less than r square).     
 ANOVA – F value: 26.223 and significance of .000 which indicates that the 
overall model produces better results than simply guessing the mean. 
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 VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst 
the variables. Low scores indicate that the independent variables are not heavily 
inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.  
 Coefficients: 
o Significant (<.05): Median household income, density, age, survey quality, 
city, county and mediation all appear to be significant. 
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-statistic (of those noted as 
significant) are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:  
 Median household Income ($000) (beta .389 and t-statistic 5.985) 
with an unstandardized coefficient B of .24 indicates that for every 
unit change of $1000 in the median household income (mean 59.0 
($000) or $59,000), there is a .24 increase in the composite 
performance index (mean 46.5).  
 Survey Quality of Life (beta .363 and t-statistic 5.354) with an 
unstandardized coefficient B of 30.363 indicates that for every unit 
change of 1 in the survey – quality of life score (mean .76); there is 
a 30.363 increase in the composite performance index (mean 
46.5). A better way to illustrate is for every unit change of .1 (10%) 
in survey quality of life score, there is a 3.0 increase to the 
composite performance index. 
 Age (beta .170 and t-statistic 3.461) with an unstandardized 
coefficient B of 24.5 indicates that for every unit change of 1 in age 
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15-24% (mean .16); there is a 24.5 increase to the composite 
performance index (mean 46.5). A better way to illustrate is for 
every unit change of .1 (10%) in age 15-24%, there is a 2.5 
increase to the composite performance index. This result may 
appear to be counter-intuitive as it was previously noted a 
correlation of this age bracket and higher probability for crimes 
committed. However, other mitigating circumstances may lend 
themselves to higher performance. Examples could include: 1) 
Higher proportion in an older age bracket; or 2) More citizen-
friendly survey responses for those in portion of age bracket (21-
25).  
 City (beta -.155 and t-statistic -3.036) with an unstandardized 
coefficient B of -5.2 indicates that cities, on average, have a 5.2 
lower composite performance index (mean 46.5) when compared to 
towns. 
 Density (beta -.146 and t-statistic – 2.977) with an unstandardized 
coefficient B of -.001 indicates that for every unit change of 1 in 
density (mean 2378.7); there is a decrease to the composite 
performance index (mean 46.5) of -.001. A better way to illustrate is 
for every unit change of 100 in density there is a decrease to the 
composite performance index of -.1. 
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 Mediation – Hypothesis 1B (beta -.126 and t-statistic -2.247) with 
an unstandardized coefficient B of -3.49 indicates that mediation 
localities, on average, have a 3.49 lower composite performance 
index (mean 46.5) when compared to non-collective bargaining 
localities and 4.98 lower composite index when compared to 
arbitration and its 1.49 increased composite performance index. 
 As median household incomes, survey – quality of life scores or age 15-24% of 
population increases, the composite performance score of law enforcement services 
also increase. This means some combination of higher favorable rating on law 
enforcement survey questions on how safe does a citizen feel, lower violent or property 
crimes; or law enforcement national accreditation pursuit or attainment has occurred. 
This may be due to overall abilities of higher income and quality of life attributes mitigate 
crime from occurring and/or enable law enforcement to perform at a higher level 
whereas the age factor may also represent a more family-friendly area in deterring 
crime. The inverse relationship exists for density in that as population density increases, 
the composite performance score of law enforcement decreases. This may be due to 
the challenges of performance for higher density areas in the calls for service that may 
result from citizens interacting in closer proximity. There also appears to be a contrast 
between cities and counties with cities decreasing the composite measure score when 
compared to towns. This may be due to how citizens are exposed to law enforcement 
and its ability to deter crime at a greater rate in the towns than in the cities. However, 
further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining factors for 
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why these relationships of variables to increased or decreased composite performance 
measures exist.   
In regards to workforce classification, mediation (Hypothesis 1B) has a 
decreased composite performance measure. All of the other variables were not 
significant enough to warrant any further analysis in regards to relationship to composite 
performance measure. There may be some determining factor localities with a 
mediation possess to warrant a decreased composite performance measure (e.g., 
workforce constraints to adopt low crime rate strategies; accreditation pursuit lacking; 
and/or engaging and informing their citizens of safety-quality measures and related 
survey question measures). As an example, law enforcement organizations with 
mediation workforce classification may not have gained the confidence of their citizens 
in addressing crime as well as non-collective bargaining or arbitration localities. This 
may be because the general population of such localities does not share the same 
workforce classification status as those in the law enforcement organization and 
therefore, may not empathize as well in how such challenges are addressed. While it 
may be a challenge to control these factors, surveys may gauge the sentiment of 
citizens in mediation and non-mediation localities to determine what may be correlation 
of mediation to lower composite performance index. Rational Choice Theory attributes 
(e.g., employee motivation) may also be less present in mediation localities. However, 
further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining factors for 
why this relationship of mediation to decreased composite performance measure exists.   
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In addition, arbitration (Hypothesis 1A) is positive with its increased composite 
performance measure, even though it was above the .05 significance threshold set for 
further review. This means that arbitration is viewed more favorably than mediation and 
non-collective bargaining, and while arbitration is not statistically different from non-
collective bargaining, it does appear to be statistically different from mediation. 
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Table 4.2: Composite Performance Measure 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .777
a
 .603 .580 8.58202 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County 
Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, 
Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates, 
Median HH Inc (000) 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 25107.560 13 1931.351 26.223 .000
b
 
Residual 16497.835 224 73.651   
Total 41605.395 237    
a. Dependent Variable: Performance Composite 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj 
Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High 
School Graduates, Median HH Inc (000) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 12.558 10.898  1.152 .250   
Population (000) -.001 .004 -.015 -.300 .764 .758 1.320 
Bond Rating Adj Scale .602 .865 .032 .696 .487 .860 1.163 
High School Graduates 2.828 13.427 .013 .211 .833 .443 2.255 
Median HH Inc (000) .238 .040 .389 5.965 .000 .416 2.406 
Density -.001 .000 -.146 -2.977 .003 .733 1.365 
Unemployment Rate -27.107 27.396 -.055 -.989 .324 .568 1.760 
Age15to24% 24.451 7.065 .170 3.461 .001 .730 1.369 
Survey-Quality of Life 30.363 5.670 .363 5.354 .000 .385 2.598 
Non Right-to-Work 
State 
-.957 1.504 -.036 -.636 .525 .551 1.816 
City (v. Town) -5.158 1.699 -.155 -3.036 .003 .677 1.478 
County (v. Town) 5.272 3.066 .094 1.720 .087 .595 1.682 
Med  (v. NCB (b)) -3.485 1.551 -.126 -2.247 .026 .566 1.765 
Arb  (v. NCB (b)) 1.486 1.801 .054 .825 .410 .411 2.431 
a. Dependent Variable: Perform Composite 
b. NCB (Non-collective bargaining) 
 
Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which illustrated a correlation of 
mediation to a lower composite performance measure, it would appear that the null 
hypothesis 1B can be rejected as there appears to be a relationship between law 
enforcement workforce classification of mediation and higher (or lower) performance 
attributes. Rejection of the null hypothesis does not confirm the hypothesis. For 
hypothesis 1A, because there was no such statistically significant correlation as it 
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pertains to arbitration and higher (or lower) performance attributes, the null hypothesis 
1A cannot be rejected. 
Hypotheses 2A and 2B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
 Null Hypothesis 2A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
 
Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 Null Hypothesis 2B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
 
Whereas hypotheses 1 were capturing the correlation, if any, between the 
classification of the workforce and a variety of performance measure attributes, 
hypotheses 2 captures the correlation between classification of the workforce and law 
enforcement costs per capita. Table 4.3: Law Enforcement Costs per Capita illustrates 
the following via SPSS linear regression:  
 Model Summary - r square: .187 which indicates on average the model’s 
predictions are 18% better than guessing the mean; which is considered a low 
prediction rate (note Hypothesis 1 had a 60% rate). The variance between the r 
square (.187) and adjusted r square (.139) is actually a large variance 
(unfavorable), with adjusted r square 25.7% below r square (whereas Hypothesis 
1 had a variance of 3.8%). This may be correlated to the number of insignificant 
variables being examined as part of this analysis as the greater number of 
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variables added, the greater the chance of a larger spread between r-square and 
adjusted r-square. Based upon this low r square and large variance, another 
regression was conducted removing those insignificant variables that had a 
significance factor > .250 in hopes that such significance variables were 
impacting the adjusted r square. However, this resulted in only slightly improved 
results - r square (.181) and adjusted r square (.152) with a high 16.0% variance. 
Based upon this large variance, additional regression analyses were conducted 
changing variables (e.g., lowering significance factor further to remove other 
variables, changing composite of variables included in analysis) in hopes that 
certain variables were impacting the results in producing a large variance 
between r square and adjusted r square. However, there was an inability to make 
improvements to the adjusted r square variance. Based upon these factors, the 
model is not necessarily parsimonious from a statistical analysis (i.e., only slightly 
better than guessing the mean). Therefore, the output for hypotheses 2 results 
carry caveat of low r square and poor model and should not be overly relied upon 
as part of a statistical analysis.  
 ANOVA – F value: 3.95 and significance of .000 which indicates that the overall 
model produces better results than simply guessing the mean. 
 VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst 
the variables. The low scores indicate that the independent variables are not 
heavily inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.  
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 Coefficients: 
o Significant (<.05): Non-right-to-work state, county and arbitration all 
appear to be significant.  
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-score (of those noted as significant) 
are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:  
 Non-right-to-work state (beta .340 and t-statistic 4.190) with an 
unstandardized coefficient B of 66.6 indicates that for non-right-to-
work states there is a $66.62 increased cost to the law enforcement 
cost per capita (mean $236.30) when compared to right-to-work 
states. 
 Arbitration – Hypothesis 2A (beta -.254 and t-statistic -2.701) with 
an unstandardized coefficient B of -51.43 indicates that arbitration 
localities, on average, have a $51.43 deceased cost to law 
enforcement costs per capita (mean $236.30) when compared to 
non-collective bargaining localities and $72.67 decreased cost 
when compared to mediation and its $21.24 increased cost to law 
enforcement costs. 
 County (beta -.189 and t-statistic -2.413) with an unstandardized 
coefficient B of -78.24 indicates that counties have a $78.25 
decreased cost to law enforcement costs per capita (mean 
$236.30) when compared to towns. 
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Therefore, for those localities with law enforcement arbitration when compared to 
the other workforce classifications or are a county when compared to towns, there is a 
relationship to either of those statuses and decreased law enforcement costs per capita. 
For non-right-to-work states, there is a relationship to increased law enforcement costs. 
All of the other variables were not significant enough to warrant any further analysis in 
regards to relationship to law enforcement costs. 
Reasons supporting a lower cost environment for arbitration could be attributable 
to sensitivity to union-negotiated practices regarding compensation and benefits that 
other facets of operations (e.g., vehicle replacements, equipment, training) may be 
lower than other localities. There may also be practices existing in arbitration localities 
that through their empowered union, they may not be as susceptible to political or other 
distractions in provision of law enforcement services and its related costs (e.g., hiring 
additional personnel). Rational Choice Theory attributes (e.g., efficiency in rational goal 
attainment) may also be more present in arbitration localities. There may also be 
reasons for non-right-to-work states that support a higher cost environment and 
counties that support a lower cost environment (e.g., states with greater union-friendly 
practices may have higher service costs whereas counties may be able to run more 
efficiently without urban challenges). However, further research would need to be done 
in order to further isolate determining factors for why this relationship of arbitration to 
decreased law enforcement costs per capita exists as well as the relationships of non-
right-to-work states and counties.   
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Table 4.3: Law Enforcement Costs Per Capita 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .432
a
 .187 .139 90.755 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County 
Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, 
Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates, 
Median HH Inc (000) 
 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 423124.372 13 32548.029 3.952 .000
b
 
Residual 1844989.359 224 8236.560   
Total 2268113.731 237    
a. Dependent Variable: Law Enfor Exp per Capita 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County Local Govt, 
Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, Unemployment Rate, 
Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates, Median HH Inc (000) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 
(Constant) 180.222 115.245  1.564 .119   
Population (000) -.025 .043 -.039 -.568 .571 .758 1.320 
Bond Rating Adj Scale 13.747 9.149 .098 1.503 .134 .860 1.163 
High School 
Graduates 
36.611 141.990 .023 .258 .797 .443 2.255 
Median HH Inc (000) -.220 .421 -.049 -.522 .602 .416 2.406 
Density .005 .004 .080 1.142 .255 .733 1.365 
Unemployment Rate 352.208 289.719 .097 1.216 .225 .568 1.760 
Age15to24% -100.713 74.717 -.095 -1.348 .179 .730 1.369 
Survey-Quality of Life -2.213 59.966 -.004 -.037 .971 .385 2.598 
Non Right-to-Work 
State 
66.629 15.902 .340 4.190 .000 .551 1.816 
City (v. Town) -24.269 17.963 -.099 -1.351 .178 .677 1.478 
County (v. Town) -78.245 32.424 -.189 -2.413 .017 .595 1.682 
Med  (v. NCB) 21.736 16.401 .106 1.325 .186 .566 1.765 
Arb  (V. NCB) -51.435 19.044 -.254 -2.701 .007 .411 2.431 
a. Dependent Variable: LE Exp per Capita 
 
 
Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which illustrated a correlation of 
arbitration to decreased law enforcement costs per capita, it would appear that the null 
hypothesis 2A can be rejected as there appears to be a relationship between an 
element of law enforcement workforce classification (arbitration) and law enforcement 
costs per capita (does not confirm the hypothesis). Because of the inability of the 
statistical tests to illustrate a correlation of mediation to increased (or decreased) law 
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enforcement costs per capita, it would appear that the null hypothesis 2B cannot be 
rejected.  
As noted, because of the low r square and large variance to adjusted r square, 
the variability amongst the data has given rise to a model that may be only slightly 
better than guessing the mean; even after removing low significance variables from data 
output analysis in attempting to lower the variance between r square and adjusted r 
square. Therefore, the results appropriately disclose this challenge to the model and 
would require further research to best ascertain other variables, if any, that may 
produce a more parsimonious model. However, such low r squares may also be 
indicative of a null hypothesis that may fail to be rejected on the underlying data.  
 
Hypotheses 3A and 3B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite measure when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
  
 Null Hypothesis 3A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite 
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite measure when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
 Null Hypothesis 3B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite 
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
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The goal of the hypothesis 3 is to calculate and then analyze a high performance 
return on costs (HPRC) from the data variables in the two previous hypotheses. From 
the HPRC quantified factor for each locality (composite performance measure/law 
enforcement costs per capita), a statistical analysis can be performed of this factor and 
the classification factor of the workforce.  
In performing the statistical analysis initially using the same control variables in 
the prior hypothesis tests, many of these variables resulted in high “significance” results 
which indicate high correlations of inapplicability of such variables amongst the data set. 
This may have also given rise to large variance between adjusted r square and r square 
(81.8%). Appendix H – Hypotheses 3 Full Variable Result Table provides the result of 
such initial statistical analysis. In trying to negate the effects of such irrelevant variables, 
the statistical analysis for hypotheses 3 was refined to include those control variables 
with a lower rate of risk on the analysis. A threshold of significance use for a revised set 
of control variables, included in this section’s analysis, included only those below a 
significance of .250 (high school graduates, median household incomes, non-right-to-
work states and county government). 
Table 4.4: High Performance Return on Costs illustrates the following via SPSS 
linear regression: 
 Model Summary - r square: .056 which indicates on average the model’s 
predictions are 5% better than guessing the mean. This a very low percentage 
which reflects that there is not much difference between predictions and 
guessing the mean. The variance between the r square (.056) and adjusted r 
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square (.031) is actually a large variance (unfavorable), with adjusted r square 
44.6% below r square (whereas Hypotheses 1 had a variance of 3.8%, but an 
improvement from the initial Hypotheses 3 variance of 81.8% as noted in 
Appendix H). This may be correlated to the number of variables being examined 
as part of this analysis as the greater number of variables added, the greater the 
chance of a larger spread between r-square and adjusted r-square. Based upon 
this large variance, additional regression analyses were conducted by changing 
variables (e.g., lowering significance factor further to remove other variables, 
changing composite of variables included) in hopes that certain variables were 
impacting the results in producing a large variances between r square and 
adjusted r square. However, there was an inability to make improvements to the r 
square and adjusted r square variance. Based upon these factors, the model is 
not necessarily good from a statistical analysis (i.e., only slightly better than 
guessing the mean). Therefore, the output for hypothesis 3 results carry caveat 
of low r square and high variance with adjusted r square; which results in a 
model that is not robust and should not be overly relied upon as part of a 
statistical analysis. 
 ANOVA – F value: 2.268 and significance of .038 which indicates that the overall 
model produces better results than simply guessing the mean. 
 VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst 
the variables. The low scores indicate that the independent variables are not 
heavily inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.  
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 Coefficients: 
o Significant (<.05): Median household income and county appears to be 
significant. 
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-score (of those noted as significant) 
are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:  
 Median Household Income ($000) (beta .190 and t-statistic 2.400) 
with an unstandardized coefficient B of .314 indicates that for every 
unit change of $1000 in the median household income (mean 59.0 
($000) or $59,000), there is a .314 increase in the HPRC index 
(mean 27.28). 
 County (beta .159 and t-statistic 2.426) with an unstandardized 
coefficient B of 24.156 indicates that counties have a 24.156 
increase in the HPRC index (mean 27.28) when compared to 
towns. 
Therefore, as median household incomes increases, the HPRC index for law 
enforcement services also increases. This may indicate that higher median household 
income localities enable a lower costing law enforcement organization to also perform 
better as there are less opportunities for crime to occur, more time dedicated to 
accreditation and/or a higher survey satisfaction rate. This may also be the result that 
higher median household incomes also may follow better practices of crime reduction 
strategies (e.g., securing their households and vehicles better; contacting law 
enforcement about suspicious activity or crime alert hotline tips; or be less positioned to 
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commit crimes because of higher incomes). There is also a correlation of counties 
having an increased HPRC index when compared to other (e.g., towns). This may be 
the result of counties without the urban challenges faced in many cities or towns being 
able to perform better at a lower cost. Further research would be necessary to 
determine what, if any, of these potential underlying scenarios for median household 
incomes and counties could yield HPRC. All of the other variables were not significant 
enough to warrant any further analysis in regards to relationship to HPRC. 
 
Table 4.4: High Performance Return on Costs 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .236
a
 .056 .031 35.37148 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Median HH Inc (000), County Local 
Govt, High School Graduates, Med, Non Right-to-Work State 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 17022.663 6 2837.110 2.268 .038
b
 
Residual 289013.787 231 1251.142   
Total 306036.450 237    
a. Dependent Variable: HPRC 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Median HH Inc (000), County Local Govt, High School Graduates, 
Med, Non Right-to-Work State 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 61.968 36.739  1.687 .093   
High School Graduates -58.975 44.875 -.102 -1.314 .190 .674 1.483 
Median HH Inc (000) .314 .131 .190 2.400 .017 .652 1.533 
Non Right-to-Work State -7.748 6.046 -.108 -1.282 .201 .579 1.728 
County (v. Town) 24.156 9.957 .159 2.426 .016 .958 1.044 
Med (v. NCB) .354 6.094 .005 .058 .954 .623 1.604 
Arb (v. NCB) 5.356 7.294 .072 .734 .464 .426 2.347 
a. Dependent Variable: HPRC 
 
Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which did not illustrate a correlation of 
workforce classification to change in HPRC index, it would appear that the null 
hypotheses 3 (both 3A and 3B) cannot be rejected.   
As noted, because of the low r square and large variance to adjusted r square, 
the variability amongst the data has given rise to a model that may be only slightly 
better than guessing the mean; even after removing high significance variables from 
data output analysis in trying to lower the variance between r square and adjusted r 
square. Therefore, the results appropriately disclose this challenge to the model and 
would require further research to best ascertain other variables, if any, which may 
produce a better and more robust model. However, a low r-square indicates a weak 
model overall therefore it is difficult to draw strong conclusions even if the null 
hypothesis could be rejected, it would be with caution.  
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Hypothesis Results Summarized 
Based upon the preceding statistical results, findings for each of the hypotheses 
can be stated. 
 Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to 
non-collective bargaining 
 
o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential 
relationships identified in this research).  
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with median household 
income (positive), density (negative), age (positive), survey quality 
(positive) and city (negative). This applies to hypothesis 1B also. 
 
 Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to 
non-collective bargaining 
 
o The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (mediation (negative)) 
when compared amongst non-collective bargaining as results indicate 
potential relationship.  
 
 
 Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
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o The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (arbitration (negative)) 
when compared amongst non-collective bargaining as results indicate 
potential relationship.  
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with non-right-to-work 
state (positive) and county (negative). This applies to hypothesis 2B also. 
o However, because of low r squares and large variance between r square 
and adjusted r square, the model’s output is only slightly better than 
guessing the mean. Even after removing variables with high significance 
or other traits in a variety of analysis, the variance between r square and 
adjusted r square were not improved. Therefore, because of the model’s 
limitations in not being parsimonious, the preceding results may not be as 
valid as data output and analysis that yielded a higher r square and a 
lower variance to adjusted r square. This applies to hypothesis 2B also. 
 
 Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
 
 
o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential 
relationships identified in this research).  
 .  
 Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite 
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
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o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential 
relationships identified in this research).  
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with median household 
income (positive) and counties (positive). This also applies to hypothesis 
3B. 
o However, because of low r squares and large variance between r square 
and adjusted r square, the model’s output is only slightly better than 
guessing the mean. Even after removing variables with high significance 
or other traits in a variety of analysis, the variance between r square and 
adjusted r square were not improved. Therefore, because of the model’s 
limitations in not being parsimonious, the preceding results may not be as 
valid as data output and analysis that yielded a higher r square and a 
lower variance to adjusted r square. This also applies to hypothesis 3B. 
 
 Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite 
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential 
relationships identified in this research).  
While two of the six null hypotheses were rejected, there are observations of 
these research findings worthy of further discussion. As indicated in Chapter 1 – 
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Introduction, the advocacy groups with strong opinions about the high costs of unions 
and low performance results is contrasted by those advocacy groups that attribute 
unions as an inherent trait needed to meet a worker’s needs and provide for a safe and 
productive workplace towards a high performing organization. These sentiments and 
related research helped give rise to the problem statement, research question and 
hypothesis development. Because the null hypothesis was rejected two out of six times, 
there appears to be a possible correlation from this research between workforce 
classification and a law enforcement organization’s ability to perform better and at a 
lower cost, but no correlation in regards to higher performance return on costs (HPRC).   
 
Summary - Validity and Reliability of Data Variables 
As the data results were accumulated, further efforts were made to re-address 
validity and reliability of data variables. Validity and reliability were initially addressed in 
Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology, as validity determines whether the 
data is measuring what was intended to be measured and reliability determines how 
accurately the measuring is without the effects of potential bias. As the data variables 
were subjected to statistical tests in this chapter, additional data verification techniques 
were performed. 
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Validity  
Construct validity, through use of independent authoritative sources of 
performance indicators (FBI data, budget documents, NCS citizen surveys), appears to 
be the proper measures. In addition, through the use of descriptive statistics (including 
frequency and descriptive tabulations), the sample appears to be representative of the 
population.  
Internal validity properly demonstrates the causal relationship between two 
variables. With workforce classification as the independent variable and dependent 
variables of performance, cost and HPRC, through linear regression analysis and 
significance of the t test, correlations were confirmed to be either positive, negative or 
neither. Additional validity aspects accounted for: 1) Maturation via aligned time 
horizons so similar environmental conditions existed during measurement period 
(controlled with survey results, census and other data sources all within a 8-year period 
(concentrated within a 3-year period) to mitigate variances that may be associated with 
longer time periods of data collection); 2) Instrumental (and measurement effect) 
changes as measurement tools replicated throughout the study (controlled with the 
same manner in collecting and coding data amongst all sample localities); 3) Selection 
bias mitigated through consistent demographic (control variable) classification and 
bivariate correlation analysis performed on such variables (controlled through reliance 
on objective data sources and standard statistical tests of such data); and 4) 
Experimental mortality factors are mitigated by the relative non-transition nature of local 
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governments and collective bargaining agreements (controlled with continuity of local 
government and workforce classification statuses). 
For external validity, statistical data was computed for the sample and the 
population in illustrating the sample’s representation through the use of many control 
variables. For control variables in which the population of all local governments was not 
easily determined to be correlated, additional analysis was performed to illustrate that 
the sample was actually representative of local governments that have a certain size 
and scope to have a fully functioning law enforcement organization. In addition, 
because selection of the sample was not volunteers, those external validity concerns 
are negated. In addition, the ability to segment similar demographic and socio-economic 
local governments helps mitigate relative external validity concerns. Confounded 
treatment effects were mitigated by focusing on the incremental changes between the 
dependent variable based upon the independent variable mitigating the risk of 
generalization of very low or high performance to an entire population of local 
governments. Situational effects were mitigated as the subjects are local governments 
and their citizens, all subject to the same scope and duration of study. Effects due to 
differential mortality were mitigated in a similar manner as noted under internal validity. 
 
Reliability 
Reliability is different than validity, in that reliability helps determine that what 
data being measured is consistently being done, whereas validity addresses the 
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relevance and accuracy of the data being measured. What was measured amongst the 
entire sample and across all of their variables were measured consistently without 
regard to any other factors to best address reliability. Consistency examples include the 
same set of survey questions (NCS) and data sources accessed (e.g., FBI, CALEA, 
Census) to ensure that a consistent manner to compile the data was performed 
throughout the data gathering and analysis process. For example, since the survey 
questions used were the same survey questions used amongst all of those localities 
sampled, there is a high degree of reliability that the response of the survey question is 
a measure off of the same worded question. In addition, for crime rates, the FBI has a 
standard process for all local governments in defining violent and non-violent crimes; 
therefore, there is a high degree of reliability that the data reported amongst the 
localities is reliable and reported in a consistent manner.  
 
Comparison of Findings with Other Research 
As the findings achieved in this research may be unique in reference to the 
assortment of independent, dependent and control variables, other research was 
examined for elements of these variables and their related outcomes. There were no 
expectations with regards to any of the results, although from an initial review of the 
literature and related research, there were attributes of higher personnel costs 
associated with collective bargaining and higher performance measures associated with 
more educated and higher median income areas. As you can ascertain from the 
previous studies noted, there is variability in the results and not one study merited all of 
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the traits and hypotheses that were undertaken as part of this research. Extensive 
searches were done to try and locate similar studies, but the combination of an array of 
performance measures (surveys, costs, crime indices, and accreditation) while also 
comparing it to levels of workforce classification were not able to be detected.  
However, the following studies are a representation of other research with certain 
traits that are similar to enable a comparison to the findings in this research: 
 Freeman and Ichinowski (1988) compared teacher unions with greater and 
lesser unionization with result that collective bargaining correlated higher 
teacher salaries and generally higher educational performance. 
 Eberts and Stone (1986) used test scores to determine that union school 
districts have 7% higher test scores. 
 Feuille, Delaney and Hendricks (1985) determined law enforcement union 
contracts over time favors the local law enforcement union as it becomes 
more empowered and influential (not a trait correlated to HPO). 
 Xu (2008) indicated no significant relationship between organizational-
incentives structure and high performance attributes.  
 Doellgast, Holtgrewe and Deery (2009) study of private sector call centers 
determined that unionized call centers and in-house call centers (compared to 
outsourced) were associated with significantly higher measures of job quality. 
 Kim and Bae (2005) examined two different Korean companies determining 
that there was a correlation between being unionized and innovation.  
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 Koper, Maguire and Moore (2001) and Valletta (1989) determined that large 
law enforcement organizations over time retain employees longer than 
smaller organizations and larger organizations also tend to be more 
associated with collective bargaining.  
 Rees (1991) concluded that collective bargaining’s “strong voice” to an 
employee is considered a primary factor for lower turnover rates than non-
collective bargaining law enforcement organizations. 
 Kelling (1975) determined that no correlation existed between preventive 
patrol increases and citizen perception of law enforcement presence or 
personal safety, or reported crimes.  
 Department of Labor (2004) indicated that local government union employees 
are paid 32% more than non-union local government employees.  
 Wagner (2008) concluded that compensation and benefits of the union worker 
are better.  
 Putchinisky (2007) provided evidence that unions do influence law 
enforcement expenditures to a substantial degree.  
 Victor (1977) determined differential of union law enforcement officers and 
firefighters were paid 8 – 12% over their non-union counterparts.  
 Zhao and Lovrich (1997) illustrated that large law enforcement organizations 
with collective bargaining  have additional salary benefits. 
 Zax (1988) cities with collective bargaining in a study have higher salaries.  
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For those studies (example: Freeman and Ichinowski (1988)) that compared non-
law enforcement organization’s (e.g., teacher unions, private sector call centers), in 
which attributes of unionization and/or high performance were noted, there was no such 
correlation in the research performed for this project. Comparison of different types of 
workers with different training and related needs to perform their job function is 
challenging and would be subject to validity concerns. However, additional research 
may be needed across professions to see if there are any similar outcomes of workforce 
classification and HPRC and if so, are there traits of that profession that contribute to 
such similarity.  
For those studies in which law enforcement was the research topic, the studies 
(example: Feuille, Delaney and Hendricks (1985)) that illustrated a correlation between 
a collective bargaining atmosphere and greater workforce influence, it appears that 
such measures in these studies do not necessarily reference high performance 
organization or HPRC traits, but rather other matters of workforce influence (e.g., higher 
pay and benefits, job protection, workplace environment conditions). This research 
project did not correlate workforce classification to the array of workplace topics 
deemed to be “influential” as its focus was on HPRC.  
For those studies (examples: Koper, Maguire and Moore (2001) and Valletta 
(1989)), that showed a correlation between larger law enforcement organizations and 
collective bargaining which also was correlated to lower turnover rates, such analysis 
was not able to be replicated in this research. The correlations for the control variable 
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population and law enforcement costs per capita did not appear to be correlated to any 
threshold of workforce classification nor did this study consider any population density. 
In addition, lower turnover rates on their own merit are not necessarily of a high 
performance organization as the organization may be retaining underperforming 
workers and be labeled as “low turnover.” Whereas another organization with a higher 
turnover rate may be better positioning its higher performing workforce to succeed 
better through the dismissal of lower performing employees. 
For those studies (example: Zhao and Lovrich (1997)) that determined higher 
compensation and benefits to the law enforcement worker with collective bargaining 
abilities, no such correlation was determined as part of this research. As the law 
enforcement costs for this research used the total costs of the law enforcement 
organization, it was not possible to determine the salaries and benefit costs that could 
be better compared to other research in this area. Perhaps if other studies indicate 
positive correlations of salaries and benefits to a certain level of workforce classification 
and the researched performed as part of this study indicate higher overall (salaries, 
benefits, operating and capital) law enforcement costs per capita for non-collective 
bargaining and mediation, but lesser costs per capita for arbitration, then perhaps 
variances exist between the non-salaries and benefits expenses to offset the higher 
salaries and benefits. Note that mediation did illustrate higher costs per capita, so 
further research may be needed to determine variations between these two forms of 
workforce classification.   
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For those studies (example: Kelling (1975)), that illustrated the effects, if any, of a 
law enforcement service increase on the effects it would have upon citizen survey 
responses regarding quality of service or performance results in the reduction of crime, 
no such correlation was determined as part of this research. Because these studies 
required the introduction of a variable (change in service) to be introduced and then 
measured by other manners (e.g., surveys, crime rate) after a period of time, this 
research project was focused on not changing a key variable in order for the sample 
data to be better examined for correlation. 
 
Limitations of Findings 
As noted previously, all research was conducted from the perspective of 
performance measurement data, cost efficiencies and citizen effectiveness satisfaction 
results. No data or information was obtained from the perspective of the employee 
which would identify variances between collective and non-collective bargaining 
localities in the manners of satisfaction of compensation, benefits and work 
environment. Separate research on this topic could be substantive and serve to 
compliment the results of this research in yielding further conclusions on this issue and 
further validate or challenge outcomes of the hypotheses tested as part of this research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY 
 In this final chapter, a summary will bring closure to this research project, but 
hopefully position this subject area for future research as workforce classification and its 
role in the public sector will continue to be debated. The primary focus of this research 
was law enforcement organizations and their performance and costs in subjecting a 
high performance return on costs dependent variable to the independent variable of 
workforce classification. Law enforcement organizations are those charged with the 
responsibility of law and order in their locality and represented primarily by city and town 
police departments, but also may include county sheriff or other law enforcement 
offices. Workforce classification as described throughout this research is the differential 
of law enforcement’s ability to collectively bargain (or not), and if so, whether the 
employees have the ability to resolve impasses in negotiation through mediation 
(employer-preferred if there is collective bargaining) or the more employee-favored 
mandatory arbitration.  
This summary is divided into many sections that are representative of the 
preceding four chapters. A Background illustrates the environment that has given rise to 
the development of a problem statement and research question. Theoretical Framework 
provides the Rational Choice Theory lens that was used throughout this research in 
developing the six hypothesis statements (two statements in each of the three subject 
areas), selecting the appropriate variables, correlating the review of literature and 
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interpreting the results. Research Design and Methodology provides an overview of the 
independent (workforce classification), dependent (performance, cost and high 
performance return on costs (HPRC) measures) and control (socio-economic and 
demographic) variables. In addition, the manner in how the data was subject to a proper 
statistical testing process and how the threats to validity and reliability were mitigated 
are summarized. Findings will provide the results of the statistical analysis for each of 
the null hypothesis tested in determining what correlation, not causation, exists between 
the independent and dependent variables. A Comparison of Results to Other Studies 
helps put into perspective this research compared to other similar research studies in 
this area. Further Research in Workforce Classification and High Performance 
Organization will provide a pathway for others to consider in this subject area that would 
benefit the profession, local government law enforcement organizations and the citizens 
they serve. Finally, the Conclusion will be the closing commentary on this research 
project. 
 
Background 
One variance between organizations is the ability of employees to access and 
use collective bargaining in negotiated contracts for salaries, benefits and workplace 
conditions. These employees are generally represented by an empowered union to act 
on behalf of the employees. For local governments, such workforce classification is 
governed through their respective state laws to either avail or not avail collective 
bargaining rights to certain classes of workers amongst its local government workforce; 
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including law enforcement employees (Salerno, 1981). For law enforcement 
organizations, three distinct categories of workforce classification exist via collective 
bargaining: 1) None; 2) Impasse resolution via mediation; and 3) Impasse resolution via 
mandatory arbitration. A fourth classification - work stoppages (strikes) - exist for other 
professions, but not for law enforcement organizations (except in Montana, but Montana 
requires many pre-qualifying conditions in order for strikes to occur).  
 
Problem Statement, Research Question and Hypothesis 
From the initial environmental scan in Chapter 1 – Introduction, the repeated 
debates on the merits of public sector unions in the 21st century ranged from those with 
opinions about high union costs to those that associate unions with providing an 
environment where the worker, and therefore the locality, can operate at a higher 
performance level over the long-term. From these various opinions and additional 
research performed, the following problem statement was formulated:  
 Local government law enforcement collective bargaining practices 
appear to create advocacy groups in support and against such 
practices; however, these emotional debates seem to focus on just 
salary and benefit costs and not on any high performance law 
enforcement organization factors; especially when total law 
enforcement costs and demographic factors are considered in 
determining high performance return on costs. 
 
Understanding what, if any, relationship exists between workforce classification 
and the high performing organization (HPO) can help address the problem. The 
research was designed to remove the emotional and advocacy-related elements that 
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are often associated with collective bargaining with emphasis on theoretical inspired 
data analysis. In order to not be too broad, the focused local government service 
subject to this question is law enforcement. Accounting for the costs amongst the 
various local government law enforcement organizations was important to the research 
question’s focus on the relationship between workforce classification and HPO. Based 
upon these research goals, the following research question was formulated:    
 Is there a relationship between a local government law enforcement 
collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining workforce and a high 
performance law enforcement organization when cost and demographic 
factors are considered in determining high performance return on 
costs?  
In order to position a research project for statistical analysis, hypotheses are 
developed from which independent, dependent and control variables can then be 
gathered and tested via statistical software (e.g., SPSS). Based upon the problem 
statement and research question, and related literature review, the following hypotheses 
and related null hypotheses to be subjected to statistical analysis) were derived to try 
and capture results on performance and costs individually and then collectively through 
a composite measure developed – High Performance Return on Costs (HPRC). Each of 
the subject areas (arbitration (A) and mediation (B)) of the hypotheses statements was 
captured as separate hypothesis statements in order to isolate the subject area subject 
to the statistical test. HPRC can be used to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of 
taxpayers’ costs for law enforcement.  
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 Law Enforcement Performance Hypotheses (1) 
o Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationships between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
o Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationships between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Cost Hypotheses (2) 
o Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
o Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Hypotheses (3) 
o Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
o  Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
Independent Variable – Workforce Classification 
In categorizing the independent variable of workforce classification, the United 
States is fairly evenly divided amongst the three categories of workforce classification: 
1) Thirty-two states permit collective bargaining for its law enforcement organizations 
and are segmented through their impasse resolution process with fifteen states (30.0% 
of total) via mediation and seventeen states (34.0% of total) via mandatory arbitration; 
and 2) Eighteen states (36.0% of total states) that do not permit collective bargaining.  
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Dependent Variable – Performance 
Dependent variables, as they pertain to law enforcement HPO measures, were 
focused upon four primary high performance statistics or traits: 1) Survey Results - the 
perception a citizen has about the law enforcement services provided in their locality 
and how safe and secure they feel in factors that are key to high quality of life; 2) Crime 
Index (separately captured for violent and property crimes) - data from actual crimes 
committed; and 3) National Accreditation – recognition of a professionally managed law 
enforcement organization. These statistics were selected because they appear to be 
representative and an appropriate gauge for performance from both an internal (staff, 
elected official) and external (citizen, business, media) perspective. Clearance rates for 
crimes committed was not used as a performance measure because of the variability in 
this measure defined amongst local governments and the timing difference between 
numerator and denominator (crime A cleared in the numerator may not be part of the 
crimes tabulated in the denominator if the crime occurred in the prior year). 
For the survey results, a highly regarded survey company, National Citizens 
Survey (NCS), provided detailed local government professionally stratified sample 
survey responses for 238 local governments across the country. This included a 
comprehensive questionnaire for representative sample of citizens to complete 
regarding all aspects of their local government, its services and their quality of life. 
These same 238 local governments were also the basis for the entire sample.  
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Three different parts of the survey were used for this research. The first two parts 
were used as separate statistics in gauging how safe the citizen felt and the quality of 
their law enforcement organization. For the “how safe do you feel” section, results from 
the following six questions were utilized: 1) Violent crimes (e.g., rape, assault, robbery); 
2) Property crimes (e.g., burglary, theft); 3) In their neighborhood during the day; 4) In 
their neighborhood after dark; 5) In shopping areas during the day; and 6) In shopping 
areas after dark. All of the results of these responses were averaged together to form a  
“how safe do you feel” performance composite measure.  
Another section of the NCS survey asked the following question - “please rate 
the quality of law enforcement services” (NRC, 2012). A third section of the survey 
utilized for this research asked about overall quality of life, not related directly to law 
enforcement, and this result was utilized as a control variable in determining if there is 
any correlation between performance (and other dependent variables of cost and 
HPRC) and overall quality of life.  
A second set of statistics focused on a local government’s crime index for violent 
and property crimes. The FBI collects such information from every law enforcement 
organization (called UCR Part I Crimes). Violent crimes include aggravated assault, 
forcible rape, murder and robbery whereas property crimes include arson, burglary, 
larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft (USDOJ, 2012). The crime indices for property and 
violent crimes were calculated by taking the total respective crimes for each of the 
indices and dividing them by population (demand trait). Other demand factors that may 
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influence the ability of a local government to provide service and correlating crimes that 
may arise include businesses (and their employees and business guests) and other 
visitors (e.g., tourists). However, these demand factors are not accumulated in any 
consistent manner amongst local governments and were not subject to this research. In 
order to classify crime rates for statistical analysis as part of a composite performance 
score on a 100 point scale, the crime rates were incrementally scaled with those with 
the highest crime rates (lowest performance indicator) getting a 0 scaled to those with 
the lowest crime rates (highest performance indicator) assigned a 100 factor score.   
The third set of statistics gathered was the national accreditation of a local 
government’s law enforcement organization. The pursuit and attainment of national 
accreditation for local government law enforcement is recognized as a HPO trait in 
ensuring compliance to generally accepted standards of the profession. The 
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) was formed 
in 1987 by four major national law enforcement associations. CALEA has published a 
standards manual containing professional standards that address nine major law 
enforcement areas: 1) Role, responsibilities, and relationships; 2) Organization, 
management, and administration; 3) Personnel structure; 4) Personnel process; 5) 
Operations; 6) Operation support; 7) Traffic operations; 8) Detainee and court-related 
activities; and 9) Auxiliary and technical services (CALEA, 2012). In quantifying the 
factor for statistical analysis, a score of 100 was given to localities with accreditation, 50 
for those localities in self-assessment category in pursuit of accreditation and 0 for 
those localities that do not have accreditation nor are pursuing such accreditation. 
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The performance dependent variable was a compilation of the preceding 
performance statistics with a weighted average applied amongst the statistics to best 
represent one consistently applied performance measure for the statistical analysis. The 
weighted average formula is as follows: Composite Performance Measure = (Safe 
survey questions * 25%) + (law enforcement quality survey question *25%) + (violent 
crime rate *20%) + (property crime rate * 20%) + (accreditation factor *10%). 
 
Dependent Variable – Cost per Capita 
For the law enforcement costs per capita dependent variable, the costs to 
provide law enforcement services were comprised of personal services (salaries and 
fringe benefits), operating (e.g., supplies, fuel, training, contractual services) and capital 
(e.g., vehicles). These costs were attained through third party sources (ICMA’s 
Performance Measurement Survey (ICMA, 2011)) or directly from the respective local 
government’s audit or budget documents that illustrated actual costs for law 
enforcement. The cost of services and operations for law enforcement are often highly 
debated during a locality’s budget process with expectations of high correlations of 
service performance to costs. Compensation and benefits is also the highest portion of 
an organization’s budget; therefore inclusion of this cost measure and its correlation to 
workforce classification is warranted as a dependent variable. In determining the per 
capita costs factor, the total law enforcement costs were divided by the population. As 
noted under crime index, additional considerations were given to other demand factors 
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for the denominator, but also as noted previously, these factors were not consistently 
calculated or available amongst local governments. 
 
Dependent Variable – High Performance Return on Costs (HPRC) 
A final dependent variable was a composite calculation from the preceding 
dependent variables in illustrating a HPRC through a weighted criteria formula to best 
represent the dependent variables of performance as a factor (numerator) from the 
costs invested into the service (denominator). The attempt to create HPRC was to 
better compare and contrast an overall HPRC measure as there can be higher 
performance traits that take an inordinately higher cost to attain or even lower 
performance traits that may be associated with an inordinately lower cost. The formula 
for HPRC is Performance Composite Measure / Law Enforcement Costs per Capita.  
 
Control Variables 
The control variables utilized were designed to accomplish two objectives: 1) 
Provide validity that the sample selected is representative of the population of local 
governments through comparisons to US Census and other sources; and 2) There are 
no anomalies of sample local governments (e.g., performance) that would cause the 
independent variables to not be comparable. For example, if all the high survey result 
communities in one category of workforce classification were the result of higher socio-
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economic factors compared to a lower survey result in another category of workforce 
classification from lower socioeconomic factors, then the differential may be attributable 
to underlying socio-economic factors and not because of workforce classification. For 
each of the following control variables selected, they were selected because of possible 
correlation between the survey respondents of that local government, the perception of 
service and the ability of that local government to provide a high performing service at 
an appropriate cost (Unless otherwise noted, control variable sources were the US 
Department of Census (US Census, 2012)): 
 Municipal bond ratings (uninsured): Provided a good overall indicator of a local 
government’s economic health as the higher the bond rating, the lower the risk of 
default. Moody’s Investors Services was the data source and they base their 
ratings on four factors – economic, debt, administrative and financial (Moody’s, 
2012). Uninsured is an important qualifier as many local governments that are 
unrated or have a lower bond rating, may be able to purchase bond insurance to 
warrant a AAA-bond rated deal. Therefore, the bond ratings utilized for this 
analysis have removed such insured transactions in order to ensure accurate 
comparability. 
 Population: This is the demand statistic for a local government’s law enforcement 
services. The size of the population in prior research has been correlated to 
higher crime statistics from a per capita and related demand statistic perspective 
(Ellis, Beaver and Wright, 2009). This is attributable to higher populated localities 
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may have a wider scope of citizens with needs to warrant services or citizens 
who may be associated with criminal activity; also requiring additional law 
enforcement services. 
 Density: This represents population per square miles and can affect services that 
are more associated with density. This includes noise complaints as neighbors 
are closer to each other.   
 Form of Government: There are three primary types of local government 
structures: City, County and Towns (which includes districts and other locally 
defined governmental units).  
 Survey-Quality of Life: Being able to segment the sample population’s overall 
perception of quality of life may provide analytical results showing variances 
amongst local governments, independent variables and dependent variables.  
 Right-to-Work States: While the independent variable properly distinguishes 
between unionized and non-unionized law enforcement unions, some of these 
unions are permitted in right-to-work states and in some non-right-to-work states, 
there may not be a law enforcement union. 
 Other Control Variables: Additional variables were used that are common in 
classifying a local government’s socio-economic and demographic environment 
and its relative ability to perform to the varying demands its citizens may place 
upon it because of such environment. These other factors included median 
household income, high school graduation rates, percentage of population aged 
15-25, and unemployment rate.  
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As an example of such variance in demand for service is an increase in the 
educational level significantly reduces subsequent violent and property crimes with 
numerous other positive impacts upon the community (Lochner, 2008). Another 
example is that the age group of 15-25 can place far higher demands upon law 
enforcement than any other age group tier. After age 25, a steep drop in criminal activity 
occurs as people take-on new roles and the possibility of jail time becomes a relatively 
more-serious matter because of the impact it will have on the perpetrator’s life and 
responsibilities (Sociology.org, 2012). 
Workforce Classification 
Citizens often aspire for their local government services to recognize their needs 
and adapt to changes in a timely manner. This HPO trait may be further realized with or 
without collective bargaining. The environment exists that certain unions are under 
further scrutiny and pressures to justify their existence without regard to performance 
outcomes. This scrutiny has become more prevalent during the recession resulting in 
certain states debating changes to their collective bargaining laws. This scrutiny is 
further fueled by: 1) Declining investment return rate impacts upon public sector defined 
benefit pension plans that create material unfunded pension liabilities; and 2) Collective 
bargaining agreements that stipulate defined salary increases and employer payments 
towards health insurance during employees’ tenure and retirement. These factors, in 
addition to general recession factors of less taxable bases (property, income and sales 
tax) constrain local government budgets and have resulted in some combination of tax 
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rate increases or service reductions; both of which are generally opposed by the 
citizens. 
If general tenets of fair and equitable workplace practices, including 
compensation and benefits, could be defined, then objectively determining whether 
there exists additional motivation and performance of a unionized worker versus a non-
unionized worker can be fairly debated. However, the realization is that there is an 
inherent challenge and employee skepticism about any objective process based upon 
the history and plight of the worker under duress from management; both in the public 
and private sector.  
Private sector employees and their unions in the United States were formally 
recognized and empowered with the passage of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act 
– Wagner Act (LaborUnionReport.com, 2012). The impetus for the Wagner Act was 
focused on the private sector as public sector applicability was not envisioned (Code of 
Federal Regulations, 1935). President Franklin Roosevelt, a private-sector union 
advocate, cautioned that collective bargaining was not meant to be transplanted to the 
public sector (DiSalvo, 2010). 
It was not until 1958, when New York City Mayor Wagner (son of Senator 
Wagner from Wagner Act) issued an executive order enabling certain local public 
workers the ability to unionize. Soon thereafter, many other states, starting with 
Wisconsin in 1959 (LaborUnionReport.com, 2012), and local governments provided 
such access for defined segments of their workforce. In 1962, President John Kennedy 
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enabled certain federal workers the right to unionize for the first time through Executive 
Order 10988 (American Presidency Project, 2012). This executive order was reinforced 
by Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Dilts and Walsh, 1988). 
 
Law Enforcement Organizations 
Law enforcement officers and firefighters have over 36% of their employees 
nationwide part of a union; which is second only to teachers for all occupational 
categories, private or public (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2004). This percentage increases substantially when it is just large law enforcement 
organizations; with over 70% of organizations with greater than 100 sworn officers 
engaging in collective bargaining (Zhao and Lovrich, 1997). Therefore, the importance 
of determining what is a high performance organization for law enforcement and 
whether there are or are not correlations to workforce classification has far greater 
applicability for many law enforcement workers, their employer and the citizens they 
serve. However, in order to have a rational discussion and interpret research rationally, 
the fragmentation between employer and worker and between citizen and their 
government needs to be overcome. 
This fragmentation between employer and employee has been around prior to 
unions and was the impetus for the creation of unions. As it pertains to law 
enforcement, this fragmentation was evident in the early actions of the Boston Police 
Social Club. When the Boston law enforcement chief in 1919 refused to recognize this 
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social club as having union status, a majority of the law enforcement officers “walked off 
the job” for four days which resulted in “widespread looting, hundreds of injuries and 
seven deaths” with order restored only upon National Guard arrival (DeLord, Burpo, 
Shannon, and Spearing, 2008, p. 227).  
As citizens and their government try to address this issue rationally, it is 
becoming more common to measure law enforcement effectiveness by focusing on 
“victimization data and citizens’ satisfaction with law enforcement service” (ICMA, 1991, 
p. 381). The accounts from the victim’s perspective and the community at-large on how 
well law enforcement is performing in a variety of manners may help better frame the 
strengths and weaknesses of the law enforcement organization for which the 
community may want further action plans initiated in reducing any weaknesses.  
 
High Performance Organizations (HPOs) 
HPOs are defined in many ways, but generally address the ability of the 
organization to leverage its collective resources to achieve the highest production value 
of products and services produced. Citizens often aspire for their local government 
services to recognize their needs and adapt to changes in a timely manner. This high 
performance organization trait may be further realized with or without collective 
bargaining. The environment exists that certain unions are under further scrutiny and 
pressures to justify their existence without regard to performance outcomes. Law 
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enforcement unions are facing a “global trend of policing reform driven by underlying 
social and economic factors (e.g., public demand for safety and security services that 
may not be met through traditional sworn officers)” (DeLord, Burpo, Shannon, and 
Spearing, 2008, p. 299). It is from these and similar HPO traits and environmental 
challenges that a privatization movement of HPO arose which has raised the 
expectation for HPO standards in the public sector (Wooldridge, Amagoh and Menefee, 
2002). 
Pursuing national accreditation is an HPO trait and achieving such accreditation 
can be viewed as a requirement for a HPO. For law enforcement, CALEA accreditation 
standards are not an “assessment in how well a local law enforcement organization has 
controlled crime or disorder, but rather how the organization has complied with 
guidelines that CALEA believes are associated with “good administrative practices” and 
“if these practices produce better performance, the law enforcement leader may claim 
that their organization is a higher performer as a result of such practices” (ICMA, 1991, 
p. 391). In leveraging CALEA-type standards into an operational mode, the productivity 
of law enforcement can be increased through: “1) Improving current policies and 
practices to the highest level; 2) Allocating resources most efficiently to the varied law 
enforcement services; 3) Increasing the probability of goal accomplishment; and 4) 
Leveraging the workforce talents to their full potential” (More, 1979, p. 326).  
All of the previous measures and attributes for the HPO need to also be done in 
a continuous improvement environment, and in the most efficient manner, in order for 
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HPO attainment and continuum of HPO status. Employees and organizations should 
develop together the appropriate tools and proactive strategies in adapting to the 
changing workplace in pursuit of and maintenance of HPO traits. “Managers with an 
appreciation of the problems of individuals and groups at work and an understanding of 
possible solutions can utilize their knowledge to facilitate organizational effectiveness” 
(Steers, 1984, p. 540). In addition, “performance measures can measure the output 
produced by the organization or the outcomes created in the community which results 
from organizational output” (Wooldridge, 2007, p. 47). A HPO-type performance 
measurement strategy can position the law enforcement organization to be proactive in 
dealing with issues as they arise, rather than reactive strategies hurriedly put together to 
appease politicians or the public.  
 
Theoretical Framework – Rational Choice Theory 
The theoretical basis utilized to best help answer the research question for this 
dissertation was Rational Choice Theory (RCT). Rational Choice Theory is a subset of 
the neo-classical theories (employee marginal utility and employer profit maximization) 
whereby individuals through “explanation and prediction” enable a rational choice 
process to ensue even with the likelihood of “high uncertainty and imperfect information” 
(Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 404). The underlying primary value of Rational Choice 
Theory is its efficiency in rational goal attainment (Harmon and Mayer, 1986). As the 
research question is based upon HPO attributes which are dependent upon employee 
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performance, Rational Choice Theory’s approach to employee motivation is a critical 
factor to high performance. 
The degree of organizational reality attempts to gauge the ability of the manager 
to “optimize instead of maximize on the quality of their decision” based upon the 
changing environment around them (Steers, 1984, p71). It is through rational choice 
process of optimization that viable alternatives emerge and that the selected alternative 
is appropriate to meet environmental demands (Steers, 1984). It is recognized that an 
individual’s self-interest goal is to maximize utility; which is correlated to the concept of 
“ends” previously addressed and positions the individual to make choices to best serve 
the individual. “Choosing rationality becomes equivalent to maximizing utility” which 
seeks the “greatest fulfillment of pre-existing passions” (Allingham, 1999, p. 1). 
Rational Choice Theory also “maximizes the satisfaction of preferences” by 
“individual actors” (Hindess, 1988, p. 1). “Narrow rationality” is where individual actions 
are motivated by “self-interest”; however, that does not necessarily translate to the 
actions of a group as acting rationally (Hardin, 1982, p. 9). From this perspective, non-
collective bargaining traits appear to be more self-interest targeted for narrow rationality 
to excel. Perhaps a key connection to narrow rationality’s success in law enforcement is 
whether such employees perform better in a self-interest capacity than in larger groups 
most traditionally associated with law enforcement unions. 
It is perhaps from these rational responses that an environment was created for 
private sector unions to initially materialize from an idea to a legal standing via the 
Wagner Act to having the public sector employee also interpret such societal benefits 
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and higher quality of life for themselves in their advocacy of creating organized public 
sector unions. Until the ability to form unions existed, individuals may not have had any 
defined pathway towards coordination. An “absence of assurance and coordination 
among individuals can make second-best choices rational to all” because a “joint 
outcome of such choices is a rationally inferior product from the point of view of the 
participating individuals” (Frohock, 1987, p. 131). 
This perhaps sets the possibility that there is neither an absolute social norm that 
may exist for collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining as these choices, while 
clear and distinct, may each have a rational basis from an individual’s perspective that 
is reinforced if that individual is surrounded by similar collective thoughts of other 
individuals. This also appears to not constrain a HPO (or existing organization seeking 
HPO status) in developing multiple, but finite courses of action to best position the 
employee, customer and organization for continuum of HPO success. The result for law 
enforcement officers is that they will be “happier in their work and more productive when 
the decisions they are allowed to make for themselves are maximized and the decisions 
others make for them are minimized” (Maddox, 1975, p. 25). 
Future issues in the workplace and organizational behavior can evolve from trend 
changes in “socio-normative, demographic, economic or technological” and the manner 
in which leaders (and workers) address these changes and their inherent challenges will 
determine how HPO traits can be achieved and maintained (Steers, 1984, p. 537). 
Collective bargaining trends can be influenced by any of these changes. While 
economic changes may cause more immediate constraints on collective bargaining 
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during periods of recession, it may be socio-normative changes that impact the 
workplace for more sustained periods of time. Socio-normative changes could include 
“work ethic, aspiration levels, attitudes towards authority and trust in organization” that 
can also be external forces “influencing the nature of the work environment which, in 
turn, influences how people behave and feel on the job” (Steers, 1984, p. 537). 
Perhaps greater awareness of the dynamics in which performance attributes can 
be enhanced through metrics as noted in this research ultimately will motivate the law 
enforcement officers further towards a high performance environment. Just as Henry A. 
Landsberger in Hawthorne Revisited (Landsberger, 1958) identified correlations 
between worker productivity improvement and the greater interest in them as workers 
from management, perhaps this heightened interest in the law enforcement officer from 
not just management, but from the community, with their support, can also be that same 
interest mechanism to yield a higher performing organization. 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
Through an exploratory cross-sectional study utilizing SPSS, the data collection 
was a compilation of information generally available for local governments that can be 
further analyzed. The sample population is derived by using all participants in the 
National Citizen Survey (NCS). Additional information regarding the sample population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 
 
and variables utilized (independent, dependent and control) were previously addressed 
in this Summary’s Background section.  
All data categories were entered into statistical software (e.g., Statistical Package 
for Social Services (SPSS)) from which applicable statistical data analysis could be 
performed. The primary manners in which data was analyzed were as follows: 
 Linear Regression Analysis: In order to determine the t- score, significance of the 
t test, variance inflation factor (VIF), standardized coefficient and related output 
from linear regression, correlations can be used to determine if two variables are 
linearly related to each other (SPSS, 2009).  
 Descriptive Statistics: In order to ensure that the sample is representative of the 
population, descriptive statistics (frequency tabulations for variables comprising 
ordinal or nominal traits and descriptive tabulations for variables comprising scale 
traits) were statistically performed.  
 
Validity and Reliability of Sample and Data Variables 
As the data results were accumulated, further efforts were made to re-address 
validity and reliability of data variables. Validity determines whether the data is 
measuring what was intended to be measured and reliability determines how accurately 
the measuring is without the effects of potential bias. Construct validity, through use of 
independent authoritative sources of performance indicators, appears to be the proper 
measures. In addition, through the use of descriptive statistics, the sample appears to 
be representative of the population. Internal validity properly demonstrates the causal 
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relationship between two variables. With workforce classification as the independent 
variable and dependent variables of performance, cost and HPRC, through linear 
regression analysis, the t score and significance of the t test, linear correlations were 
confirmed to be either positive, negative or neither. 
Additional validity aspects accounted for: 1) Maturation via aligned time horizons 
so similar environmental conditions existed during measurement period; 2) Instrumental 
(and measurement effect) changes as measurement tools replicated throughout the 
study; 3) Selection bias mitigated through consistent demographic (control variable) 
classification and linear regression analysis performed on such variables; and 4) 
Experimental mortality factors are mitigated by the relative non-transition nature of local 
governments and collective bargaining agreements.  
For external validity, statistical data was computed for the sample and the 
population in illustrating the sample’s representation through the use of many control 
variables. For control variables in which the population of all local governments wasn’t 
easily determined to be correlated, additional analysis was performed to illustrate that 
the sample was actually representative of local governments that have a certain size 
and scope to have fully functioning law enforcement organizations. In addition, because 
the selection of the sample was not volunteers, those external validity concerns are 
negated.  
In addition, the ability to segment similar demographic and socio-economic local 
governments helps mitigate relative external validity concerns. Confounded treatment 
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effects were mitigated by focusing on the incremental changes between the dependent 
variable based upon the independent variable mitigating the risk of generalization of 
very low or high performance to an entire population of local governments. Situational 
effects were mitigated as the subjects are local governments and their citizens, all 
subject to the same scope and duration of study. Effects due to differential mortality 
were mitigated in a similar manner as noted under internal validity. 
Reliability concerns were addressed as what was measured amongst the entire 
sample and across all of their variables was measured consistently without regard to 
any other factors. Consistency examples include the same set of survey questions and 
data sources accessed to ensure that a consistent manner to compile the data was 
performed throughout the data gathering and analysis process.  
The examination of correlation, if any, between law enforcement workforce 
classification and performance, costs and associated HPRC was performed in Chapter 
4 – Findings. Through SPSS linear regression, statistical analysis was performed for 
each of the dependent variables compared to the independent and control variables.  
The control variables were accumulated and analyzed in helping determine the 
comparability of data amongst the three independent variable classifications (associated 
with workforce classification): 1) Non-collective bargaining (what the following variables 
of mediation and arbitration are being compared to); 2) Collective bargaining through 
mediation (included in the model); and 3) Collective bargaining through mandatory 
arbitration (included in the model).  
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The control variables were reviewed to determine the representativeness of the 
sample to the entire population of local law enforcement organizations. This was 
accomplished via two manners: Research design control and statistical control. For 
research design control, a representative cross-section of many types of localities was 
selected (as the entire data set of National Citizen Survey participants was utilized) so 
that the results are more generalizable to the whole population of localities. For 
statistical control, the various control variables were specifically selected (e.g., 
population, bond ratings, density) and statistically analyzed to ensure that such 
variables are not linked to the differences between results of the hypothesis being 
tested (performance, cost, and high performance return on costs).  
As the hypotheses are the basis from which this research is conducted and 
findings are emulated, they are illustrated again below: 
 Law Enforcement Performance Hypotheses (1) 
o Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
o Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Cost Hypotheses (2) 
o Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
o Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Hypotheses (3) 
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o Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
o  Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
  
As part of the findings, the results may be based upon the result of random 
chance rather than an actual relationship between the variables; therefore the 
hypothesis is neither proven nor rejected as part of this research. Because the research 
is focused on correlation (positive or negative relationship) and not causation, the 
hypothesis cannot be confirmed as definitively true or false (SPSS, 2009). Rather, a null 
hypothesis (no relationship) is formulated that will either be rejected or fail to be rejected 
as that is the only manner of supporting a hypothesis – by refuting (nullifying) a null 
hypothesis (McDonald, 2009). A deductive valid rejection of a null hypothesis may 
occur, yet not achieve a deductively valid affirmation of it. The examination of how all of 
these variables are possibly correlated or not is the goal of this research and possible 
considerations of future research if certain correlations emerge. Therefore, the following 
null hypotheses have been formulated: 
 Law Enforcement Performance Null Hypotheses (1) 
o Null Hypothesis 1A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
o Null Hypothesis 1B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Cost Null Hypotheses (2) 
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o Null Hypothesis 2A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
o Null Hypothesis 2B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-
collective bargaining 
 
 Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Null Hypotheses (3) 
o Null Hypothesis 3A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
o Null Hypothesis 3B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
 
Hypothesis 1A and 1B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
 Null Hypothesis 1A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to 
non-collective bargaining 
Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
 Null Hypothesis 1B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to 
non-collective bargaining 
 
As noted in Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology, the composite 
performance measure (includes survey, crime rates (violent and property) and 
accreditation factors) was calculated for each of the local governments in the sample. 
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This composite performance measure was then analyzed via SPSS linear regression. 
Table 5.1: Composite Performance Measure illustrates the following: 
 Model Summary – r square: .603 which indicates on average the model’s 
predictions are 60% better than guessing the mean. The small variance between 
the r square (.603) and adjusted r square (.580) are also indicative of good model 
of data producing results (adjusted r square is 3.8% less than r square).     
 ANOVA – F value: 26.223 and significance of .000 which indicates that the 
overall model produces better results than simply guessing the mean. 
 VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst 
the variables. Low scores indicate that the independent variables are not heavily 
inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.  
 Coefficients: 
o Significant (<.05): Median household income, density, age, survey quality, 
city and mediation all appear to be significant. 
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-statistic (of those noted as 
significant) are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:  
 Median household Income ($000) (beta .389 and t-statistic 5.985) 
with an unstandardized coefficient B of .24 indicates that for every 
unit change of $1000 in the median household income (mean 59.0 
($000) or $59,000), there is a .24 increase in the composite 
performance index (mean 46.5).  
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 Survey Quality of Life (beta .363 and t-statistic 5.354) with an 
unstandardized coefficient B of 30.363 indicates that for every unit 
change of 1 in the survey – quality of life score (mean .76); there is 
a 30.363 increase in the composite performance index (mean 
46.5). A better way to illustrate is for every unit change of .1 (10%) 
in survey quality of life score, there is a 3.0 increase to the 
composite performance index. 
 Age (beta .170 and t-statistic 3.461) with an unstandardized 
coefficient B of 24.5 indicates that for every unit change of 1 in age 
15-24% (mean .16); there is a 24.5 increase to the composite 
performance index (mean 46.5). A better way to illustrate is for 
every unit change of .1 (10%) in age 15-24%, there is a 2.5 
increase to the composite performance index. This result may 
appear to be counter-intuitive as it was previously noted a 
correlation of this age bracket and higher probability for crimes 
committed. However, other mitigating circumstances may lend 
themselves to higher performance. Examples could include: 1) 
Higher proportion in an older age bracket; or 2) More citizen-
friendly survey responses for those in portion of age bracket (21-
25). 
 City (beta -.155 and t-statistic -3.036) with an unstandardized 
coefficient B of -5.2 indicates that cities, on average, have a 5.2 
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lower composite performance index (mean 46.5) when compared to 
towns. 
 Density (beta -.146 and t-statistic – 2.977) with an unstandardized 
coefficient B of -.001 indicates that for every unit change of 1 in 
density (mean 2378.7); there is a decrease to the composite 
performance index (mean 46.5) of -.001. A better way to illustrate is 
for every unit change of 100 in density there is a decrease to the 
composite performance index of -.1. 
 Mediation – Hypothesis 1B (beta -.126 and t-statistic -2.247) with 
an unstandardized coefficient B of -3.49 indicates that mediation 
localities, on average, have a 3.49 lower composite performance 
index (mean 46.5) when compared to non-collective bargaining 
localities and 4.98 lower composite index when compared to 
arbitration and its 1.49 increased composite performance index. 
 
 As median household incomes, survey – quality of life scores or age 15-24% of 
population increases, the composite performance score of law enforcement services 
also increase. This means some combination of higher favorable rating on law 
enforcement survey questions on how safe does a citizen feel, lower violent or property 
crimes; or law enforcement national accreditation pursuit or attainment has occurred. 
This may be due to overall abilities of higher income and quality of life attributes mitigate 
crime from occurring and/or enable law enforcement to perform at a higher level 
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whereas the age factor may also represent a more family-friendly area in deterring 
crime. The inverse relationship exists for density in that as population density increases, 
the composite performance score of law enforcement decreases. This may be due to 
the challenges of performance for higher density areas in the calls for service that may 
result from citizens interacting in closer proximity. There also appears to be a contrast 
between cities and counties with cities decreasing the composite measure score when 
compared to towns. This may be due to how citizens are exposed to law enforcement 
and its ability to deter crime at a greater rate in the towns than in the cities. However, 
further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining factors for 
why these relationships of variables to increased or decreased composite performance 
measures exist.   
In regards to workforce classification, mediation (Hypothesis 1B) has a 
decreased composite performance measure. All of the other variables were not 
significant enough to warrant any further analysis in regards to relationship to composite 
performance measure. There may be some determining factor localities with a 
mediation possess to warrant a decreased composite performance measure (e.g., 
workforce constraints to adopt low crime rate strategies; accreditation pursuit lacking; 
and/or engaging and informing their citizens of safety-quality measures and related 
survey question measures). As an example, law enforcement organizations with 
mediation workforce classification may not have gained the confidence of their citizens 
in addressing crime as well as non-collective bargaining or arbitration localities. This 
may be because the general population of such localities does not share the same 
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workforce classification status as those in the law enforcement organization and 
therefore, may not empathize as well in how such challenges are addressed. While it 
may be a challenge to control these factors, surveys may gauge the sentiment of 
citizens in mediation and non-mediation localities to determine what may be correlation 
of mediation to lower composite performance index. Rational Choice Theory attributes 
(e.g., employee motivation) may also be less present in mediation localities. However, 
further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining factors for 
why this relationship of mediation to decreased composite performance measure exists.   
In addition, arbitration (Hypothesis 1A) is positive with its increased composite 
performance measure, even though it was above the .05 significance threshold set for 
further review. This means that arbitration is viewed more favorably than mediation and 
non-collective bargaining, and while arbitration is not statistically different from non-
collective bargaining, it does appear to be statistically different from mediation. 
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Table 5.1: Composite Performance Measure 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .777
a
 .603 .580 8.58202 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County 
Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, 
Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates, 
Median HH Inc (000) 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 25107.560 13 1931.351 26.223 .000
b
 
Residual 16497.835 224 73.651   
Total 41605.395 237    
a. Dependent Variable: Performance Composite 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj 
Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High 
School Graduates, Median HH Inc (000) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 12.558 10.898  1.152 .250   
Population (000) -.001 .004 -.015 -.300 .764 .758 1.320 
Bond Rating Adj Scale .602 .865 .032 .696 .487 .860 1.163 
High School Graduates 2.828 13.427 .013 .211 .833 .443 2.255 
Median HH Inc (000) .238 .040 .389 5.965 .000 .416 2.406 
Density -.001 .000 -.146 -2.977 .003 .733 1.365 
Unemployment Rate -27.107 27.396 -.055 -.989 .324 .568 1.760 
Age15to24% 24.451 7.065 .170 3.461 .001 .730 1.369 
Survey-Quality of Life 30.363 5.670 .363 5.354 .000 .385 2.598 
Non Right-to-Work 
State 
-.957 1.504 -.036 -.636 .525 .551 1.816 
City (v. Town) -5.158 1.699 -.155 -3.036 .003 .677 1.478 
County (v. Town) 5.272 3.066 .094 1.720 .087 .595 1.682 
Med  (v. NCB (b)) -3.485 1.551 -.126 -2.247 .026 .566 1.765 
Arb  (v. NCB (b)) 1.486 1.801 .054 .825 .410 .411 2.431 
c. Dependent Variable: Perform Composite 
d. NCB (Non-collective bargaining) 
 
Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which illustrated a correlation of 
mediation to a lower composite performance measure, it would appear that the null 
hypothesis 1B can be rejected as there appears to be a relationship between law 
enforcement workforce classification of mediation and higher (or lower) performance 
attributes. Rejection of the null hypothesis does not confirm the hypothesis. For 
hypothesis 1A, because there was no such statistically significant correlation as it 
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pertains to arbitration and higher (or lower) performance attributes, the null hypothesis 
1A cannot be rejected. 
Hypotheses 2A and 2B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
 Null Hypothesis 2A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
 
Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 Null Hypothesis 2B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
 
Whereas hypotheses 1 were capturing the correlation, if any, between the 
classification of the workforce and a variety of performance measure attributes, 
hypotheses 2 captures the correlation between classification of the workforce and law 
enforcement costs per capita. Table 5.2: Law Enforcement Costs per Capita illustrates 
the following via SPSS linear regression:  
 Model Summary - r square: .187 which indicates on average the model’s 
predictions are 18% better than guessing the mean; which is considered a low 
prediction rate (note Hypothesis 1 had a 60% rate). The variance between the r 
square (.187) and adjusted r square (.139) is actually a large variance 
(unfavorable), with adjusted r square 25.7% below r square (whereas Hypothesis 
1 had a variance of 3.8%). This may be correlated to the number of insignificant 
variables being examined as part of this analysis as the greater number of 
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variables added, the greater the chance of a larger spread between r-square and 
adjusted r-square. Based upon this low r square and large variance, another 
regression was conducted removing those insignificant variables that had a 
significance factor > .250 in hopes that such significance variables were 
impacting the adjusted r square. However, this resulted in only slightly improved 
results - r square (.181) and adjusted r square (.152) with a high 16.0% variance. 
Based upon this large variance, additional regression analyses were conducted 
changing variables (e.g., lowering significance factor further to remove other 
variables, changing composite of variables included in analysis) in hopes that 
certain variables were impacting the results in producing a large variance 
between r square and adjusted r square. However, there was an inability to make 
improvements to the adjusted r square variance. Based upon these factors, the 
model is not necessarily parsimonious from a statistical analysis (i.e., only slightly 
better than guessing the mean). Therefore, the output for hypotheses 2 results 
carry caveat of low r square and poor model and should not be overly relied upon 
as part of a statistical analysis.  
 ANOVA – F value: 3.95 and significance of .000 which indicates that the overall 
model produces better results than simply guessing the mean. 
 VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst 
the variables. The low scores indicate that the independent variables are not 
heavily inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.  
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 Coefficients: 
o Significant (<.05): Non-right-to-work state, county and arbitration all 
appear to be significant.  
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-score (of those noted as significant) 
are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:  
 Non-right-to-work state (beta .340 and t-statistic 4.190) with an 
unstandardized coefficient B of 66.6 indicates that for non-right-to-
work states there is a $66.62 increased cost to the law enforcement 
cost per capita (mean $236.30) when compared to right-to-work 
states. 
 Arbitration – Hypothesis 2A (beta -.254 and t-statistic -2.701) with 
an unstandardized coefficient B of -51.43 indicates that arbitration 
localities, on average, have a $51.43 deceased cost to law 
enforcement costs per capita (mean $236.30) when compared to 
non-collective bargaining localities and $72.67 decreased cost 
when compared to mediation and its $21.24 increased cost to law 
enforcement costs. 
 County (beta -.189 and t-statistic -2.413) with an unstandardized 
coefficient B of -78.24 indicates that counties have a $78.25 
decreased cost to law enforcement costs per capita (mean 
$236.30) when compared to towns. 
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Therefore, for localities that have arbitration for law enforcement when compared 
to the other workforce classifications or are a county when compared to towns, there is 
a relationship to either of those statuses and decreased law enforcement costs per 
capita. For non-right-to-work states, there is a relationship to increased law enforcement 
costs. All of the other variables were not significant enough to warrant any further 
analysis in regards to relationship to law enforcement costs. 
Reasons supporting a lower cost environment for arbitration could be attributable 
to sensitivity to union-negotiated practices regarding compensation and benefits that 
other facets of operations (e.g., vehicle replacements, equipment, training) may be 
lower than other localities. There may also be practices existing in arbitration localities 
that through their empowered union, they may not be as susceptible to political or other 
distractions in provision of law enforcement services and its related costs (e.g., hiring 
additional personnel). Rational Choice Theory attributes (e.g., efficiency in rational goal 
attainment) may also be more present in arbitration localities. There may also be 
reasons for non-right-to-work states that support a higher cost environment and 
counties that support a lower cost environment (e.g., states with greater union-friendly 
practices may have higher service costs whereas counties may be able to run more 
efficiently without urban challenges). However, further research would need to be done 
in order to further isolate determining factors for why this relationship of arbitration to 
decreased law enforcement costs per capita exists as well as the relationships of non-
right-to-work states and counties.   
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Table 5.2: Law Enforcement Costs Per Capita 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .432
a
 .187 .139 90.755 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County 
Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, 
Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates, 
Median HH Inc (000) 
 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 423124.372 13 32548.029 3.952 .000
b
 
Residual 1844989.359 224 8236.560   
Total 2268113.731 237    
a. Dependent Variable: Law Enfor Exp per Capita 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County Local Govt, 
Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, Unemployment Rate, 
Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates, Median HH Inc (000) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 
(Constant) 180.222 115.245  1.564 .119   
Population (000) -.025 .043 -.039 -.568 .571 .758 1.320 
Bond Rating Adj Scale 13.747 9.149 .098 1.503 .134 .860 1.163 
High School 
Graduates 
36.611 141.990 .023 .258 .797 .443 2.255 
Median HH Inc (000) -.220 .421 -.049 -.522 .602 .416 2.406 
Density .005 .004 .080 1.142 .255 .733 1.365 
Unemployment Rate 352.208 289.719 .097 1.216 .225 .568 1.760 
Age15to24% -100.713 74.717 -.095 -1.348 .179 .730 1.369 
Survey-Quality of Life -2.213 59.966 -.004 -.037 .971 .385 2.598 
Non Right-to-Work 
State 
66.629 15.902 .340 4.190 .000 .551 1.816 
City (v. Town) -24.269 17.963 -.099 -1.351 .178 .677 1.478 
County (v. Town) -78.245 32.424 -.189 -2.413 .017 .595 1.682 
Med  (v. NCB) 21.736 16.401 .106 1.325 .186 .566 1.765 
Arb  (V. NCB) -51.435 19.044 -.254 -2.701 .007 .411 2.431 
a. Dependent Variable: LE Exp per Capita 
 
 
Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which illustrated a correlation of 
arbitration to decreased law enforcement costs per capita, it would appear that the null 
hypothesis 2A can be rejected as there appears to be a relationship between an 
element of law enforcement workforce classification (arbitration) and law enforcement 
costs per capita (does not confirm the hypothesis). Because of the inability of the 
statistical tests to illustrate a correlation of mediation to increased (or decreased) law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
257 
 
enforcement costs per capita, it would appear that the null hypothesis 2B cannot be 
rejected.  
As noted, because of the low r square and large variance to adjusted r square, 
the variability amongst the data has given rise to a model that may be only slightly 
better than guessing the mean; even after removing low significance variables from data 
output analysis in attempting to lower the variance between r square and adjusted r 
square. Therefore, the results appropriately disclose this challenge to the model and 
would require further research to best ascertain other variables, if any, that may 
produce a more parsimonious model. However, such low r squares may also be 
indicative of a null hypothesis that may fail to be rejected on the underlying data.  
 
Hypotheses 3A and 3B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite measure when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
  
 Null Hypothesis 3A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite 
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification 
of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite measure when 
compared to non-collective bargaining 
 Null Hypothesis 3B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite 
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
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The goal of the hypothesis 3 is to calculate and then analyze a high performance 
return on costs (HPRC) from the data variables in the two previous hypotheses. From 
the HPRC quantified factor for each locality (composite performance measure/law 
enforcement costs per capita), a statistical analysis can be performed of this factor and 
the classification factor of the workforce.  
In performing the statistical analysis initially using the same control variables in 
the prior hypothesis tests, many of these variables resulted in high “significance” results 
which indicate high correlations of inapplicability of such variables amongst the data set. 
This may have also given rise to large variance between adjusted r square and r square 
(81.8%). Appendix H – Hypotheses 3 Full Variable Result Table provides the result of 
such initial statistical analysis. In trying to negate the effects of such irrelevant variables, 
the statistical analysis for hypotheses 3 was refined to include those control variables 
with a lower rate of risk on the analysis. A threshold of significance use for a revised set 
of control variables, included in this section’s analysis, included only those below a 
significance of .250 (high school graduates, median household incomes, non-right-to-
work states and county government). 
Table 5.3: High Performance Return on Costs illustrates the following via SPSS 
linear regression: 
 Model Summary - r square: .056 which indicates on average the model’s 
predictions are 5% better than guessing the mean. This a very low percentage 
which reflects that there is not much difference between predictions and 
guessing the mean. The variance between the r square (.056) and adjusted r 
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square (.031) is actually a large variance (unfavorable), with adjusted r square 
44.6% below r square (whereas Hypotheses 1 had a variance of 3.8%, but an 
improvement from the initial Hypotheses 3 variance of 81.8% as noted in 
Appendix H). This may be correlated to the number of variables being examined 
as part of this analysis as the greater number of variables added, the greater the 
chance of a larger spread between r-square and adjusted r-square. Based upon 
this large variance, additional regression analyses were conducted by changing 
variables (e.g., lowering significance factor further to remove other variables, 
changing composite of variables included) in hopes that certain variables were 
impacting the results in producing a large variances between r square and 
adjusted r square. However, there was an inability to make improvements to the r 
square and adjusted r square variance. Based upon these factors, the model is 
not necessarily good from a statistical analysis (i.e., only slightly better than 
guessing the mean). Therefore, the output for hypothesis 3 results carry caveat 
of low r square and high variance with adjusted r square; which results in a 
model that is not robust and should not be overly relied upon as part of a 
statistical analysis. 
 ANOVA – F value: 2.268 and significance of .038 which indicates that the overall 
model produces better results than simply guessing the mean. 
 VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst 
the variables. The low scores indicate that the independent variables are not 
heavily inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.  
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 Coefficients: 
o Significant (<.05): Median household income and county appears to be 
significant. 
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-score (of those noted as significant) 
are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:  
 Median Household Income ($000) (beta .190 and t-statistic 2.400) 
with an unstandardized coefficient B of .314 indicates that for every 
unit change of $1000 in the median household income (mean 59.0 
($000) or $59,000), there is a .314 increase in the HPRC index 
(mean 27.28). 
 County (beta .159 and t-statistic 2.426) with an unstandardized 
coefficient B of 24.156 indicates that counties have a 24.156 
increase in the HPRC index (mean 27.28) when compared to 
towns. 
Therefore, as median household incomes increases, the HPRC index for law 
enforcement services also increases. This may indicate that higher median household 
income localities enable a lower costing law enforcement organization to also perform 
better as there are less opportunities for crime to occur, more time dedicated to 
accreditation and/or a higher survey satisfaction rate. This may also be the result that 
higher median household incomes also may follow better practices of crime reduction 
strategies (e.g., securing their households and vehicles better; contacting law 
enforcement about suspicious activity or crime alert hotline tips; or be less positioned to 
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commit crimes because of higher incomes). There is also a correlation of counties 
having an increased HPRC index when compared to other (e.g., towns). This may be 
the result of counties without the urban challenges faced in many cities or towns being 
able to perform better at a lower cost. Further research would be necessary to 
determine what, if any, of these potential underlying scenarios for median household 
incomes and counties could yield HPRC. All of the other variables were not significant 
enough to warrant any further analysis in regards to relationship to HPRC. 
 
Table 5.3: High Performance Return on Costs 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .236
a
 .056 .031 35.37148 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Median HH Inc (000), County Local 
Govt, High School Graduates, Med, Non Right-to-Work State 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 17022.663 6 2837.110 2.268 .038
b
 
Residual 289013.787 231 1251.142   
Total 306036.450 237    
a. Dependent Variable: HPRC 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Median HH Inc (000), County Local Govt, High School Graduates, 
Med, Non Right-to-Work State 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 61.968 36.739  1.687 .093   
High School Graduates -58.975 44.875 -.102 -1.314 .190 .674 1.483 
Median HH Inc (000) .314 .131 .190 2.400 .017 .652 1.533 
Non Right-to-Work State -7.748 6.046 -.108 -1.282 .201 .579 1.728 
County Local Govt 24.156 9.957 .159 2.426 .016 .958 1.044 
Med .354 6.094 .005 .058 .954 .623 1.604 
Arb 5.356 7.294 .072 .734 .464 .426 2.347 
a. Dependent Variable: HPRC 
 
Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which did not illustrate a correlation of 
workforce classification to change in HPRC index, it would appear that the null 
hypotheses 3 (both 3A and 3B) cannot be rejected.   
As noted, because of the low r square and large variance to adjusted r square, 
the variability amongst the data has given rise to a model that may be only slightly 
better than guessing the mean; even after removing high significance variables from 
data output analysis in trying to lower the variance between r square and adjusted r 
square. Therefore, the results appropriately disclose this challenge to the model and 
would require further research to best ascertain other variables, if any, which may 
produce a better and more robust model. However, a low r-square indicates a weak 
model overall therefore it is difficult to draw strong conclusions even if the null 
hypothesis could be rejected, it would be with caution.  
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Hypothesis Results Summarized 
Based upon the preceding statistical results, findings for each of the hypothesis 
can be stated (also summarized in Table 5.4: Null Hypotheses Findings). 
 Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to 
non-collective bargaining 
 
o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential 
relationships identified in this research).  
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with median household 
income (positive), density (negative), age (positive), survey quality 
(positive) and city (negative). This applies to hypothesis 1B also. 
 
 Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to 
non-collective bargaining 
 
o The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (mediation (negative)) 
when compared amongst non-collective bargaining as results indicate 
potential relationship.  
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 Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
 
o The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (arbitration (negative)) 
when compared amongst non-collective bargaining as results indicate 
potential relationship.  
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with non-right-to-work 
state (positive) and county (negative). This applies to hypothesis 2B also. 
o However, because of low r squares and large variance between r square 
and adjusted r square, the model’s output is only slightly better than 
guessing the mean. Even after removing variables with high significance 
or other traits in a variety of analysis, the variance between r square and 
adjusted r square were not improved. Therefore, because of the model’s 
limitations in not being parsimonious, the preceding results may not be as 
valid as data output and analysis that yielded a higher r square and a 
lower variance to adjusted r square. This applies to hypothesis 2B also. 
 
 Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective 
bargaining 
 
 
o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential 
relationships identified in this research).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
265 
 
 .  
 Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite 
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential 
relationships identified in this research).  
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with median household 
income (positive) and counties (positive). This also applies to hypothesis 
3B. 
o However, because of low r squares and large variance between r square 
and adjusted r square, the model’s output is only slightly better than 
guessing the mean. Even after removing variables with high significance 
or other traits in a variety of analysis, the variance between r square and 
adjusted r square were not improved. Therefore, because of the model’s 
limitations in not being parsimonious, the preceding results may not be as 
valid as data output and analysis that yielded a higher r square and a 
lower variance to adjusted r square. This also applies to hypothesis 3B. 
 
 Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite 
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining 
 
o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential 
relationships identified in this research).  
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While two of the six null hypotheses were rejected, there are observations of 
these research findings worthy of further discussion. As indicated in Chapter 1 – 
Introduction, the advocacy groups with strong opinions about the high costs of unions 
and low performance results is contrasted by those advocacy groups that attribute 
unions as an inherent trait needed to meet a worker’s needs and provide for a safe and 
productive workplace towards a high performing organization. These sentiments and 
related research helped give rise to the problem statement, research question and 
hypothesis development. Because the null hypothesis was rejected two out of six times, 
there appears to be a possible correlation from this research between workforce 
classification and a law enforcement organization’s ability to perform better and at a 
lower cost, but no correlation in regards to higher performance return on costs (HPRC).   
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Table 5.4: Null Hypotheses Findings
 
 
Comparison of Results to Other Studies 
Chapter 4 – Findings provided a summary of other studies in high performance 
organizations and related HPRC, collective bargaining and law enforcement services. 
There were no expectations with regards to any of the results, although from an initial 
review of the literature and related research, there were attributes of higher personnel 
costs associated with collective bargaining and higher performance measures 
associated with more educated and higher median income areas. While there was no 
one research study found to cover all three subject areas, Freeman and Ichinowski 
 
 
 
 
 
 
268 
 
(1988) compared teacher unions with greater and lesser unionization with the result that 
collective bargaining correlated to higher teacher salaries and generally higher 
educational performance. Comparison of different types of workers (teacher vs. police 
officer) with different training and related needs to perform their job function is 
challenging and would be subject to validity concerns. However, additional research 
may be needed across professions to see if there are any similar outcomes of workforce 
classification and HPRC and if so, are there traits between professions that contribute to 
such similarity.  
For those studies in which law enforcement was the research topic, the studies 
(example: Feuille, Delaney and Hendricks (1985)) that illustrated a correlation between 
a collective bargaining atmosphere and greater workforce influence, it appears that 
such measures in these studies do not necessarily reference high performance 
organization or HPRC traits, but rather other matters of workforce influence (e.g., higher 
pay and benefits, job protection, workplace environment conditions). This research 
project did not correlate workforce classification to the array of workplace topics 
deemed to be “influential” as its focus was on HPRC.  
For those studies (example: Zhao and Lovrich (1997)) that determined higher 
compensation and benefits to the law enforcement worker with collective bargaining 
abilities, no such correlation was determined as part of this research. As the law 
enforcement costs for this research used the total costs of the law enforcement 
organization, it was not possible to determine the salaries and benefit costs that could 
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be better compared to other research in this area. Perhaps if other studies indicate 
positive correlations of salaries and benefits to levels of workforce classification and the 
researched performed as part of this study indicate higher overall (salaries, benefits, 
operating and capital) law enforcement costs per capita for non-collective bargaining 
and mediation, but lesser costs per capita for arbitration, then perhaps variances exist 
between the non-salaries and benefits expenses to offset the higher salaries and 
benefits. Note that mediation did illustrate higher costs per capita, so further research 
may be needed to determine variations between these two forms of workforce 
classification.   
 
Further Research in Workforce Classification and HPOs 
Further research on this problem statement should incorporate some aspect of 
longitudinal studies to determine the effect of trends and data over time and if the same 
correlations (or lack of correlations) result. A significant contribution of this study is that 
it seeks to not focus on just costs, but to put any costs in context with performance for 
local government law enforcement services. The ability to know whether there is a result 
or not of collective bargaining as it pertains to a law enforcement HPO can help to 
include that variable in future discussions; and if there is no correlation, then it is 
appropriate to not include that variable in future discussions. The introduction of a new 
composite measure, high performance return on costs (HPRC), also adds to the 
significance of the study as such calculation can potentially correlate costs to 
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performance and enable such calculations to be uniformly compiled, compared and 
contrasted. 
Additional manners in how HPRC could be calculated and assigning different 
weight to the criteria and its outcome on the HPRC score would also benefit from 
research. Eventually each organization, public and private, should develop some metric 
in knowing how well it is performing. Comparison of similarly designed and data 
captured metrics amongst peers further illustrates how well one organization is doing 
when compared to another and to industry benchmarks. Because some organizations 
may have a variety of professions that are motivated in maximizing the utility (rational 
choice theory) via different manners, the development of universal metrics is 
challenging in any organization. Perhaps multiple metric development and research of 
varying metrics and their outcomes in motivating the workforce to perform at HPO level 
would also benefit the profession.  
Additional research will also be need to be performed with clearance rates that 
localities submit to the FBI, but are not captured in a manner that appears to be 
consistent to the underlying crimes cleared nor shared in a public manner to lend itself 
to developing comparative peer calculations or industry standards based upon socio-
economic profile of the local government. The compilation of peer local governments 
with similar socio-economic and demand factors would greatly benefit research. 
As an example of other demand factors besides population that are worthy of 
further consideration in determining proper indices (e.g., crime rate) of the demands 
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placed upon law enforcement would include tourism and business activities. These 
activities may not correlate to a local government’s population proportionally, therefore 
making comparative crime indices that much more challenging. Unfortunately, data 
availability for such factors (e.g., number of hotel rooms, number of employees) by local 
government are not readily available and in many cases, not publicly shared. 
Current implications for practice and policy as a result of this research could 
focus upon the following: 
• Positioning the local government for a higher performance return on costs (e.g., 
developing strategies to improve the median household incomes) based upon 
variables with high correlation between increasing in value and positively 
impacting the HPRC ratio. 
• Local government participation in national citizen surveys with comparable 
benchmarks can help determine performance attributes (e.g., “how safe do you 
feel”). 
• National law enforcement accreditation practices should be researched by more 
local governments with pursuit of accreditation considered.  
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Conclusion 
The research addressed in this analysis is an example to not merely focus on the 
results of performance and costs; but also recognize that there are internationally 
established rights of workers that need to be respected so that any short-term 
accomplishments (lower costs) do not result in lower performance. Conversely, 
increased costs without an improvement to performance need to also be gauged to 
ensure that the tax burden is leveraging the best relative array of services in a high 
performing manner.  
The importance of this issue is justified from the perspective that public sector 
collective bargaining is a topic that continues to be raised as to what the return on 
taxpayer investment (performance) accrues for the benefits bestowed on protected 
employees. As local governments are becoming further scrutinized by taxpayers to 
have an appropriate array of high performing services in both effective and efficient 
manners, workforce classification (via collective or non-collective bargaining) can be 
isolated as an independent variable to determine if it has any impacts or effect upon 
high performing results. In addition, while effectiveness measures (output, outcome) of 
performance are one attribute of correlation to performance, the comparison and 
contrast to the relative cost (efficiency measures) is another key attribute of 
performance. Together these effectiveness and efficiency measures need to both excel 
for a HPO. 
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The importance of this issue from a citizen’s perspective is that the more safe 
and secure their community is, the higher their quality of life in relation to a variety of 
factors (CNBC, 2012). For example, higher crime areas may adversely affect property 
values as evidenced by a decrease in home property values of 10% for areas with a 
higher crime rate of one standard deviation (Gibbons, 2004). This is where HPOs in the 
public sector distinguish themselves from the private sector. For the private sector, the 
HPO may garner a more secure customer base and yield greater profits; however, for 
the public sector entity, the HPO factors translate into positive quality of life attributes for 
citizens and productive environment for businesses; all with a reasonable tax burden 
that maximizes the potential of return on investment of such tax burden. 
If additional costs can yield higher performance, then it would be appropriate to 
best gauge the high performance return on costs of such additional cost and the 
incremental marginal utility rewards. From an economic perspective, there will be a 
point at which such marginal utility is diminished to the point that such additional cost 
investment does not provide a return on such investment (Hicks, 1935); or in this case a 
higher performance return on costs. From a public sector perspective, this point may be 
debated as there can be subjective determinants as to what is defined as “return” as 
there may exist more qualitative factors in the public sector than private sector. 
However, if agreed-upon objective measures of performance can be assembled 
together with a consistent cost basis by which such services are performed, then 
correlations of costs to higher performance can possibly be calculated, analyzed and 
further discussed. 
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As certain variables illustrated relationships to performance, costs and HPRC, 
many variables exhibited no relationship. Median household incomes and counties 
provided the only relationship to HPRC. For median household incomes, this may 
illustrate the wealth factor that provides the means to demand less upon their law 
enforcement services while yielding high survey results, for which the costs provided for 
such service are low enough to generate a high HPRC. For counties, this may illustrate 
the abilities of counties to have an environment more conducive to higher performance 
and lower costs that may not exist in more urban areas. The findings rejected the null 
hypothesis in two of the six separate tests in determining whether or not there was a 
correlation between workforce classification (independent variable) and 1) Performance 
(mediation was lower performance); 2) Costs (arbitration was lower costs) and 3) High 
performance return on costs (no rejection of null). There may be underlying factors that 
determined these correlations to arise in performance and cost; including some of the 
motivation factors addressed in Rational Choice Theory. These findings should only 
serve those with strong advocacy opinions on either side of this political debate that 
further research is needed in this area and less rhetoric. 
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APPENDIX A - RESEARCH IDENTITY MEMO 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES:  
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND COST IN  
COLLECTIVE AND NON-COLLCTIVE BARGAINING WORKFORCES  
 
Joseph P. Casey   March 21, 2012 
There have been prior experiences I have had that are relevant to this topic or 
setting. I was raised in a household with a very pro-union parent who leveraged the 
power of her teacher’s union to keep pace with other collective bargaining professions 
which were perceived to be of less educational or technical demand (e.g., solid waste 
collection). In my own career, I work for a local government in Virginia where non-union 
forces have resulted in a workforce that is perceived to be of equal merit and receives 
equal compensation increases and benefits.  
Beginning in 2008, I closely monitored Federal legislative proposals that would 
mandate collective bargaining to all public safety workers in every state. The names of 
these proposals were titled “Employee Free Choice Act” and Public Safety Employer-
Employee Cooperation Act.” While this legislation did not prevail, it was heavily 
scrutinized from a local government management perspective as the Federal 
government’s intrusion into a state’s existing “right-to-work” laws. In addition, such 
legislation, if passed, would have changed the scope of my job as a component of the 
job would be devoted to collective bargaining agreements and potential for higher 
wages and benefits being negotiated for public safety workers that would be greater 
than the rest of the local government workforce. 
There are certain assumptions that have resulted from these experiences. One 
assumption is that it should be the decision of local government officials and the 
community whether the merits of a union would result in better services at a reasonable 
cost. Secondly, although I have not been in a union, I have had experience with 
“mandatory dues” and other practices that coerce the worker into actions that they 
otherwise would not take on their own free will. 
There are also goals that have emerged from these experiences, some of which 
have become important. An overarching goal is to have an unbiased perspective in 
determining if there is a differentiation between performance, cost and collective 
bargaining. Also, it is important to respect that the evolution of certain unions was the 
direct result of poor working conditions, adverse actions on the rights of employees and 
below market compensation and benefits. Finally, through leveraging various contacts 
to gather information and potentially observe and interview both organizations is critical 
in collecting background information that can better frame the data population to be 
analyzed. 
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The experiences and assumptions mentioned previously and goal to address this 
topic in an unbiased perspective helped shape my decision to choose this topic. It is 
important to me to determining if there is a cause-effect between unions and 
performance and cost.. The potential advantages in this study would include a balanced 
background and experiences which will enable the gathering of accurate information to 
be analyzed impartially. A potential disadvantage is that many audiences to such 
information and results have their own bias and assumptions that traditionally are hard 
to overcome; even when presented with fresh information prepared in non-biased 
manner.  
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APPENDIX B – NATIONAL CITIZENS SURVEY  
LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES QUESTIONS 
 
Please rate how safe or unsafe you feel from the following in ABC: 
 Violent crime (e.g., rape, assault, robbery) 
 Property crimes (e.g., burglary, theft) 
 Environmental hazards, including toxic waste 
 
Please rate how safe or unsafe you feel: 
 In your neighborhood during the day 
 In your neighborhood after dark 
 In ABC's downtown area during the day 
 In ABC's downtown area after dark 
 
During the past twelve months, were you or anyone in your household the victim of any 
crime? 
 If yes, was this crime (these crimes) reported to the police? 
 
Please rate the quality of each of the following services in ABC: 
 Police services 
 Crime prevention 
 Traffic enforcement 
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APPENDIX C – ICMA COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE  
MEASUREMENT PROGRAM 
The ICMA Comparative Performance Measurement Program includes several 
hundred indicators and descriptors, but for the purpose of this research, the law 
enforcement indicators were selected as a population of potential performance 
measures to consider in dependent and control variables (ICMA, 2011). The indicators 
utilized in this research are noted with “UTILIZED.” Refer to Chapter 3 - Research 
Methodology and Design for the descriptions and process for selecting final indicators 
used for performance and the control variables that best represent comparability 
amongst local law enforcement organizations. Indicators and descriptors not selected 
for variables to compile were due to the strength and representativeness of variables 
selected or the limited data available amongst localities in the sample population (e.g., 
information not recorded by locality, survey constraints of time, effort and 
responsiveness to gather such information). In addition, There were additional 
variables utilized for this research that were not part of ICMA’s Comparative 
Performance Measurement Program. Refer to Chapter 3 – Research Methodology 
and Design for a complete list of such variables utilized. 
Performance Measures (Dependent Variable Consideration) 
Deterrence/Patrol Indicators 
 Number of crimes per 1000 population - UCR Part 1 Crime Rate (UTILIZED) 
 Number of crimes per 1000 population - Property Crime Rate (UTILIZED) 
 Number of police calls per patrol officer  
 Calls handled by means other than dispatch  
 Total calls to 911 police  
 Percent of commissioned personnel dedicated to patrol services (actual)  
 Average patrol time utilization per officer  
 Response time to emergency calls 
 Juvenile arrest rate  
Service Provider Descriptors 
 Actual annual operating expenditures (UTILIZED) 
 Staff by type  
 Department cost  
 Specialized units (e.g., search and rescue)  
 Provided by department  
 Provided by other  
 Dedicated unit  
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 Total Cost by unit  
Apprehension/Investigation Indicators 
 Crimes cleared -  UCR Part I Crimes reported 
 Crimes cleared -  Violent crimes 
 Crimes cleared -  Property crimes 
 Investigative personnel  
 Total department cost per arrest made  
 Total cost per crime cleared 
 Crimes against persons per investigator 
 Crimes against property per investigator 
 Investigation cost 
Community Policing Descriptors 
 Do you have a community policing definition? 
 What constitutes your community policing? 
 Do you have dedicated community policing teams?  
Miscellaneous Indicators 
 Number of Injury-producing traffic accidents per 1000 population 
 
Control Variable Consideration 
Service Area Descriptors 
 Population served (UTILIZED) 
 Square miles served (UTILIZED) 
 Median household income (UTILIZED) 
 Percentage below poverty level  
 Median age of population (UTILIZED, modified slightly to % age 15-24) 
 Juvenile population  
 Unemployment rate (UTILIZED) 
 Number of households  
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APPENDIX D: PROPOSAL COMMON QUESTIONS AND PRELIMINARY ANSWERS 
 What contribution does your study make to the literature on this topic? 
o Enables a perspective to focus on performance and not solely on costs as 
many studies do in regards to collective bargaining. 
 What are the practical policy implications from this study? 
o If there are correlations between performance and collective bargaining, 
then future policy changes can be considered in regards to the benefits or 
detriments of collective bargaining on performance. 
 How does this study contribute to our understanding of policy (or policy-making or 
policy implementation) in this area? 
o With focus on narrow field of law enforcement, policy implications can also 
be narrowly focused with considerations of additional fields of collective 
bargaining and their correlations to performance.  
 What are the limitations of your study design for answering your research question? 
o Other variables extrinsic to the workplace will not be measured (e.g., 
quality of life attributes for workers, workers satisfaction rating with 
workplace) or general gauge of support or non-support of unions by the 
local residents being served.  
 What alternative research designs might you use to address those limitations? 
o Determine if statistics are available to measure citizen composition of 
unionized workers (via census possibly) or worker satisfaction (e.g., 
turnover ratios); although even turnover ratios may be difficult to compare 
if the collective bargaining localities pay higher wages and/or make it more 
difficult to leave one local government for a similar position in another local 
government. 
 What are the next studies you would recommend to learn more about your research 
question? 
o Compare other collective bargaining positions in local government using 
similar methodology and varying methodology to determine if replications 
of results occur.  
 How do you explain …this pattern…in your findings? What alternative explanations 
might exist to explain these findings? 
o  Question can be answered upon compilation of results. 
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APPENDIX E – LAW ENFORCEMENT PERFORMANCE – ARBITRATION 
COMPARED TO MEDIATION 
In order to account for the independent variable amongst all the possibilities of 
comparisons, Table 4.2: Composite Performance Measure was subject to a second 
iteration. The one differential in how the data was analyzed was to compare arbitration 
directly to mediation. Other variables subject to the analysis in Chapter 4 were not 
repeated in this appendix because the underlying data and results for these other 
variables is the same as the underlying data and results subject to this additional 
statistical analysis. The hypothesis by which the comparison of arbitration to mediation 
would be framed to be tested and the related null hypothesis tested would be stated as 
follows: 
 Hypothesis: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to 
mediation 
o Null Hypothesis: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when 
compared to mediation 
 
Based upon the results in the following table, the null hypothesis result is as 
follows: The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (arbitration (positive)) when 
compared to mediation as results indicate potential relationship. 
 Significance <.05: Arbitration appears to be significant  
 Arbitration Standardized Coefficient beta .181 and t-statistic 3.083 with an 
unstandardized coefficient B of 4.97 indicates that arbitration localities, on 
average, have a 4.97 higher composite performance index (mean 46.5) when 
compared to mediation. 
 
In regards to workforce classification, arbitration has an increased composite 
performance measure when compared to mediation. There may be some determining 
factors localities with arbitration possess to warrant an increased composite 
performance measure (e.g., less workforce constraints to adopt low crime rate 
strategies; accreditation pursuit encouraged; and/or engaging and informing their 
citizens of safety-quality measures and related survey question measures). However, 
further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining factors for 
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why this relationship of arbitration to increased composite performance measure exists 
when compared to mediation.   
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 9.073 10.949  .829 .408   
Population (000) -.001 .004 -.015 -.300 .764 .758 1.320 
Bond Rating Adj 
Scale 
.602 .865 .032 .696 .487 .860 1.163 
High School 
Graduates 
2.828 13.427 .013 .211 .833 .443 2.255 
Median HH Inc 
(000) 
.238 .040 .389 5.965 .000 .416 2.406 
Density -.001 .000 -.146 -2.977 .003 .733 1.365 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-27.107 27.396 -.055 -.989 .324 .568 1.760 
Age15to24% 24.451 7.065 .170 3.461 .001 .730 1.369 
Survey-Quality of 
Life 
30.363 5.670 .363 5.354 .000 .385 2.598 
Non Right-to-Work 
State 
-.957 1.504 -.036 -.636 .525 .551 1.816 
City Local Govt -5.158 1.699 -.155 -3.036 .003 .677 1.478 
County Local Govt 5.272 3.066 .094 1.720 .087 .595 1.682 
Arb (v. Med) 4.971 1.612 .181 3.083 .002 .513 1.949 
Non-Col Bargain 
(v. Med) 
3.485 1.551 .119 2.247 .026 .630 1.586 
a. Dependent Variable: PerformComposite 
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APPENDIX F - LAW ENFORCEMENT COSTS – ARBITRATION COMPARED 
TO MEDIATION 
In order to account for the independent variable amongst all the possibilities of 
comparisons, Table 4.3: Law Enforcement Costs per Capita was subject to a second 
iteration. The one differential in how the data was analyzed was to compare arbitration 
directly to mediation. Other variables subject to the analysis in Chapter 4 were not 
repeated in this appendix because the underlying data and results for these other 
variables is the same as the underlying data and results subject to this additional 
statistical analysis. The hypothesis by which the comparison of arbitration to mediation 
would be framed to be tested and the related null hypothesis tested would be stated as 
follows: 
 Hypothesis: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to mediation 
o Null Hypothesis: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to mediation 
 
Based upon the results in the following table, the null hypothesis result is as 
follows: The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (arbitration (negative)) when 
compared to mediation as results indicate potential relationship. 
 Significance <.05: Arbitration appears to be significant  
 Arbitration Standardized Coefficient beta -.361 and t-statistic -4.291 with an 
unstandardized coefficient B of -73.17 indicates that arbitration localities, on 
average, have a $73.17 deceased cost to law enforcement costs per capita 
(mean $236.30) when compared to mediation localities. 
 
In regards to workforce classification, arbitration has a lower cost per capita than 
mediation. There may be some determining factors localities with arbitration possess to 
warrant a lower cost per capita (e.g., sensitivity to union-negotiated practices regarding 
compensation and benefits that other facets of operations (e.g., vehicle replacements, 
equipment, training) may be lower than other localities, not as susceptible to political or 
other distractions in provision of law enforcement services and its related costs). 
However, further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining 
factors for why this relationship of arbitration to decreased law enforcement costs per 
capita exists.   
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Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 201.958 115.790  1.744 .082   
Population (000) -.025 .043 -.039 -.568 .571 .758 1.320 
Bond Rating Adj Scale 13.747 9.149 .098 1.503 .134 .860 1.163 
High School Graduates 36.611 141.990 .023 .258 .797 .443 2.255 
Median HH Inc (000) -.220 .421 -.049 -.522 .602 .416 2.406 
Density .005 .004 .080 1.142 .255 .733 1.365 
Unemployment Rate 352.208 289.719 .097 1.216 .225 .568 1.760 
Age15to24% -100.713 74.717 -.095 -1.348 .179 .730 1.369 
Survey-Quality of Life -2.213 59.966 -.004 -.037 .971 .385 2.598 
Non Right-to-Work State 66.629 15.902 .340 4.190 .000 .551 1.816 
City Local Govt -24.269 17.963 -.099 -1.351 .178 .677 1.478 
County Local Govt -78.245 32.424 -.189 -2.413 .017 .595 1.682 
Arb (v. Med) -73.171 17.052 -.361 -4.291 .000 .513 1.949 
Non-Col Bargain (v. 
Med) 
-21.736 16.401 -.101 -1.325 .186 .630 1.586 
a. Dependent Variable: LE Exp per Capita 
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APPENDIX G - LAW ENFORCEMENT HIGH PERFORMANCE RETURN ON 
COSTS – ARBITRATION COMPARED TO MEDIATION 
In order to account for the independent variable amongst all the possibilities of 
comparisons, Table 4.4: High Performance Return on Costs was subject to a second 
iteration. The one differential in how the data was analyzed was to compare arbitration 
directly to mediation. Other variables subject to the analysis in Chapter 4 were not 
repeated in this appendix because the underlying data and results for these other 
variables is the same as the underlying data and results subject to this additional 
statistical analysis.  The hypothesis by which the comparison of arbitration to mediation 
would be framed to be tested and the related null hypothesis tested would be stated as 
follows: 
 
 Hypothesis: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite 
measure when compared to mediation 
o Null Hypothesis: No relationship between law enforcement workforce 
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs 
composite measure when compared to mediation 
 
Based upon the results in the following tables, the null hypothesis result is as 
follows: The null hypothesis of no relationship was not rejected when compared to 
mediation as results do not indicate potential relationship. 
 Significance <.05: Arbitration does not appears to be significant  
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Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 62.322 36.173  1.723 .086   
High School Graduates -58.975 44.875 -.102 -1.314 .190 .674 1.483 
Median HH Inc (000) .314 .131 .190 2.400 .017 .652 1.533 
Non Right-to-Work State -7.748 6.046 -.108 -1.282 .201 .579 1.728 
County Local Govt 24.156 9.957 .159 2.426 .016 .958 1.044 
Arb (v. Med) 5.001 6.331 .067 .790 .430 .565 1.769 
Non-Col Bargain (v. Med) -.354 6.094 -.004 -.058 .954 .694 1.442 
a. Dependent Variable: HPRC 
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APPENDIX H: HYOTHESES 3 FULL VARIABLE RESULT TABLE 
As identified in Chapter 4 – Findings, the initial statistical output for all variables 
resulted in many variables having a very high significance factor which increased the 
risk that the output results could not be evaluated as well. Therefore, a second analysis 
was performed for refined control variables that were below a significance of .250 with 
such results available in Chapter 4 – Findings for the Hypotheses 3. The following is the 
initial statistical output performed, of which, the initial observations are also included.   
 
High Performance Return on Costs illustrates the following via SPSS linear 
regression: 
 Model Summary - r square: .066 which indicates on average the model’s 
predictions are 6% better than guessing the mean; essentially the model is no 
better than guessing the mean. The large variance between the r square (.066) 
and adjusted r square (.012) are also indicative of poor model of data producing 
results.     
 ANOVA – F value: 1.219 and significance of .266 which indicates that the overall 
model produces better results than simply guessing the mean. 
 VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst 
the variables. The low scores indicate that the independent variables are not 
heavily inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.  
 Coefficients: 
o Significant (<.05): Median household income appears to be significant 
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-score:  
 Median household income ($000) (beta .217 and t-statistic 2.17) 
with an unstandardized coefficient B of .36 that for every unit 
change of $1000 in the median household income (mean 59.0 
($000) or $59,000), there is a .36 increase in the high performance 
return on costs composite performance index (mean 27.3)  
 
Therefore, as median household incomes increases, the high performance return 
on costs scores for law enforcement services also increase. All of the other variables 
were not significant enough to warrant any further analysis in regards to relationship to 
HPRC. 
 
Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which illustrated no relationship basis 
for non-collective bargaining, mediation or arbitration, it would appear that the null 
hypotheses 3A and 3B cannot be rejected as there appears to be no relationship 
between these elements of law enforcement workforce classification and high 
performance return on costs for law enforcement services. 
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .257
a
 .066 .012 35.72022 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, 
County Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), 
City Local Govt, Unemployment Rate, Med, Right-to-Work State, High 
School Graduates, Median HH Inc (000) 
 
 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
1 
Regression 20227.254 13 1555.943 1.219 .266
b
 
Residual 285809.196 224 1275.934   
Total 306036.450 237    
a, Dependent Variable: HPRC 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County Local 
Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, 
Unemployment Rate, Med, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates, Median 
HH Inc (000) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardiz
ed 
Coefficient
s 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
 
(Constant) 89.870 45.359  1.981 .049   
Population (000) -.007 .017 -.030 -.408 .684 .758 1.320 
Bond Rating Adj 
Scale 
.428 3.601 .008 .119 .905 .860 1.163 
High School 
Graduates 
-78.492 55.886 -.136 -1.405 .162 .443 2.255 
Median HH Inc (000) .359 .166 .217 2.168 .031 .416 2.406 
Density 
6.415E-
005 
.002 .003 .038 .970 .733 1.365 
Unemployment Rate -82.492 
114.03
0 
-.062 -.723 .470 .568 1.760 
Age15to24% 27.284 29.408 .070 .928 .355 .730 1.369 
Survey-Quality of Life -8.157 23.602 -.036 -.346 .730 .385 2.598 
Non Right-to-Work 
State 
-8.554 6.259 -.119 -1.367 .173 .551 1.816 
City Local Govt -5.986 7.070 -.066 -.847 .398 .677 1.478 
County Local Govt 19.734 12.761 .129 1.546 .123 .595 1.682 
Med  (v. NCB) 2.173 6.455 .029 .337 .737 .566 1.765 
Arb  (v. NCB) 5.392 7.496 .072 .719 .473 .411 2.431 
a. Dependent Variable: HPRC 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
303 
 
VITA 
 
Joseph Patrick Casey was born April 28, 1964 in Washington DC and is an American 
citizen. He graduated North Brunswick Township High School, North Brunswick, New 
Jersey in 1982. He graduated with a Bachelor of Science from University of Richmond, 
Virginia in 1986 and with a Masters in Public Administration from Virginia 
Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia in 1995. He is currently employed as a 
Deputy County Manager with County of Henrico, Virginia; a county he has worked since 
January 2013. Previously he was employed from 1986 – 1990 rising to a senior 
accountant with KPMG; an international accounting firm and from 1990 – 2013 rising to 
a Deputy County Administrator with the County of Hanover, Virginia. He currently 
resides in Mechanicsville, Virginia with his wife Suzanne and three sons, Harrison, 
Patrick and Jackson. 
 
